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ABSTRACT 
 
Discriminatory related party transactions (DRPTs) are non-arm’s length transactions with 
related parties of controlling shareholders for private benefit at the cost of other shareholders. 
This is a governance issue between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in both 
developed and developing countries. However, most studies on DRPTs are in developed 
countries with the few exceptions of studies in China, India and Mexico.  
 
In 2006, listed companies in Bangladesh were subjected to corporate governance reforms 
through the SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-08 order issued by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Bangladesh. The reforms have potential to curb DRPTs. However, 
prior studies on the effectiveness of corporate governance reform in protecting minority 
shareholders from DRPTs in a developing country have been limited. The few evaluations 
undertaken in China and India have been narrowly focused. Therefore, this area of literature is 
open to further development. Moreover, there has been limited systematic effort to develop a 
sound measures for such discriminatory transactions at the company level. One notable measure 
is the Anti-self Dealing Index which is a comprehensive index to measure DRPTs at the country 
level. At the company level, several researchers simply use total dollar amount of RPTs as a 
proxy for DRPTs. Alternatively, some other researchers use selected RPTs or some derivatives 
of related party transactions as a measure of DRPT. However, all of these company level 
measures are based on weak theoretical underpinnings and therefore prone to high measurement 
error.  
IX 
 
Considering the limited research on these two related areas of the measurement of DRPTs and 
the effectiveness of corporate governance reforms in curtailing DRPTs, this thesis develops two 
objectives. The first objective is to develop a new improved measure for DRPTs. To achieve the 
first objective, this thesis develops and tests a measure that seeks to distinguish the proportion of 
transactions in total RPTs that is discriminatory from the proportion that is based on legitimate 
business motives. Type 1 and Type 2 error rates and power of the new measurement are 
compared with an existing measure using computer simulated and real data. The capital market 
sensitivity of the new measure is also tested and compared with an existing measure. The new 
measure is found to be superior to the existing measure.   
The second objective of the thesis is to investigate the effectiveness of Bangladesh’s 2006 
reforms for protecting minority shareholders from DRPTs. For this Oliver Williamson’s Market 
and Hierarchy model is used as a theoretical framework. Using this framework, several research 
questions are developed and tested.  
A mixed methods approach is used to obtain evidence to address the research questions. Panel 
data regression modes and growth curve models are run using quantitative data collected from 
annual reports for a sample of companies and from a publication of the stock exchange. Then 
semi-structured interviews with directors, independent directors and audit committee members 
are undertaken and the transcripts are qualitatively analysed.  
Both the quantitative and qualitative methods identify the limitation and factors that affect the 
implementation and enforcement of the governance requirements as set out in the 2006 reform  
for controlling DRPT practices in Bangladesh. The panel data regression results of the 
quantitative analysis section show no improvement of the corporate governance variables in 
X 
 
reducing DRPTs in the post reform period. However, growth curve modelling results shows that 
independent directors are becoming significantly effective in reducing DRPTs over the post-
2006 period of years under study. 
The interviews reveal perspectives of key players about flaws in the selection of independent 
directors and inexperience of independent directors in their role. They reveal that most of the 
independent audit committee members are either retired bureaucrats or academics. Many of 
them frankly acknowledge their deficiencies in accounting knowledge and experience. 
Moreover, the interviews with directors suggest that many independent directors do not speak 
out to protect minority shareholders’ interests mainly because of their friendly relationship with 
the chair or controlling shareholders group who recruited him/her to the board. The results of 
both the qualitative and quantitative analysis show that a lack of accounting education and 
experience hinders the audit committee’s activities. The interviews further reveal that 
independent directors are motivated to learn the job in concern for their social reputation. This 
motivation does indicate potential improvement in their performance over coming years. The 
inference from quantitative and qualitative findings is that independent directors in Bangladesh 
are currently in learning phase and have the potential to become effective in protecting minority 
shareholders in the future.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Within the last decade, shareholder activism has drawn attention to the plight of minority 
shareholders who claim to experience behaviour by controlling shareholders that is 
oppressive, prejudicial and discriminatory. Such behaviour is most notably manifest in 
discriminatory related party transactions (hereafter DRPTs) that are pursued for the self-
interest of the controlling shareholders.1 The term ‘discriminatory’ is used in the dictionary 
sense of ‘setting up exceptional treatment against or in favour of particular groups’ (Oxford 
Dictionary 2013). The groups to which this term is applied in this study are controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. DRPTs are non-arm’s length transactions by a 
company with its own controlling shareholders or their associated parties, and have the effect 
of favouring controlling shareholders at the cost of the minority shareholders. Empirical 
research confirms that controlling shareholders resort to DRPTs for private benefit at the cost 
of minority shareholders (Gao and Kling 2008, Cheung et al. 2006, Atanasov 2005, Dow and 
McGuire 2009, Peng et al. 2010, Dahya et al. 2008). DRPTs are found to erode firm value 
(Peng et al. 2010, Atanasov et al. 2010, Jiang et al. 2010) and  many of the notorious 
                                               
1 Various terms, such as tunnelling, self-dealing transactions, minority shareholder expropriation have been used 
for such behaviour of controlling shareholders to the minority shareholders.  However, no unique term has been 
used in literature to describe this discriminatory behaviour of controlling shareholders.  ‘Discretionary Related 
Party Transaction’ is used in this thesis to describe this behaviour of the controlling shareholders of a company. 
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corporate collapses in the twenty-first century are associated with DRPTs (Ge et al. 2010, 
Gallery et al. 2008). Considering the significance of curbing DRPTs, many countries have 
reformed their corporate sector to give better protection to minority shareholders from such 
transactions through preventative mechanisms and various remedies. Although studies on 
DRPTs have been undertaken in many developed countries (e.g Gallery et al. 2008, Kohlbeck 
and Mayhew 2010, Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2005, Gordon et al. 2004), there is a dearth of 
research on DRPTs in developing countries.  A few notable exceptions to studies of related-
party transactions in developing countries are studies in China (Gao and Kling 2008, Cheung 
et al. 2009a, Peng et al. 2010, Ge et al. 2010, Jiang et al. 2010), in  Mexico (Silanes et al. 
2003) and in India (Bertrand et al. 2002, Black and Khanna 2007).  
 
Minority shareholder protection from discriminatory related-party transactions (DRPTs) by 
controlling shareholders is the issue of focus in this study. Two particular areas of deficiency 
in the body of research on this issue are addressed. They are the development and validation 
of an improved measure of DRPTs, and the establishing of evidence on the degree of 
effectiveness of corporate governance reforms for controlling DRPTs in an emerging 
economy, Bangladesh. 
In 2006, listed companies in Bangladesh were subjected to corporate governance reforms 
through an order, SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin/02-08, issued by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Bangladesh.2 These reforms, which are detailed later in this thesis, 
require a listed company to: (a) appoint independent directors to its board, (b) publish a 
directors’ certification about the fairness of financial statements prepared by management and 
the soundness of the internal control system, (c) form an audit committee, (d) restrict external 
auditors in the provision of non-audit services, and (e) implement various other governance-
                                               
2 The order stipulates that the reforms should be complied with by all listed companies; if not complied with, 
companies should give an explanation for that.  
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related mechanisms. All these reforms are new to Bangladesh and have potential to curb 
DRPTs. It can be argued that corporate governance reform initiatives are only meaningful if 
they achieve their objectives. Post-implementation reviews of reform initiatives can highlight 
the need for modification in particular requirements that are found to be ineffective or 
dysfunctional. Such reviews need to be well-informed and evidence-based. Although some 
studies have been undertaken into corporate governance either during or after the 
implementation of the 2006 reforms in Bangladesh, with the exception of two studies 
(Siddiqui 2010, Azim and Rahman 2008), none of these prior studies focus on the 2006 
corporate governance reforms. In his study of the 2006 reforms, Siddiqui (2010) questions the 
suitability of the reforms in Bangladesh, but does not investigate the effectiveness of the 
reforms in general or evaluate the reforms from the perspective of DRPTs. The study by Azim 
and Rahman (2008) only surveys the reform compliance reporting in its first year of 
implementation. 
Reform compliance imposes an additional cost on companies. If the reforms aimed at 
protecting minority investors fail to significantly reduce discriminatory transactions or other 
discriminatory behaviour of controlling shareholders, then the reform costs involved for a 
company means that minority investor are in a worse situation than they were in the pre-
reform period. Past studies have investigated the cost and benefit of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 
to US companies (Zhang 2007, Doyle et al. 2007, Iliev 2010, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009, 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008), and corporate governance reform effectiveness in some other 
countries (Mengoli et al. 2009, Mukherjee-Reed 2002, Hutchinson et al. 2008). There have 
also been studies on the effectiveness of governance reform in preventing DRPTs in 
developed countries mainly the USA (Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2007) and Australia 
(Gallery et al. 2008). However, no study has investigated how effective corporate governance 
reforms have been in protecting minority shareholders from DRPTs in a developing country, 
other than a cursory  evaluation in India by Jiang et al (2010). Therefore, this area of 
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investigation on the effectiveness of governance reforms in developing countries remains 
largely untapped.  
In quantitative research, accurate measurement of variables is pivotal. Error in measurement 
of variable may lead to biased and inconsistent estimation of coefficients in regression 
analysis (Wooldridge 2003). Though there are several studies on DRPTs in developed 
countries, there is a dearth of systematic effort to develop a measurement for such 
discriminatory transactions except for one notable exception, the Anti-self Dealing Index by 
Djankov et al. (2008) which is a comprehensive index to measure DRPTs. However, this 
index is developed to measure minority shareholders protection from DRPTs at the country. 
For measurement at the company level, several researchers use the total dollar amount of 
related party transactions (RPTs) as a proxy for DRPTs (Gordon et al. 2004, Kohlbeck and 
Mayhew 2005, Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2010). Some other researchers use selected RPTs or 
some derivatives of related party transactions as a measure of DRPT (Cheung et al. 2009a, 
Cheung et al. 2006). However, all of these measures are based on weak theoretical 
underpinnings, and therefore are prone to high measurement error. As mentioned in a later 
chapter, empirical studies have to date found inconsistent relationships between/among 
DRPTs and other variables which may be due to poor construct validity of current DRPT 
measures. A precise DRPT measure with improved construct validity may resolve these 
anomalies in this area of literature.    
1.2 Objectives and Significance of the Study 
Considering the importance of minority shareholders protection from DRPTs and the 
deficiencies in the research in this area, the present study seeks to achieve the following 
objectives: 
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Objective 1: 
To develop and validate a new measure for the concept, discriminatory related-party 
transactions (DRPTs), as an improved estimation of the extent to which controlling 
shareholders use RPTs to unfairly prejudice minority shareholders rights.  
 
Objective 2: 
To assess the effectiveness of the 2006 corporate governance reforms in Bangladesh  
in terms of the impacts of various governance mechanisms required by the reforms on 
minority shareholders’ protection from DRPTs by controlling shareholders. 
Given the potential significance of the 2006 reforms for protecting minority shareholders 
from DRPTs, it is both timely and important to investigate the extent to which the reforms 
have been effective to curb DRPTs in Bangladeshi companies. The contribution of the 
research lies in the fact that no study has been done so far that investigates the post-reform 
governance practices of listed companies in Bangladesh in a way that seeks to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the reforms from the perspective of DRPTs. It is expected  that this study will 
be informative to policy-makers in both Bangladesh and other developing countries in respect 
of the refinement of existing governance requirements/guidelines and their implementation by 
listed companies. It is also expected to contribute to the research literature on minority 
shareholder protection by establishing a more valid and precise measure of the discriminatory 
component of RPTs.   
Measuring DRPTs is important both for theoretical and practical purposes. Minority 
shareholder protection has been recognised as a major factor associated with capital market 
development which, in turn, positively affects economic development. A sound measure of 
DRPTs at the country level can help international investors make their investment portfolio 
allocation decision among countries. At a company level, this measure helps investors’ 
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decisions on the allocation of equity investments among companies. Apart from these 
practical implications, a more precise and valid DRPT measure can lead to improved 
modelling and testing of theoretical relationships between various corporate governance and 
other company-specific variables and the extent to which minority shareholders are 
discriminated against by controlling shareholders through the primary vehicle of RPTs.  
 
1.3 Motivation of the Study 
The significance of this study has been discussed above in terms of, first, identifying a 
deficiency in the literature concerning the measurement of the DRPT construct and, second, 
providing new evidence about the effectiveness of the corporate governance reforms in 
Bangladesh and, by inference, other developing countries.  These two matters also form the 
motivation for this study.  
To elaborate, the primary motivation is to make a contribution to the under-researched area of 
corporate governance that deals with minority shareholder protection. The importance of this 
area has been established due to the emergence of evidence that diffuse corporate ownership 
around the world is relatively uncommon and that most corporations are controlled by large 
blockholders (LaPorta et al. 1998, Holderness 2009, Berkman et al. 2009).  Consequently, the 
primary concern of corporate governance has shifted from mitigating the agency conflicts 
between firm managers and diffuse shareholders (Berle and Means 1932, Jensen and 
Meckling 1976) to protecting minority shareholders from expropriation by the controlling 
blockholder(s) and their management team (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Johnson et al. 2000). 
In developing economies where State-based organizations and/or families are large 
blockholders, the protection of minority shareholders should be regarded as a major 
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regulatory objective of those responsible for controlling the securities market (Tomasic and 
Neil 2007).  
Underlying this primary motivation is the need for an improved measure in the literature of 
the extent of discriminatory actions by controlling shareholders against minority shareholders 
through related-party transactions. The measurements used in the literature for distinguishing 
between the discriminatory and non-discriminatory related party transactions have been weak 
in face validity and, in this sense, are high in measurement error. The construct validity of a 
measurement scale is a pre-requisite for making sound statistical inferences. Quantitative 
researchers using measures with high measurement error, due to the poor validity or reliability 
of the measure, are subject to bias and inconsistency in their results.  
 
A further motivation for this study is that the findings can have practical consequences. First, 
they can provide insights to Bangladeshi capital market policy makers. Bangladesh, a south 
Asian country struggling for poverty reduction and economic development, has a smaller less 
developed capital market than its neighbouring countries (Siddiqui 2010). A more developed 
capital market can aid a country’s economic growth by turning domestic savings into 
investment as well as attracting foreign investment. Market economists provide argument and 
evidence of positive relationships between a developed stock market, economic growth and 
capital accumulation (Levine and Zervos 1998, Levine 1997). Investor protection is 
considered one of the key criterion for developing a capital market, serving to boost investor 
confidence particularly amongst minority shareholders (Atanasov et al. 2010, Black and 
Khanna 2007). Second, the findings of this study can potentially guide Bangladeshi economic 
policy makers on foreign investment. Land, capital, organization and labour are the four basic 
ingredients for production. Though Bangladesh lacks the first three, it has a comparative 
advantage in labour. With a total population of 160 million, Bangladesh’s labour cost on 
average is about one third of that in China (Chowdhury 2012). Bangladesh has a comparative 
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advantage in labour cost compared to many other countries in the world. Therefore, 
Bangladesh could develop its economy with the help of foreign investment and knowhow. 
Bangladesh has taken the initiative to attract foreign investments.3 But investor protection is 
crucial to attract foreign investment. If a country’s corporate governance and capital markets 
regulators cannot ensure that foreign investors’ money will not be eroded by illegitimate 
tunnelling of asset by local controlling shareholders, then foreign investors will be less likely 
to invest in that country. This research can shed light on what specific aspects of the 2006 
reforms, if any, have been effective in limiting the extent of DRPTs in Bangladeshi 
companies, and what potential modification may be needed to make these reforms more 
effective.   
 
1.4 Thesis  Structure 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter two surveys the focal literature on corporate 
governance reform and DRPTs.  This chapter focuses mainly on literature from three topic 
areas: corporate governance reform, the phenomenon of tunnelling and RPTs, and 
measurement of DRPTs. The first part of this chapter discusses recent corporate governance 
reform around the world and the 2006 reform in Bangladesh. It also details the major reforms 
related to disclosure of RPTs around the world. The second part focuses on the concept and 
practice of DRPTs. It details the current literature on motivation and techniques for DRPTs by 
controlling shareholders and safeguards for preventing DRPTs in a corporation. The last part 
of the chapter details the current available measures of DRPTs and explains the rationale for 
development of a new measure. 
                                               
3 The investor incentive scheme for foreigners includes tax benefit and other facilities for foreign investors. For 
example, full income tax exemption for foreign technician employed in foreign companies for three years, full 
repatriation of capital investment,  Bangladeshi citizenship for investor of US$500,000 and permanent residency 
for investor of US$ 75,000 and so on. Bangladesh Bank 2012. 'Investment facilities.' http://www.bangladesh-
bank.org/investfacility/invesfac.php. 
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Chapter three explains the models used in this research, the rationale for their use and other 
related theories in this area of research. It then goes on to outline the research questions for 
the thesis and develops the quantitative models for answering those questions.  
Chapter four is on the research methods of the thesis. It contains broadly two parts: 
quantitative methods using secondary data from company reports and the share market, and 
qualitative methods using primary data from the text of management interviews. Both 
sections discuss sample size, sample selection procedure, and other research methods. The 
quantitative section further explains parameter estimation methods and measurement of 
variables used in the various models in the thesis.  
Chapter five is dedicated to the development of the new DRPTs measure. It explains the new 
measurement model, details the simulation procedure for testing it, and compares this new 
measure with a popular existing measure.  
Chapter six presents the result of the study. It contains two sub-parts: quantitative results and 
qualitative results. The quantitative section explains the results of the model developed to 
answer the research questions. The qualitative section provides insight on one of the research 
questions which cannot be addressed using quantitative methods. Chapter seven concludes the 
thesis and provides directions for future research.        
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REFORMS AND RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews relevant focal literature for the thesis. There are three main sections in 
this chapter: corporate governance reform, concepts and practices associated with DRPTs, and 
measurement of DRPTs. The first section reviews related literature on major corporate 
governance reform in countries around the world including Bangladesh and identifies the 
factors that influence violation of corporate governance safeguards for protecting minority 
shareholders. It shows the current evidence in the literature on how and why corporations do 
not comply with reforms. The second part reviews literature on DRPT focusing on motivators 
for DRPTs, safeguards against DRPTs, and quality and enforcement of DRPTs. The last 
section reviews the current measures for DRPTs and their limitations.   
 
 Page No. 11
2.2 Corporate Governance Reforms  
2.2.1 Reforms around the World    
Corporate governance reform initiatives date back to the late twentieth century, for example, 
the Cadbury Report (1992) and Greenbury Report (1995). At the beginning of the 1990s, the 
abuse of power, fraud, and pilferage of minority shareholders assets by Robert Maxwell at 
Maxwell Communication and Mirror Group newspapers gave the impetus for corporate 
governance reform in the UK. The Cadbury Report (1992) is considered as the first systematic 
approach to explicitly documenting the best practices of corporate governance that were 
implicit in many UK companies (Solomon 2007). After the Cadbury Report, there were  
corporate governance recommendations from several committees, for example, Greenbury 
Report (1995), Hample Report (1998) and Turnbull Report (1999). None of these reports were 
legislative reforms and therefore compliance with them was not mandatory for companies.  
 
Because of the demise of some giant corporations at the beginning of the twenty first century, 
mainly because of greed and power of some corporate management and controlling 
shareholders, many minority shareholders lost their investment in those companies. Many 
countries made legislative reforms of their corporate governance systems to protect investors, 
and others were influenced by international organization to reform their corporate sector. One 
of the major corporate governance reforms is the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
Investor Protection Act (popularly known as the Sarbanes Oxley Act, or SOX 2002). The 
winding up of Enron, the world biggest energy company, and the collaboration of its auditor 
Arthur Anderson in Enron’s governance malpractices, highlighted the need for US minority 
shareholders’ protection. SOX 2002 came into force in July 2002 and introduced several 
mechanisms aimed at protecting minority shareholders from DRPTs. These mechanisms 
included a ban on loans to executives and disclosures for purchase of securities by any 
directors or a shareholder holding more than ten percent shares. Apart from the specific 
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safeguards for DRPTs, SOX 2002 has some general safeguard. For example, it requires a 
listed company to appoint a majority of independent directors to its board, to require 
disclosure of CEO and CFO certifications about the fairness of financial statements prepared 
by management, to ensure the evaluation of the internal control system and the auditor’s 
attestation to this evaluation, to form an audit committee comprising independent directors, 
and to restrict external auditors in the provision of non-audit services.  
Like Enron in the USA, the HIH demise is considered the biggest corporate collapse in 
Australia. The fraud by one of the controlling shareholders Rodney Alder and some top level 
management led to billions of dollars of losses to minority shareholders. The Australian 
response to this corporate collapse was the promulgation of the Australian Securities 
Exchange’s (ASX) Corporate Governance Guidelines 2003 and the Federal Government’s 
Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure Act 2004 (arising from what is know as CLERP 9) 
(Hutchinson et al. 2008). Unlike SOX, CLERP 9-based legislation and ASX guidelines do not 
provide any specific safeguard from DRPT. However, they provide general safeguards for 
protection of minority shareholders. The CLERP 9-based legislation restricts the maximum 
hours of non-audit services by auditors, requires the CEO and CFO to give their opinion on 
proper compliance of accounting standards and maintenance of financial records of the 
company, and mandates directors to prepare a ‘Directors Report’ in the annual report in such 
a way that users can make assessment of the operation, financial position, business strategies 
and financial prospect for the next financial years. It further gives shareholders the right to 
participate in voting on the adoption of the remuneration report by directors and to ask 
questions about the remuneration report. Shareholders are also allowed to submit questions to 
the auditor about the audit. ASX guidelines add protection to minority shareholders on top of 
this legislation CLERP by requiring listed companies to appoint a majority of independent 
directors and have an independent chair of the board. The guidelines also require that the 
CEO and chair of the board should be two separate persons; companies should establish a 
 Page No. 13
nomination committee for the directors and disclose the process for evaluating the 
performance of the board, its committees and individual directors.  It also requires listed 
companies to establish an audit committee consisting of three non-executive directors, a 
majority of independent directors, and chaired by an independent director who is not the chair 
of the board. The ASX Corporate Governance Guidelines were released in March 2003 and 
there have been several subsequent amendments.  The latest version of the guideline came 
into effect on 1 January 2011. Unlike CLEPR 9, the ASX guideline has some flexibility in 
compliance. If a company cannot comply with any guideline, it should give an explanation. 
Recently, UK corporate governance was changed from voluntary compliance to mandatory 
compliance from 29 June 2010. All UK and foreign companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) must follow Corporate Governance Code 2010; in the case of non-
compliance, companies must explain the reason for that.  Like CLERP 9-based legislation and 
ASX guidelines, the LSE’s 2010 code does not provide specific protection for DRPTs but 
gives several general protections for minority shareholders. The rule requires, among other 
thing, the role of chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the same individual 
and forming an audit committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies two, 
independent non-executive directors. The reform mandates the chair of a board to discuss 
governance and strategy with shareholders and to ensure that the views of shareholders are 
communicated to the board as a whole and to arrange the audit, remuneration and nomination 
committees to be available to answer questions at the AGM and for all directors to attend.  
 
Apart from the USA, Australia and the UK, other countries also reformed their corporate 
governance in the last decade to protect minority shareholders. Tareq et al. (2011) present   
recent reforms to protect minority shareholders in different countries. They report that many 
countries have increased the disclosure requirement in general and particularly disclosure of 
related party transactions. Many countries have reformed the related party transaction (RPT) 
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approval procedure, some countries now require shareholders’ approval of RPTs (e.g. Israel, 
New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia) while others have the requirement of pre-review of RPTs by 
an external independent party (e.g. Egypt, Tajikistan, Tunisia), and many countries have made 
it easier for minority shareholders to sue directors for misconduct (e.g. Germany, India, 
Mexico, Tanzania). These reforms are summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Corporate Governance Reform around the World (2005-2010) 
2005-06 
 
Mexico, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sweden – increase disclosure requirement for companies.  
 
Germany, India, Mexico, Tanzania – make it easier to sue directors.  
 
China, Hong Kong and Tunisia – amend law to require companies to open books for 
shareholders inspection.  
 
Israel and New Zealand – require approval by shareholders for related party transactions.  
 
2006-07 
 
Belarus, Colombia, Georgia, Iceland, Indonesia, Vietnam – increase disclosure requirement. 
 
Georgia, Mozambique and Portugal – define duties for directors and controlling shareholders. 
 
Norway and Slovenia – require approval of shareholders for related party transactions. 
 
2007-08 
 
Albania, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Tajikistan – increase disclosure requirements. 
 
Albania, Botswana, Greece, Slovenia, Kyrgyz Republic and Thailand – make it easier to sue 
directors by the shareholders. 
 
Albania, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan – require approval of related party transactions by 
shareholders.  Egypt introduces prior review of related party transaction by external party.  
 
2008-2009 
Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Macedonia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, Tunisia and 
Ukraine – increase disclosure requirement.  
 
Dominican Republic, Macedonia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and Ukraine – require 
shareholders’ approval for related party transactions. Tajikistan and Tunisia - introduced prior 
review of related party transactions by external party. 
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Colombia, Dominican Republic, Macedonia, Rwanda and Tajikistan – make it easier to sue 
directors. Dominican Republic and Rwanda - allow access of company book by shareholders.  
 
2009-10 
 
Kazakhstan, Morocco, Swaziland and Tajikistan – reform for higher disclosure by companies.  
 
Chile, Swaziland and Sweden – require approval of related party transaction by shareholders. 
Sweden – also requires prior review of related party transaction by external parties.  
 
Georgia, Swaziland and Tajikistan – make it easier to access corporate information. 
Source: Tareq et al. (2011) 
 
 
2.2.2 Reforms of 2006 in Bangladesh 
The corporate governance reforms of 2006 in Bangladesh were initiated by the World Bank 
and IMF (Siddiqui 2010). Though Bangladesh has a history of extreme minority shareholder 
oppression by controlling shareholders (Uddin and Choudhury 2008), Bangladesh did not 
have a well formulated corporate governance guideline before the reform. According to 
section 45(1) of the Bank Company Act 1991, Bangladesh Bank (the central bank of 
Bangladesh) issues circulars for monitoring and regulating banks. Bangladesh Bank has 
issued several corporate governance circulars for commercial banks. However, some of these 
circulars were never followed by the commercial banks because of the influence of powerful 
founder shareholders. For example, BRPD circular no. 12 of 2003 requires commercial banks 
to have a maximum of 13 directors on their board and sets the maximum tenure of directors at 
six years (Bangladesh Bank 2003). However, powerful sponsor directors in many banks 
ensure banks seldom follow that guideline, have more than 13 directors on their board and  
directors hold their office for decades (Ahmed 2012a). Some guidelines may be followed but 
these have not been compatible with international guidelines and are seen to be ineffective in 
protecting minority shareholders. For example, BRPD circular no 12 of 2002 requires every 
commercial bank to form an audit committee without any requirement of independence and 
qualification of the members (Bangladesh Bank 2002a). The corporate governance guidelines 
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2006, which have similarities with other big reforms in the USA, Australia and UK, is the 
first initiative to bring good governance in the corporate sectors in Bangladesh. These 2006 
guidelines had the potential to protect minority shareholders from DRPTs. This legislative 
reform was influenced by international agencies to make Bangladesh’s corporate sector 
compatible to the developed world  (Siddiqui 2010). 
 
Although some studies have been undertaken into corporate governance both during and after 
the implementation of the 2006 reforms in Bangladesh, with the exception of two studies 
(Siddiqui 2010, Azim and Rahman 2008) none of the research focuses on the 2006 corporate 
governance reforms. For example: Amin and Tareq (2006) look at corporate governance 
disclosure; Imam and Malik (2007) investigate the link between ownership structure and firm 
performance; Farooque et al. (2007) examine the effect of board ownership on firm 
performance; Uddin and Choudhury (2008) explore the suitability of the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance in a less developed country like Bangladesh; Azim (2010) 
investigates the link between corporate monitoring mechanism and firm performance; and 
Kabir et al. (2011) examine the effect of big four audit affiliation on accrual quality of listed 
companies.   
 
Azim and Rahman (2008) study the 2006 reforms using corporate governance compliance 
reports in the annual reports of listed companies. Their study mainly focuses on how many 
companies complied with the reform requirements in the first year of implementation. They 
also explain the reforms’ importance for the Bangladeshi corporate sector. However, they do 
not evaluate the 2006 reforms’ effectiveness. 
 
In his study of the 2006 reforms, Siddiqui (2010) questions the suitability of the reforms in 
Bangladesh. His view has similarities with Mukherjee-Reed (2002) and Uddin and 
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Choudhury (2008) who opine that western style corporate governance is  unsuitable for 
developing countries. Using DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) institutional isomorphism 
perspective, Choudhury (2008) argues that coercive and mimetic pressures have influenced 
corporate governance reform. His contention is that the stockholder model of corporate 
governance implemented in Bangladesh is not consistent with the country’s socio-economic 
condition. Siddiqui proposes instead the stakeholder model for the Bangladeshi corporate 
sector. The main difference between the stockholder model and the stakeholder model lies in 
the philosophical position concerning in whose interest a company should act when doing 
business. According to the stockholder model, a company should serve the interests of the 
stockholders. In contrast, the stakeholder model posits that a company should be run in the 
best interests of its stakeholders. Siddiqui goes as far as to propose that there should be a 
representative from a bank and a labour union on the board of directors to implement a 
stakeholder based model, arguing that: 
Bangladesh has not been affected by the first phase of [the] global financial crisis, it is 
probable that it will be affected by the second phase of the crisis and export and 
remittances will suffer. This will deteriorate the unemployment rate, [the] wage rate 
and will affect [the] financial sector. Therefore, to protect the interest of employees 
and banks, there should be representatives from them in the corporate board (Siddiqui 
2010: Page 270).  
However, this argument is weak for two reasons. First, the corporate governance model of a 
country cannot be based on a temporary phenomenon like the global financial crisis, 
significant though that may be. Second, the proposal to adopt a stakeholder based model is 
based on the researcher's fear of a future economic downturn in the country's prosperity. 
Moreover, his argument lacks any empirical evidence and does not consider the fact that 
without proper enforcement corporate governance safeguard is not effective.  
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2.2.3 Background of the Reform 2006 
As mentioned in the earlier section, the 2006 corporate governance reforms in Bangladesh 
were initiated by the World Bank and IMF. The background of the international agencies 
initiative is associated with the context of Bangladesh’s socio-economic condition, its 
historical background, and its growing importance and integration to the world economy. 
Bangladesh was a British colony for 190 years before it became independent from colonial 
rule in 1947 along with India and Pakistan. The Indian subcontinent which comprised of 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh was divided in two countries based on religion: India and 
Pakistan. Bangladesh being a place with majority Muslim became a province of Pakistan. But 
after 24 years of economic and political discrimination and dominance of Pakistan, 
Bangladesh became an independent country through a bloody nine months long war in 1971. 
However, its political turbulence continued after independence. It was mainly governed by 
military rulers till 1990 when democratic government came to power through an election. It 
gradually started connecting with the rest of the world through open market economic policy 
in relatively more stable political condition than earlier. Its economy has grown at around 6% 
p.a. in recent years, specially its textile sector viewed as a tremendous development with the 
leverage of cheap labour. Many developed countries are now linked with Bangladesh as the 
buyer of textile products. Bangladesh is now the second largest garment exporters in the 
world followed by China. Moreover, many foreign investors have invested in textile and other 
sectors to use the cheap labour of Bangladesh. Therefore, its connection and integration with 
the rest of the world has increased a lot in recent years.        
Despite the trade and investment integration with other countries, the corporate sector in 
Bangladesh is in its infancy. The development of local corporate business in Bangladesh is 
very recent. Most of the big corporations were owned by Pakistan before independence in 
1971. After independence, Bangladeshi entrepreneurs started to set up their own corporate 
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businesses. Many multi-national companies have also opened their branches in Bangladesh. 
However, the local public corporations have yet to develop a pervasive corporate culture. 
Most of the local public companies are still run for the sole interest of founder shareholders. 
The minority shareholders’ interests are often ignored in corporations, and the SEC – the 
monitoring agency for public corporation – is weak (Kabir et al. 2011).          
Historically Bangladesh has suffered from various socio-political problems such as 
corruption, dominance and discrimination in society, as well as poor governance in private 
and public sectors in the pre- and post- independence periods (Belal and Cooper 2011). But 
Bangladesh lacks resources and expertise to solve these problems by itself alone.  
Development agencies including the World Bank and IMF are working in Bangladesh to 
mitigate these problems for the development of the country. In the backdrop of the growing 
integration of the Bangladesh economy with rest of the world and dependence on international 
assistance, the World Bank and IMF initiated the corporate governance reform in 2006 
through the SEC. The intention of the reform was to align the corporate governance of 
Bangladeshi companies with that of the developed countries. 
 
2.2.4 Decoupling in Reform Compliance  
The above two sections describe different corporate governance reforms around the world, 
including Bangladesh, to protect minority shareholders. However, the appearance of adoption 
of reforms by corporations may be achieved, even though actual practice is only loosely 
coupled to the formal requirements of the system concerned. Deviation of real practice from 
prescribed practice is common in organizations (Uddin and Choudhury 2008, Tilcsik 2010).  
 
The degree of potential power and the opportunity for private benefits of controlling parties in 
an organization are two major factors that can prevent that organization from adopting reform. 
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As an illustration, state and local government accounting was reformed in the US in 1979. 
This reform required all state and local governments to change their exiting cash-based 
accounting to an accrual basis. The state of Delaware pretended to accept and used the accrual 
accounting system for years while using cash-based systems till the early nineties. Powerful 
bureaucrats in the Delaware state government used this strategy for their self-interest 
(Carpenter and Feroz 2001). Similar deceptive behaviours are seen in the adoption of 
corporate governance practices too. In the 1970s and 1980s a substantial number of large US 
firms adopted long term compensation plans for CEOs but did not actually put them into 
practice  (Wetphal and Zajac 1994). A long term performance-based compensation plan is 
designed to align the CEO’s and shareholders goals. The long-term compensation plan has the 
effect of curtailing the power of CEOs to manipulate quarterly or annual performance 
reporting and, therefore, their compensation bonuses. Power and self-interest had allowed 
company CEOs to manipulate performance-based compensation plans in the 70s and 80s. 
Such opportunistic management behavours in organizations are sometimes so deep rooted that 
it persists even after major governance reform.  For example, during the Soviet Union’s 
regime, funds were allocated to government organizations according to discretionary 
decisions of powerful bureaucrats, which were not transparent. After the fall of the communist 
regime, Russian organizations introduced a transparent formula for allocating budgets to 
different subsidiary organizations. However, because of the influence of powerful 
bureaucrats, organizations continued to use the old system and adopted the new transparent 
systems merely symbolically (Tilcsik 2010).          
 
Many  corporations in Bangladesh are run by politically-connected powerful members of the 
sponsor’s family who make all major decisions, while following state laws as a matter of 
formality (Uddin and Choudhury 2008). The effectiveness of the 2006 corporate governance 
 Page No. 21
reforms lies in their potential to curtail the opportunistic behaviour of controlling 
shareholders, usually a controlling family group.  
 
An annotated summary of decoupling of laws and regulations from their implementation is 
given in Table 2.2. A common finding arising from these studies is the deviation of real 
practice from required practice which is common in many organizations. This deviation is 
mainly due to the high power and private benefits of the powerful actors (i.e. controlling 
shareholder-director, chairperson, CEO) in the organizations.  
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Table 2.2 : Salient Research on Decoupling in Reform Compliance 
Author(s) Country Findings 
Wetphal and Zajac (1994) 
  
USA This paper investigates CEOs’ influence on board for adopting long term compensation plan for 
CEOs. Using data collected from 570 big US firms, the researchers find that substantial number of 
firms adopted long term compensation plan of CEOs but did not actually practice that for three 
reasons: power of CEOs to enhance their legitimacy while minimizing risk in their compensation 
contract, stakeholder impression management and the increasing legitimation of long term 
compensation contract.    
Carpenter and Feroz (2001) USA This paper investigates how the four US state governments, New York, Michigan, Ohio, and 
Delaware, response to the reform of accounting system from cash basis to accrual basis.  
Interviewing several key state government officials of the four state governments, the researchers 
report that three of the state adopted the accrual accounting system. Delaware state government, 
however, used a manipulative strategy of pretending to accept the new change but practicing the 
old one to protect the interest of the powerful bureaucrats in that state government.   
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Author(s) Country Findings 
Fiss and Zajac (2004) Germany This study investigates factors that influenced the adoption of US style shareholder value based 
corporate governance system in Germany in 1990s and whether the firms really practiced the US 
corporate government system or decoupled from the real practice. .Using data from 1990 to 2000 
of 112 companies the investigators find that owners groups (e.g., banks, institutional investors, 
governments, and families) and CEO education are positively related to US style corporate 
governance adoption in German. The researchers also find that German firms decouple from the 
standard governance system.  
Tilcsik (2010) Russia This paper investigates why organizations deviates actual practice from rules in Russia. Using 
interviews and document analysis the researchers reports that ideology and personal interest of 
powerful organizational member leads to deviation of actual practice from organizational rules in 
Russia. 
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2.3 Discriminatory Related Party Transactions 
 
2.3.1 Different DRPTs for Private Benefit    
 
In the above section, it is suggested that controlling shareholders, particularly influential 
founder families, would be able to continue their legacy of attaining excess private-benefit 
from the company as they had been doing in the pre-reform period. The most widely research 
method through which controlling shareholders can expropriate private benefits from their 
company is transactions with related-parties. Such transactions can ‘tunnel’ the company’s 
cash and assets to related parties by way of non-arm’s length company sales at a discount, 
purchases at a premium, loans at no/low interest or private equity placements at a discount.     
Selling an asset at lower price or acquiring an asset at higher price from related parties of the 
controlling shareholders will benefit controlling shareholders while causing a reduction in the 
company’s profitability, net cash position and net assets, thereby, unfairly prejudicing the 
company’s returns to and net wealth for minority shareholders.  
 
Prior studies have provided evidence of this discriminatory practice. Examples of this 
phenomenon are found in several studies. First, the study  by Cheung et al. (2009b) finds that 
listed companies in Hong Kong sell assets to related parties at much lower price than similar 
arm’s length transactions; and when these companies buy asset from related parties they pay 
more than market price. A similar scenario is revealed by Ge et al. (2010) in China that shows 
Chinese listed firms sell assets to related parties at unfavourable terms which affects their 
market value. Companies buy/sell not only assets but also goods at favourable terms to related 
parties.  Empirical research shows that companies give favourable terms to related parties in 
selling at a price below fair value, and purchase of goods at a price above fair value, for the 
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benefit of controlling shareholders at the cost of minority shareholders (Cheung et al. 2009a, 
Cheung et al. 2006).  
Second, related party lending is another common way of private benefit for controlling 
shareholders in developing countries. The study by Silanes et al. (2003) shows that Mexican 
banks loan to a related party enjoys on average about four percent lower interest rate and 
lower credit worthiness than that other loans. Jiang et al. (2010) finds evidence of non-arm’s 
length deals in related party loans in China. The study reveals that Chinese firms related 
parties’ loans significantly affect their market value, which indicates Chinese companies 
provide favourable loan terms to related parties. A similar picture is unveiled by  Kahle and 
Shastri  (2004)  in the USA and Gallery et al (2008) in Australia.  
 
Third, controlling shareholders may resort to private placement of equities for private benefit. 
Private placement of equity is shares issued to a particular investor(s) generally chosen by the 
controlling shareholders of a company. In the case of a private placement the controlling 
shareholders may sell shares to a related party at a lower price than the market (for listed 
companies) or the net asset value of the company (for private companies and non-listed 
companies) which not only changes the ownership structure but also tunnels out resources at 
the expense of the minority shareholders. A recent investigation by the Ministry of Finance in 
Bangladesh demonstrates that there had been significant transfer of shareholders wealth from 
companies to controlling shareholders through private placement of shares at prices 
significantly less than the market price (Ministry of Finance Bangladesh 2011).   
 
See Table 2.3 for a summary of relevant empirical studies on this phenomenon of DRPTs.  
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Table 2.3: Summary of Salient Research on Different Types of DRPTs 
 
 
Author(s) Country Findings 
Silanes (2003)  Mexico Analysing 1500 sample loans of 17 Mexican banks, the researchers find that loan to related party enjoys 
on average about four percent lower interest rate and have lower credit worthiness than that of other 
loans. 
Gordon et al.(2004) USA Using 878 transactions from112 publicly traded companies the study shows nature and type of RPTs in 
the US. The result shows the maximum number of the related party transactions is with non-executives 
directors followed by chair of the board. The transactions types are:  goods or service provided or 
received, sale or purchase of asset, loan and investment with related parties. 
 
Kahle and Shastri 
(2004) 
USA The result finds that loan given to executives have interest rate below the market rates. This suggests 
tunnelling minority asset by RPT loans.  
 
Gallery et al. (2008) Australia Using companies listed on ASX the researchers conclude that controlling shareholders tunnel out 
resources from company through related party payments and loans.  
 
Chueng et al. (2009b) Hong Kong Comparing 254 related party and arm’s length transactions the researchers show that companies in 
Hong Kong sell assets to related parties at much lower price than similar arm’s length transaction. But 
when these companies buy asset from related parties they pay more than market price. 
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Author(s) Country Findings 
Ge et al. (2010) China Using data from top 100 listed firms in China, the researchers show that Chinese firms tunnel out 
minority shareholders asset through sale of goods and assets to related parties.  
 
Jiang et al. (2010) China Using a data of 1377 firms from 1996 to 2004 the researchers find that Chinese firms’ loans to related 
parties significantly affect market value of those companies.   
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2.3.2 Other Techniques for Private Benefits by Controlling Shareholders  
Though related party transactions are primarily used by controlling shareholder for their 
private benefit, literature shows that they (controlling shareholders) sometimes use some other 
techniques for their private benefit which discriminate minority shareholders. These 
techniques are described in this section. 
  
The seminal finance theory of Miller and Modigliani (1961)  states that in a well-functioning  
market and tax and transaction costless world,  the dividend payout ratio has no effect on 
corporate value. In practice  the  dividend decision is made taking  into  consideration many 
factors, for example,  the  effect of  the  dividend rate on  share price, the tax effects of paying 
dividends and so on.  Of late,  researchers have  seen the dividend payout decision as a means 
of expropriating from minority shareholders (Faccio et al. 2001, La Porta et al. 2000). 
Controlling shareholders (who in many cases are the directors of a company or control the 
directors of a company) keep the dividend payout ratio low to retain profit within the 
company. This retained profit can be used by controlling shareholders to invest in projects 
that yield private benefits, or to tunnel monies out to firms where they have higher ownership. 
This idea is supported by the empirical finding which shows that dividend rates are lower in 
countries where there are more controlling shareholders and more family firms—for example, 
in Asian countries (Faccio et al. 2001); on the other hand  countries with higher legal 
protection for minority shareholders, such as  common law countries,  have higher dividend 
payout ratios  than civil law countries (La Porta et al. 2000). The investigation by the Ministry 
of Finance of Bangladesh reveals that many companies do not provide cash dividend to 
shareholders even through in their opinion they have enough liquidity for paying out 
dividend. Many companies give stock dividends to shareholders just to maintain the market 
price high  (Ministry of Finance Bangladesh 2011).  
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Propping up a company is another technique which has potential to discriminate minority 
shareholders. Though propping transactions apparently seems to be beneficial to minority 
shareholders, the benefit of transactions are complex to judge because of the clandestine 
nature of the transaction (Friedman et al. 2003, Dow and McGuire 2009). Moreover, propping 
may be motivated by the controlling shareholders’ future expropriations (Bertrand et al. 
2002). Therefore, propping transactions have the potential to benefit controlling shareholders 
at the cost of minority shareholders. Dow and McGuire (2009) study propping in Japanese 
firms. The study is based on a data set on Japanese companies from 1991 to 2001 in mainly 
Keiretsu groups. Many Japanese companies belong to Keuretsu – a type of business group 
many of which date back to pre - World-War II. Stronger firms in a Keiretsu prop up weaker 
firms during recessions and tunnel out resources in a good economic environment through 
related party transactions (Dow and McGuire 2009). 
 
Discriminatory terms and conditions for minority shareholders is another ways to discriminate 
minority shareholders. For example, shareholders in many countries have the pre-emptive 
right to participate in a right Share or new equity issue by a company. However, sometimes 
conditions for exercising a pre-emptive right are so strict that minority shareholders cannot 
participate in an equity issue. For example, in Bulgaria minority shareholders could 
participate in a new equity issue before 2002. However, at that time the condition to exercise 
their pre-emptive right in new equity issues was strict. The notice period for purchasing a new 
issue was short and the equity was non-tradability. Therefore, many minority shareholders 
could not participate in the new equity issue even if the issue was at a discount. Controlling 
shareholders used to purchase a majority of the equity issued at a discount and thus ownership 
of existing shareholders become diluted and their stake in the company was eroded. The 2002 
amendment of Bulgarian security law requires companies to issue one warrant for each share, 
to give shareholders at least one month to exercise their right and to allow trading of those 
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warrants in the stock market. These amendments allowed more minority shareholders to 
participate in equity issues in Bulgaria and restricted controlling shareholders from diluting 
minority stakes in Bulgarian companies (Atanasov et al. 2010). The 2002 pre-reform period in 
Bulgaria has a similar effect to the attempt to sue controlling shareholders by minority 
shareholders in Bangladesh. The terms and conditions for suing controlling shareholders by 
the minority shareholders are so strict that they (minority shareholders) virtually can never sue 
controlling shareholders for their discriminating behaviour against them. According to 
Section 233 of the Company Act 1994, minority shareholders in aggregate must have at least 
10% of the company’s shares in order to appeal to the court if they think that any decision is 
taken against their interest, or the company is run against their interest. This percentage of 
shareholders is so high that it makes controlling shareholders immunized from any legal 
actions by minority shareholders.  
 
 
 
2.3.3 Conditions that Motive DRPTs   
 
When controlling shareholders face lower cash flow rights and greater power (or voting 
control), then they will be experiencing two primary conditions that will motivate them to 
engage in DRPT practices. Formally, a 50%+ share of a company is required to control it. 
However, in reality, a 20% (or even 10%) ownership of a company can be sufficient to 
control its board and top management decisions. For example, Bill Gates (23.7%) of 
MicroSoft Corporation, Mark Zuckerberg (22%) of Facebook, Mitsui Group (12.1%) of the 
Toyota Motor Corporation, Deutsche Bank (24.4%) of Deamler-Benz AG are all perceived as 
controlling shareholders. Such powerful shareholders are found to retains control in three 
ways: issuing dual class share, creating a pyramid ownership structure, and having cross-
holdings (Bebchuk et al. 2000, Johnson et al. 2000). Using these controlling mechanisms, a 
shareholder can gain control of a company with a minimum of cash flow rights. This 
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discrepancy between control and cash flow rights motivates controlling shareholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders’ rightful cash and assets through related party transactions 
(Bertrand et al. 2002, Bebchuk et al. 2000, Jiang et al. 2010).   These three mechanisms for 
control are further explained below. 
(i) Cross holding.  If firm F1 and F2 hold n% of share of each other, then shareholder 
S can have majority control of both companies by having (51-n) % of shares of 
each company.         
 
                                                                    S 
 
 
                                                                                               
 
 
Figure 2.1: Control by crossholding of share 
 
The cross holding of shares among companies is a mechanism of more control with 
less cash flow right. There is evidence that these cross holding firm structures are 
conducive to DRPTs (Dow and McGuire 2009, Bertrand et al. 2002). Industrial 
groups, for example, Japanese Keiretsu and Korean Choibol, are examples of cross 
holding of shares among related companies.  
 
(ii) Dual class share. Control can be retained by issuing dual class shares. Controlling 
shareholders can issue shares with reduced or no voting rights to outside 
shareholders and thus can finance the company without losing control.  Dual class 
shares allow controlling shareholders to fully control a company holding only a 
low percentage of cash flow right in a company. This disparity between control 
and ownership creates a conducive atmosphere for DRPTs by controlling 
      F1       F2 
(51-n)% (51-n)% 
n% 
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shareholders (Nenova 2003, Dyck and Zingales 2004). For example, the dual class 
share in News Corp. allows Rupert Murdoch to own 39% voting shares with only 
15% ownership of the company. 
(iii) Pyramidal ownership. This is a mechanism for controlling many companies by 
just holding controlling shares of the parent company and creating subsequent 
subsidiary companies. For example, if a shareholder, S, owns at least 51% of 
company F1 and F1 holds at least 51% of F2, and F2 holds at least 51% share of F3, 
then S also controls F2 and F3 holding 26.01% share of F2 and 13.27% share of F3. 
This way S can control firms by holding less shares down the chain. S can have 
majority control over Fn firm just by holding at least (0.51)n shares of that 
company.  
 
 
 
                                                                                    
 
 
 
 
                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Control by Pyramidal ownership 
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Therefore, with a small number of shares, one party can control other companies by using a 
pyramidal ownership structure. Enriques and Volpin (2007) find that powerful shareholders 
use the pyramidal structure to control a company with far less cash flow rights in that 
company. For example, in Italy, using the pyramidal ownership technique, Tronchetti  
Provera controls 18 percent of votes in Telecom Italia with only 0.7 percent cash flow rights 
in the company. This excess of voting control over cash flow rights motivates controlling 
shareholders to engage in self-interested transactions that supplement their cash flow rights 
(Riyanto and Toolsema 2008). 
   
2.3.4 Safeguards for DRPTs in Corporate Governance Reform  
Protection of minority shareholders from DRPTs and other oppressive and prejudicial 
behaviour of controlling shareholders is the main intention of corporate governance 
mechanisms that deal with the principal-principal problem, rather than the more common 
principal-agent problem. The common corporate governance safeguards against DRPTs and 
other discriminatory behaviour by powerful individuals are: competitive market mechanism, 
independent board members, the audit committee, an independent external auditor, and 
minority shareholders’ participation in financial decisions of the company that directly affect 
them. Many countries now require companies to install these safeguards though corporate 
governance reforms. Each type of safeguard is discussed in turn below. 
 
(i) Market Mechanism  
Market mechanisms can protect minority shareholders from controlling shareholders 
discriminatory behaviour, including DRPTs. Market mechanisms, such as a hostile takeover, 
can remove inefficient or corrupt management from corporations. Furthermore, the market 
can signal inefficiency and discriminatory behaviour of controlling shareholders by affecting 
the share price negatively. Market mechanisms could allow tunnelling out of resources by 
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taking excessive compensation (Borokhovich et al. 1997) and causing inefficiencies in the 
labour market for executives (Garvey and Gordon 1999). For efficient functioning of 
securities and labour markets, information asymmetry among corporate stakeholders needs to 
be reduced. Credibility of publicly available corporate information is pivotal. Stakeholders 
who use information for decision making may be misleaded by biased or even fraudulent 
information that can distort the market. While an efficient market is a means of safeguarding 
minority shareholders from discriminatory transactions of controlling shareholders, in many 
countries (especially in developing countries) the securities market does not have the size, 
diversity or enforceability of regulatory controls to be efficient. Therefore, these securities 
markets seldom give strong protection to minority shareholders from the discriminatory 
behaviour of controlling shareholders.     
 
(ii)Managements’ Legal Liability 
There is an incentive for managers to distort and/or hide information to achieve bonus 
payments for themselves (Watts and Zimmerman 1978, Watts and Zimmerman 1986). 
Likewise, there is an incentive for controlling shareholders to distort or hide information for 
their private benefit (La Porta et al. 2006). However, the controlling shareholders or top 
executives may not be brought to justice if they deny their association with any misconduct 
concerning the supply of information. Considering the importance of the certification by 
directors and top executives of corporate information disclosures, many countries have 
introduced requirements for certification of financial statements and assessment of internal 
control systems by top management. Section 302 of SOX requires chief executive officer’s 
(CEO) and chief financial officer’s (CFO) certification about the true and fair presentation of 
accounting information and maintaining a sound internal control system in the organization. 
Like SOX, CLERP 9 increases the responsibility of top management and directors in 
Australia. Two sections of the Corporations Law brought these new changes: Section 295(A) 
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and 299(A). According to section 295(A), the CEO and the CFO are required to give their 
opinion on the proper maintenance of financial records in the company, on the true and fair 
view of financial statements and on compliance with accounting standards and other related 
laws in the preparation of financial statements. Section 299(A) of the law requires directors to 
prepare the ‘Directors Report’ of the annual report in such a way that users can make 
assessment of the operations, financial position, business strategies and financial prospects for 
the next financial year.  
 
Like SOX in the USA and CLEPR 9 in Australia, the reform of 2006 in Bangladesh stipulates 
that directors should certify on the soundness of the internal control system, the 
appropriateness of accounting policies and accounting estimates, the application of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) in the preparation of financial 
statements, and the fairness in presentation of the financial statements by management. Prior 
evidence indicates that the evaluation and certification of the internal control system increases 
the information quality in the US  (Doyle et al. 2007, Iliev 2010) and in Australia (Hutchinson 
et al. 2008). However, no studies to date have directly investigated the relationship between 
the certification of internal controls and the incidence of DRPTs.   
 
(iii)Independent Directors 
The issue of the independence of directors, which can perhaps be traced back to the US 
Investment Company Act 1940, has been a theme of many corporate governance advocates 
(Farrar 2001). Independent directors neither hold executive positions nor have any pecuniary 
relationship with the company where they sit on the board. Therefore, they work as 
watchdogs of discriminatory behaviour including DRPTs of controlling non-independent 
directors. Past empirical studies support this idea. Most past studies document that 
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independent directors reduce DRPTs significantly. For example, Gallery et al. (2008), Gao et 
al. (2008), Dahya et al. (2008) and Cheung et al. (2009a) find an inverse relationship of 
related party transactions (RPTs) with number of independent directors on the board. 
However, Chung et al. (2006) find no relationship between the two.  
Considering the importance of independent directors in the protection of minority 
shareholders, many countries now require some independent directors on a listed 
corporation’s board. US public companies must have a majority of independent directors on 
their board. ASX guidelines add protection to minority shareholders by requiring listed 
companies to appoint a majority of independent director on their board.  
The corporate governance reform of 2006 in Bangladesh mandates the appointment of at least 
ten per cent, or at least one, independent director on the board. This number is not comparable 
to that in corporate governance guidelines on independent directors in most other reforms. 
There is no study that evaluates the effect of independent directors in curbing DRPTs in 
Bangladeshi corporations.   
(iv)Audit Committee 
Audit committees were first introduced in the USA in 1978 as a general requirement by the 
recommendation of the New York Stock Exchange and the SEC (Farrar 2001). The main 
responsibility of an audit committee is to monitor the integrity of the financial affairs of a 
company. Independence and competence, among other attributes, are required for proper 
functioning of an audit committee.  Research suggests that having an effective independent 
audit committee can significantly improve information quality  (Xie et al. 2003, Davidson et 
al. 2005, Hutchinson et al. 2008) and financial integrity (Lary and Taylor 2012, Abbott et al. 
2004, Farber 2005). Therefore, an independent and capable audit committee is effective in 
improving the financial integrity and financial information quality of companies.  
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Though researchers have studied the effects of audit committees on financial integrity and 
financial statement quality, there is a lack of studies on the relationship between DRPTs and 
audit committees. It can be claimed that DRPTs are unscrupulous business transactions. 
Therefore, if the audit committee is fulfilling its role of monitoring financial integrity, it 
should prevent DRPTs in an organization. Two notable studies have investigated the effect of 
an audit committee on DRPTs; however, their results are inconsistent. The study by Cheung 
et al. (2006) finds an inverse relationship, whereas the study by Gallery  et al. (2008) does not 
find any relationship between the two.   
Many countries now require audit committees to be composed of members with specific 
attributes in public listed companies. For example, SOX 2002 requires that each member of 
the committee be independent and the committee have a member who is a financial expert. 
After SOX 2002 the audit committee’s responsibilities were increased to embrace looking 
after the overall financial function of the company (Gorman 2009). In Australia, ASX 
corporate governance reform requires each listed company to establish an audit committee 
that consists only of non-executive directors, and has at least three members with a majority 
of independent directors. It requires that the committee is chaired by an independent director 
who is not the chair of the board. Reform in the UK has mandated that listed companies 
establish an audit committee of at least three (in the case of smaller companies two) 
independent non-executive directors.  
The reform of 2006 in Bangladesh stipulates that the board of directors should form an audit 
committee of three board members including an independent director and the chair of the 
committee must have knowledge or expertise in accounting or finance. It further stipulates 
that the committee should assist the board of directors in ensuring that the financial statements 
reflect a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company and that the business has a 
good internal monitoring system. Though past research on the relationship between the audit 
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committee and DRPTs is inconclusive in Western countries, there is no literature on audit 
committees as a safeguard to protect minority shareholders from DRPTs in a developing 
country like Bangladesh. 
(v) Separation of CEO and Chair of the Board  
There is divided opinion about the separation of the CEO and chair of the board. Those who 
are against the separate role argue that the dual responsibility by a single individual is 
beneficial for a company as it establishes a strong and an unambiguous leadership in a 
company (Finkelstein and D'Aveni 1994). On the other hand, scholars who support the 
separation of the CEO and chair of the board argues that boards of directors are less effective 
when the chief executive is also the chair of the board because of the absence of decision 
management and decision control (Jensen 1993). To maintain a balance of power in a 
company, the chief executive officer (CEO) and chair of the board should be held by two 
individual persons and companies should clearly define the role and responsibilities of board 
and CEO.    
 
Although scholars are divided in their opinion on the separation of CEO and chair of the 
board, many corporate governance guidelines require corporations to have two separate 
individuals to hold these positions. For example, the corporate governance guidelines code of 
2010 in the UK requires the chairman and chief executive position should be held by two 
separate individuals and the division of responsibilities between them should be clearly 
established, set out in writing and agreed by the board. The ASX guidelines also require the 
same.  
 
Researchers have extensively studied the effect of CEO and Chair duality on firm 
performance (Rechner and Dalton 1991, Daily and Dalton 1992, Gompers et al. 2003). 
However, there is an absence of studies on the effect of duality and DRPT, with two notable 
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exceptions: Cheung et al. (2006) in Hong Kong and  (Gallery et al. 2008) in Australia. 
However, neither of these studies finds any relationship between these two.  
 
In Bangladesh a separate CEO is required in the reform. In the pre-reform period, many 
companies did not have separation of CEO and Chair. Moreover, CEOs in many companies 
were family members of the sponsor director (Farooque et al. 2007) which may be changed 
after the reform. However, there is no study on the current status of the separate CEO and 
chair, nor is there any study on the effect of separation of the CEO and Chair position on 
DRPTs in Bangladeshi companies. 
 
(vi) Independent External Auditor 
External auditors can act as a safeguard for minority shareholders, in the sense of giving an 
audit opinion on the true and fair view of the financial statements prepared by management. 
However, apart from providing this statutory audit service, auditors can provide non-audit 
services to clients. This develops economic dependence of the external auditor on the client. 
Auditor’s independence is pivotal in giving their opinion about the true and fair view of a 
client’s financial statements. Auditor’s independence may be compromised because of 
economic dependence on their client (Mautz and Sharaf 1961, Frankel et al. 2002a, Gul et al. 
2007). Many countries now restrict non-audit services by external auditors. For example, 
SOX brought several reforms to the auditing profession. Section 201 of SOX prohibits 
providing several non-audit services to client: bookkeeping and accounting service, financial 
information systems design and implementation, appraisal or valuation services, actuarial 
services, internal audit outsourcing services, management functions and human resources, 
broker or dealer, investment adviser, investment service, legal and expert services unrelated to 
the audit. Under section 203 SOX also requires lead partner rotation every five years to 
prevent economic dependence on the client and a one year cooling off period for audit team 
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members to be hired in a financial reporting role of a company. Unlike SOX, CLERP 9 in 
Australia does not ban non-audit service to audit clients but restricts it to a maximum of ten 
hours. When an auditor provides non-audit services, CLEPR 9 requires directors to explain 
that the auditor’s independence is not impaired and to disclose the amount of fees paid for 
non-audit services. 
 
Some past findings support the idea of association of non-audit services and audit quality 
(Ashbaugh et al. 2003, Antle et al. 2003, Frankel et al. 2002b). However, some scholars 
disagree with this view (Arrunada 1999, Wallman 1996). Wallman (1996), for example, 
argues that non audit service does not compromise audit quality, rather it helps auditors’ 
work. Whether it helps or not, many empirical studies fail to establish the inverse association 
between non-audit services and audit quality (Kinney et al. 2004, Bloomfield and Shackman 
2008).  
 
Though the association between auditors’ non-audit service and audit quality has been studied 
widely, there is no study that investigates the effect of non-audit service on DRPTs. A few 
researchers have studied the effect of Big5/Big4 of audit firms on DRPTs (Cheung et al. 
2009a, Gao and Kling 2008). Larger firms have less incentive to compromise their integrity 
and are more concerned about their reputation than smaller firms (DeAngelo 1981). 
Therefore, they are expected to be a better safeguard for DRPTs in an organization. However, 
the results of these studies are inconsistent. The study by Gao et al. (2008) finds an inverse 
relationship between the two, whereas Cheung et al. (2009) finds no relationship.   
 
In Bangladesh in the pre-reform period, the independence requirement for the external 
auditors was mainly determined by Section 212 of the Company Act of Bangladesh 1994 
which stipulates that an employee of the company, a person who is indebted or guarantor of 
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another person’s loan to the company for an amount exceeding one thousand taka (about 
A$15), a director of the  company, a partner of a firm which is the managing agent of the 
company and share holder of exceeding five percent in nominal value of the subscribed 
capital of the company cannot act as an external auditor of a company. The independence 
required in the Company Acts is lenient and does not restrict any non-audit service by the 
external auditors of companies. Moreover, there is no separate body for monitoring the 
external auditors in Bangladesh, like Public Company Audit Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the 
USA. The profession is still self-regulated by a professional body of auditors, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh. The SEC and Register of Joint Stock Companies of 
Bangladesh, two government bodies whose primary role is monitoring securities market and 
registration of companies, have legal provision to monitor accounting firms. However,  both 
organizations rarely monitor accounting firms and lack competent staff for the work (Kabir et 
al. 2011). In order to improve the independence and quality of audit services by the external 
auditors, the 2006 reform imposes some restrictions on performing non-audit services. 
 
The provision regarding non-audit service in the Bangladeshi 2006 reform is similar to SOX. 
It restricts six types of non-audit services: appraisal and valuation, financial information 
system design and implementation, book keeping service, broker-dealer service, actuarial 
service, and internal audit service. However, there is no literature on auditors as safeguards of 
DRPTs in Bangladeshi companies. 
 
 
(vii) Direct participation of minority shareholders   
Scholars are divided in their opinion on shareholders’ participation in corporate governance – 
one group is in favour and the other is in opposition to shareholders’ participation (Bebchuk 
2006). Those in favour argue that direct participation will protect minority shareholders rights 
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in the organization. The opposition argues that this will cause dispute and disruption in 
management. This debate has culminated in regulators and policy makers in many countries 
now supporting some degree of minority shareholder participation in decisions that directly 
affect their rights. As mentioned in the earlier section, many countries now require 
shareholders’ approval of RPTs while others have the requirement of pre-review of RPTs by 
an external independent party. For example, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, 
Dominican Republic, Macedonia, Ruwanda, Sierra Leone, Tunisia Chile, Swaziland, Sweden 
Albania, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Ukraine require approval from shareholders for some 
types of related party transactions. Some countries require both approval of related party 
transactions by shareholders and prior review of related party transactions by external party, 
such as Egypt, Tajikistan, Tunisia and Sweden (Tareq et al. 2011). In the USA, SOX 2002 
bans loans to executives and stringent disclosures for purchase of securities by any directors 
or a shareholder holding more than ten percent of shares. The ASX guideline in Australia 
does not have any clause on RPTs for Australian companies. However, section 208 of the 
Company Law 2001 requires Australian companies to obtain shareholders’ approval for most 
RPTs. Contravention of that section can be liable to a related person penalty of up to 
$200000, disqualification for directorship or imprisonment up to five years. Apart from this, 
the recent ASIC Regulatory Guide 76 requires Australian listed companies to take 
independent valuation from experts in certain cases, for example, in the case of complex 
RPTs, RPTs deemed significant from the point of view of the entity, non interested directors 
do not have expertise on RPTs valuation and so on  (ASIC 2011).   
 
Apart from the above, many countries have allowed participation of minority shareholders in 
some areas of governance which can curb the dominance of controlling shareholders and have 
the potential to reduce DRPTs. In Australia, for example, CLERP 9 gives shareholders the 
right to participate in the voting of the adoption of the remuneration report by directors and to 
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ask questions about the remuneration report. It further requires minority shareholders be 
allowed to submit questions to the auditor about their audit and be given an opportunity to ask 
questions in an AGM. The UK corporate governance code of 2010 also allows minority 
shareholder participation in a company. The UK reform mandates the chair of a board to 
discuss governance and strategy with shareholders and ensure that the views of shareholders 
are communicated to the board as a whole. Moreover, the chair is to arrange for the audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees to be available to answer questions at the AGM and 
for all directors to attend. This reform requires a company to propose a separate resolution on 
each substantially separate issue and allow the shareholders to apply their voting right in the 
AGM.  
 
In contrast, many companies in Bangladesh do not hold an AGM regularly, let alone allowing 
minority shareholders’ participation in companies’ decisions (Uddin and Choudhury 2008). 
The company law of 1994 provides some basic participation of minority shareholders, e.g. 
participation in AGM and voting on certain agenda items in the AGM, such as appointment of 
directors and auditors. However, as mentioned by Uddin and Chowdhury (2008), minority 
shareholders rarely get the chance to apply their voting in AGMs as many of these meetings 
last for five minutes and everything is decided by the powerful sponsor directors. The existing 
corporate law allows very limited participation of minority shareholders in a company and the 
reform 2006 is silent on this. Table 2.4 presents a summary of the salient research on 
corporate governance safeguards for DRPTs to date.  
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Table 2.4: Summary of Corporate Governance Safeguards for DRPTs Research 
Author(s)  Country Findings on DRPTs and Safeguards  
Chung et al. (2006) Hong Kong The researchers find that DRPT are inversely related to audit committee independence but find 
no relationship with independent director and CEO-Chair duality. 
 
Gallery et al. (2008) Australia 
 
The researchers find inverse relationship of DRPTs with the number of independent directors in 
board, but fail to find any relationship with audit committee and duality of the chair of the board 
and CEO.  
 
Gao et al (2008) China The researchers find an inverse relationship of DRPTs with independent directors, big5 auditors, 
and a positive relationship with ownership concentration.   
 
Cheung et al. (2009a) Hong Kong The result shows that state ownership of companies are positively and independent directors are 
inversely related to DRPTs.  However, the study does not find any relationship with big4 auditor 
firm with DRPTs. 
 
Kohlbeck and Meyhew (2005) USA The researchers find an inverse relationship between CEO and directors’ cash compensation and 
DRPTs and a positive relationship between CEO’s stock options and DRPTs. 
 
Dahya et al.(2008) 22 countries The study finds that independent directors are inversely related to DRPTs.  
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2.3.5 Legal System and Minority Shareholders Protection from DRPTs 
Researchers have argued  and empirically shown that the law can protect minority 
shareholders from discriminatory behaviour of controlling shareholders or other powerful 
individual of an organization  (LaPorta et al. 1998, 2000, Johnson et al. 2000, LaPorta et al. 
2008, LaPorta et al. 1997).  These researchers use legal system of a country as a proxy for the 
level of legal protections for minority shareholders.  Legal systems of countries around the 
world can be classified into two main families: English common law and civil law. The latter 
is subdivided into three categories: French civil law, German civil law and Scandinavian civil 
law. The spread of legal systems across the world was influenced by one or a combination of 
several factors: (1) the colonization of England and France spread English common law and 
French civil law to the colonies; (2) imitation and adaptationfor example, Japanese 
adaptation of the German legal system; and (3) regional influencefor example, 
Scandinavian countries have a similar legal system.  A common law system is present in 
England, the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand and many former colonial 
countries of England. The French civil law system is present in France, Spain, Mexico, 
Argentina, Peru, Brazil and many formal colonial countries of France. Germany, Japan, 
Switzerland, South Korea and Taiwan have the German civil law system; and Scandinavian 
civil law is seen in Scandinavian countries. The English common law system and effective 
law enforcement have been found to have better quality minority shareholder protection than 
countries with civil law systems.  
 
There are two basic reasons for the superiority of the English common law system. First, 
English common law system affords a greater level of protection for minority shareholders 
than other systems (LaPorta et al. 1998, LaPorta et al. 2000). This is so because of the nature 
of the system (Johnson et al. 2000), which allows more freedom than in civil law countries 
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(LaPorta et al. 2004). In common law countries, the judiciary has the power to make decisions 
based on broad principles of law. However, in civil law countries, the legal system is based on 
comprehensive legal codes and judges are not permitted to go beyond those codes in making 
judgements. Therefore, it is more difficult to use legal loopholes in common law countries 
than in civil law countries to disadvantage minority shareholders.   
 
Although many countries allow minority shareholders to sue directors (who are in many cases 
controlling shareholders) for oppressive behaviour, these cases are treated differently in civil 
and common law countries. The courts in civil law countries will consider such actions legal 
if the act done by directors conforms to the legal codethe focus is not on fairness or 
minority shareholders natural rights. In contrast, the main emphasis of a common law court is 
equitable treatment of minority shareholders going beyond the code (Johnson et al. 2000).  
 
The second advantage to minority investors in a common law country is better protection for 
them in legal statutes.  There are three main minority investors’ rights in legal statute: the 
right to corporate information, the right related to related party transactions, and the right to 
sue directors and make them liable for their activities. However, there is great variation 
among countries as far as minority investor protection is concerned. An example of one such 
variation is the derivative action procedure. In many countries, shareholders can sue directors 
or management by themselves. However, a derivative suit gives shareholders the right to sue 
directors and managers on behalf of the company concerned. Many countries have reformed 
the related party transaction approval procedure. Some countries now require shareholders’ 
approval of RPTs while others have the requirement of pre-review of RPTs by an external 
independent party. Securing information about their investment is a right of shareholders. 
Greater disclosure gives more information to stakeholders. Over the past years many countries 
have increased the disclosure requirement in general and particularly disclosure of related 
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party transactions. Moreover some countries allow access to company books by minority 
shareholders. Researchers have found significant differences in the legal statutes between 
common and civil law countries.  For example, reviewing 72 countries’ laws for a related 
party transaction, Djankov et al.(2008) shows that common law countries legal statutes 
provide better protection to minority shareholders.  He gives the illustration that common law 
countries mandate higher disclosure requirements (common law countries on average have 
0.78 disclosure on related party transaction  compared to 0.42 disclosure of French civil law 
countries on a scale of 0-1 where 1 means full disclosure). The findings by Djankov et al 
(2008)  also show that common law countries have higher standards on other aspects of a 
related party transaction as far as minority investor protection is concerned (e.g. access to 
evidence by minority investor, ease of holding liable those parties involved in wrongdoing in 
a related party transaction and so on).  
However, research suggests  that legal origin is not a destiny; quality legal reform, reform 
sensitive to legal tradition and enforcement of those reforms are  means of minority investors 
protection improvement (LaPorta et al. 2008). This echoes the finding of Tareq et al. (2011). 
They reveal that from 2006 to 2010, on average, countries across the world have improved 
minority shareholder protection but that the improvement is not homogenous across countries 
and there is no relationship of legal systems with the pace of reform for minority shareholders 
protection.  Therefore, legal origin is not a destiny of country – proper reform of legislation 
can improve the protection for minority shareholders in a country with any legal origin. 
 
Bangladesh inherited a common law system from British canonicalization; but it has 
inefficient government monitoring and enforcement agencies which hinders enforcement of 
the law. Having good quality law and a sound legal system is not enough; legal enforcement 
is also important. Empirical studies suggest that apart English common law legal system 
higher level of law enforcement is necessary for  minority shareholder protection (LaPorta et 
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al. 1998, LaPorta et al. 2000). The enforcement of law for protecting minority shareholders 
from controlling shareholders is detailed in the next section of this chapter.   
 
2.3.6 Legal Enforcement and DRPTs 
Researchers argue that the ‘quality of safeguard’ and ‘enforcement of  safeguard’ are the most  
important things in protecting minority shareholders from the oppressions and prejudicial 
behaviors of controlling shareholders (e.g  LaPorta et al. 1998, 2000, Johnson et al. 2000, 
LaPorta et al. 2008, LaPorta et al. 1997). It is deemed that proper quality of safeguards 
ensures proper protection of minority shareholders. However, having safeguards is not enough 
– genuine enforcement is necessary for minority shareholders protection.  
 
The study by Dyck and Zingales (2004) and Enriques and Volpin (2007) show that proper law 
enforcement curbs the private benefit of controlling shareholders. Sweden is example of this. 
As stated in the earlier section, pyramids, cross holding and dual-class shares are the 
mechanisms for achieving higher control with less cash flow right in a corporation, and this is 
the prime motivator for DRPTs. Most Swedish firms have these ownership structures which 
apparently make Swedish minority shareholders prone to expropriation by controlling 
shareholders. However, the strict enforcement  of safeguards does not allow minority 
shareholders’ oppression in Sweden (Holmen and Knopf 2004).  
Low enforcement of safeguards allows and expands controlling shareholders discriminatory 
behaviour. As the controlling shareholders can expropriate resources from a company they 
agree to pay more for control rights in countries where safeguards are not well enforced 
(Nenova 2003, Dyck and Zingales 2004, Nenova 2005). Italy, for example, does not strictly 
enforce safeguards for protecting minority shareholders; therefore the minority shareholders 
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are more prone to controlling shareholders oppression of their rights compared to many 
similar European countries (Zingales 1995).  
 
Quality of the safeguard is pivotal in protection minority shareholders from DRPTs. To be of 
high quality, among other things, the law of a country should protect all kind of (or at least 
most) DRPTs. As legislators are human beings with bounded rationality, it is not always 
possible for them to foresee all kinds of DRPTs that would be used by controlling 
shareholders. Therefore, regular updates of the RPT regulationswould be required to ensure 
proper protection of minority shareholders. Table 2.5 presents a summary of the salient 
research on law and minority shareholders protectin to date. 
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Table 2.5: Salient Research on Legal Enforcement and Minority Shareholders Protection 
Author(s) Country Findings 
Nenova (2003) 18 countries This paper invests the price of controlling share and legal enforcement. Using sample from 661 
dual-class share firms in 18 countries, the researcher reports that legal enforcement and investor 
protection are significantly related to the variation of premium price for controlling share. The 
researcher argues that controlling shareholders agree to pay more for control right in countries 
where minority shareholders are not well protected as they can tunnel out resources there more. 
 
Holmen and Knopf (2004) Sweden This paper investigates minority shareholders expropriation and private benefit of controlling 
shareholders in Swedish companies.  The researchers find little evidence of minority 
shareholders expropriation in Swedish firms. The researchers argue that though the pyramidal 
and dual class share structure in make Swedish minority shareholders apparently prone to 
controlling shareholders oppression, strict enforcement of law prevent such minority 
shareholders oppression in Sweden.   
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Author(s) Country Findings 
Dyck and Zingales (2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple countries 
 
 
 
 
This paper investigates private benefit of controlling shareholders. Using data from 39 countries, 
the researchers report private benefit of control exits in the sample countries and suggest legal 
enforcement as a major way of curving private benefit of controlling shareholders. 
 
Nenova (2005) Brazil This paper investigates how legal reform of minority shareholders right affects the premium 
price for controlling shareholding of a company.  Using stock market and other corporate 
archival data, the researchers finds that during weak protection regime of minority shareholders, 
the controlling shareholding premium is significantly higher than that of strict protection regime. 
The author argues that the higher control value is due to the higher possibility of expropriation 
of minority shareholders in a weak minority shareholders protection regime.  
 
Enriques and Volpin (2007) France, Germany 
and Italy 
This paper studies the corporate governance reform in France, Germany and Italy between 1991 
and 2005. Using several examples and analysing some recent reforms in these countries, the 
researchers argue strict legal enforcement as a safeguard for protecting minority shareholders. 
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2.4 Measurement of DRPTs 
The current literature does not provide complete or commonly agreed measures for the 
amount or extent of DRPTs. This section details the current DRPT measures and outlines 
their limitations.  
 
2.4.1 Current DRPTs Measures  
Several empirical researchers use total dollar amount of related party transactions as a 
measure of DRPTs (Gordon et al. 2004, Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2005, Kohlbeck and Mayhew 
2010). Though RPTs are used by controlling shareholders for their self-interest, clearly not all 
RPTs are undertaken for expropriation purposes. The bulk of RPTs are likely to be for 
genuine business purposes (Gordon et al. 2004). Therefore, considering all RPTs as DRPTs 
would cause high measurement error.   
Instead of using all related party transactions as a proxy for DRPTs, different researchers have 
used selected related party transactions as a measure for DRPTs. For example, Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein  (2007) use four types of transactions: sales of asset or goods, purchase of asset 
or goods, services provided and loans to managers or member of board of directors. In 
comparison, Berkman et al. (2009) use total loan guarantee to related parties as a measures for 
DRPTS. A further variation on the selection of particular RPTs as proxy measures of DRPTs 
is Gao and Kling’s (2008) measure of DRPTS as the difference between accounts receivables 
and payables to related parties divided by total assets, or Jiang’s (2010) use ‘other 
receivables’ scaled by total asset as a measure of DRPT. 
Another approach to the measurement of DRPTs is the classification of total RPTs into 
tunnelling and propping transactions. These researchers view tunnelling as DRPTs and 
therefore detrimental to the shareholders’ value. One other hand, they consider propping as 
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favourable transactions for minority shareholders. To measure tunnelling and propping they 
use total dollar value of some selective transactions (Cheung et al. 2006, Gao and Kling 2008, 
Cheung et al. 2009a). Cheung et al. (2006, 2009a) consider asset acquisition, asset sales, 
equity sales, sale or purchase of goods, cash payment to related party, cash receipt from a 
related party and transactions with non-listed subsidiary as propping transactions. 
Apart from company-level measures of DRPTs, some researchers have developed a country-
level index-based measure of DRPTs. These are composite indexes that comprise of various 
safeguards applying in countries. Djankov et al.’s (2008) Anti-self Dealing Index, for 
example,  includes the following items in the index: shareholders’ approval for RPTs, 
disclosure of RPTs, independent review before an RPT, disclosure of RPTs in periodic filings, 
punitive measures for prejudicial RPTs are legal protection for prejudicial RPTs at country 
level. The index assigns specific points for these protections from DRPTs in a country.  
Table 2.4 provides a listing with definitions of the various DRPT measures used to date.   
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Table 2.4: Summary of Current DRPT Measures 
Author(s) Country of Study DRPT Measurement 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) USA Uses total dollar amount of four types of transactions for measuring DRPT: sales 
of asset or goods, purchase of asset or goods, service provided and loan to 
managers or member of board of directors. 
 
Cheung et al. (2006)   
 
 
Cheung et al.(2009a) 
 
Hong Kong 
 
 
China 
Use total dollar amount of asset acquisition, asset sales, equity sales, sale or 
purchase of goods, and cash payment to related party as a measure of DRPTs.  
 
Use total dollar amount of asset acquisition, asset sales, equity sales, sale or 
purchase of goods, and cash payment to related party as a measure of DRPTs.  
 
Gao and Kling (2008) 
 
China The researchers use following formula to measure DRPTs: 
                  (Accounts Receivable –Accounts Payable)/Total Asset 
 
  
Antonios et al. (2011) Greece Uses sale of assets and sale of goods to related parties as a measure of DRPTs.  
 
 
Ge et al. (2010) China Uses sale of assets and sale of goods to related parties as a measure of DRPTs. 
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Author(s) Country of Study DRPT Measurement 
 Gallery et al. (2008) Australia Uses total dollar amount paid to staff and suppliers and related party loan as a 
measure of DRPTs. 
 
Gordon et al. (2004) 
 
 
 
USA Uses number of RPTs in a company as proxy for DRPTs 
 
 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2005, 2010) 
 
USA Uses total dollar amount of RPTs as a measurement for DRPTs 
 
Dahya et al. (2008) 
 
22 countries  
 
Use total RPTs as a measurement for DRPTs 
 
 
Jiang et al.(2010) 
 
China Uses other receivables scaled by total asset as a measure of DRPT 
 
2.4.2 Limitation of the current DRPTs measurements 
Although prior studies that develop DRPT measures have contributed a lot to help understand 
the concept and development of a body of evidence in the field of agency theory’s principal-
principal problem, these measures have several limitations. The total related party-based 
measurement is fraught with high measurement error as many RPTs in an organization are for 
strategic or legitimate business purposes — such as buying from a company’s own subsidiary 
for supply chain reliability and safety reasons, for gaining tax benefits and so on. Therefore, 
total RPTs might wrongly measure expropriation of minority shareholders rights if RPTs in a 
company are mainly for legitimate business purposes.  
The ‘selected RPT items’ approach produces measures that suffer from the limitation of not 
having a way of confirming which selected related party transactions are actually DRPTs and 
which are actually legitimate business transactions. For example, the Gao and Kling’s (2008) 
measure uses the difference between account receivable and account payable arising from 
RPTs divided by total asset to measure minority share appropriation. However, assets can be 
appropriated not only by credit transactions but also by cash transactions. Moreover, 
appropriation can be done by selling assets and/or goods at a price lower than ‘fair value’ to a 
private organization of dominant shareholders, as well as buying asset and/or goods at a price 
higher than ‘fair value’. Moreover, all credit sales or purchases to related parties are not for 
private benefit of controlling shareholders, as mentioned earlier, they may be done for 
strategic reasons. The measurements used by Jiang (2010) and  Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2007) have similar limitations. 
Cheung et al.’s (2006, 2009a) measurement may be appropriate to a specific context e.g. in 
Hong Kong or in China where there are lot of state owned or controlled entities. But, the 
generalization of the measurement to other countries could cause high measurement error as 
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different transaction could be favoured for tunnelling and propping purposes by different 
controlling shareholder (e.g., government versus family controlling shareholders) in different 
countries. Moreover, the classification is based on the view that propping is beneficial for 
minority shareholders. However, the benefit from propping transactions is complex to judge 
because of the clandestine nature of the propping transaction (Friedman et al. 2003, Dow and 
McGuire 2009). Furthermore, propping may be motivated by the controlling shareholder’s 
intention to return the company to better financial health in order to engage in future 
expropriations (Bertrand et al. 2002).  
It is also noted that although the Anti-self Dealing index of Djankov et al.’s Anti-self Dealing 
Index is a comprehensive index to measure DRPTs, it is designed to measure DRPTs at a 
country level. Therefore, that index is not suitable for measuring DRPTs at company level. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
It can be concluded from this chapter that excessive power (control), low cash flow right and 
either greed for private benefit or a belief that the level of control permits ‘rent’ extraction to 
compensate for low cash flow right, are ingredients for controlling shareholders’ practices 
which erode minority shareholders right through DRPTs. Directors are mandated to run the 
corporation for the benefit of the all shareholders. However, directors, who are in many cases 
in developing countries are controlling shareholders or representative of them, fail to do so. 
Excessive power with low cash flow right enables controlling shareholders to arrange 
discriminatory transactions with related parties for private benefit. Over the years corporate 
governance reform has tried to protect minority shareholders from the greed and power of 
controlling shareholders by requiring safeguards in corporations for minority shareholders 
protection. The literature generally shows that minority shareholders often do not get the 
protection of these corporate governance safeguards as they are not properly enforced. 
 
The current measures of DRPTs measure mainly gross RPTs or some selected items of RPTs 
which are prone to high measurement errors. There is paucity of effort in the development of 
a more precise measure for DRPTs at the firm level. Though the Anti-self Dealing Index by 
Dajankov et al. (2008) is comprehensive and relatively accurate, it is not applicable at the 
company level. Therefore, the current literature needs an improved measure for company-
level DRPTs.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
 
 
This chapter proposes a theoretical framework for the thesis. It describes about the theory and 
its suitability for the current research. It further analyses the effectiveness of the reform 2006 
using the proposed theoretical framework. This chapter also identifies the research questions 
of the study and develops the model to answer those questions.      
 
3.1 Theoretical Framework for the Research 
‘New Institutional Sociology’ and ‘Agency theory’ are probably the most widely used 
theories in corporate governance reform research. New institutional sociology is a popular 
choice among researchers who study adoption of corporate governance reform in a country.4 
Examples of the use of this theory for studying a country’s corporate governance reform are 
Sanders and Tuschke (2007),  Khadaroo and Shaikh (2007), Siddiqui (2010), Chizema and 
Kim (2010), and Chizema (2010). However, new institutional sociology does not consider the 
effectiveness and efficiency perspective which is the focus of traditional institutional theory. 
                                               
4 New institutional sociology was developed by Meyer and Rowan (1977), who argued that institutional rules 
function as myths which an organization incorporates, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability and enhanced 
survival prospects. In a seminal work they claim that institutionalization is a process that makes organizations 
similar. They argued that the institutionalization process is of three types: coercive isomorphism, normative 
isomorphism, and mimetic isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism occurs through political or state pressure, 
normative isomorphism is influenced by professional bodies, and mimetic isomorphism occurs when 
organizations imitate other successful organizations. Meyer, J. W. & Rowan, B. 1977. 'Institutionalized 
Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony.' American Journal of Sociology, 83:2, 340-63. 
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Powell and DiMaggio (1991) view new institutional sociology as being a rejection of rational-
actor models. Scholars of new institutional sociology believe that maintaining legitimacy is 
more important than efficiency and effectiveness for organizational survival.  A legitimacy 
perspective is suitable to use for explaining the extent of disclosure (or lack of disclosure) by 
the controlling shareholder about DRPTs, since it relates to external impressions 
management. It is not suitable for explaining the extent to which corporate governance 
reforms have effectively mitigated (or failed to mitigate) the practice of DRPTs pursued by a 
controlling shareholder.  This requires a theory of rational economic behaviour based on self-
interest.  
Agency theory is used by researchers to study effectiveness and efficiency of the governance 
reforms. For example, Hutchinson et al. (2008) uses agency theory to evaluating  CLERP 9 
and ASX Corporate Governance Reform in Australia. Although it is influential and used in 
many areas in corporate governance research, agency theory has been criticised by researchers 
for its limitations in several areas detailed in the next part of this chapter.  
 
For evaluating the effectiveness of the Bangladeshi corporate governance reforms to protect 
minority shareholders from DRPTs, this study draws on the theoretical perspective offered by 
‘new institutional economics’.5 New institutional economics extends neo-classical economics 
by introducing transaction costs, social relationships and organization structures. Nobel 
laureates Ronald Coase, Douglass North and Oliver E. Williamson have established these 
elements as important factors in modern economic analysis.  
 
                                               
5  The theory of institutional economics is divided into two schools: old institutional economics and new 
institutional economics. Old institutional economics (OIE) ideas were strong between 1920s to 1940s. OIE 
criticised the mainstream new classical economics for too much emphasis on markets and the assumption of 
completely rational individuals, as well as for ignoring psychological issues in decision making, property rights, 
and social norms in economic policy analysis and market failure. However, after the Second World War, 
mainstream new classical economics was much influenced by Keynes and the idea of OIE started to lose it 
dominance. For detail  see  Rutherford, M. 2001. 'Institutional Economics: Then and Now.' Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15:3(Summer), 173-94. 
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This study will use Williamson’s ‘Market and Hierarchy Model’ (see later) for analysing the 
effectiveness of the Bangladeshi corporate governance reforms to protect minority 
shareholders from DRPTs. To Williamson, governance means infusing order to mitigate 
conflict of interest for mutual gain  (Williamson 1975 , 2008). The model facilitates the 
comparison of different forms of governance. It is relevant as it gives a legitimate theoretical 
framework for analysis of organizational relationships, taking into consideration different 
forms of governance, transaction costs and the behaviours of organizational actors. 
 
Williamson’s model has some similarities with agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
but is based on more realistic assumptions and stronger philosophical standing. 6  The 
similarity of agency theory with that of Williamson’s model is that both take a contractual 
perspective and consider cost-benefit, self-interest and information asymmetry between 
contracting parties. On the other hand, the difference between the two is that agency theory 
sees effective governance from the narrow perspective of the principal’s interest, a view 
which has been criticized by scholars (Perrow 1986, Wright et al. 2001). Williamson’s model, 
on the other hand, sees governance from a neutral perspective. Furthermore, it is based on a 
more realistic assumption than that underpinning agency theory. Agency theory considers a 
contract as a full contract where conditions are set in advance, while Williamson’s market and 
hierarchy model assumes that governance is a complex contract and, like all complex 
contracts, it is incomplete because of the bounded rationality of human beings.  
Assumptions underpinning Williamson’s model are: 
1. Bounded rationality of human beings. 
2. Opportunistic behaviour of contracting parties. 
3. Markets may not work properly (market failure). 
                                               
6 The agency theory states that a principle assigns some responsibility to an agent to act on behalf of him and to 
serve the best interest of the principle through a contract; the principle uses incentive mechanisms to align the 
agents objectives to that of the principle and to curb the opportunistic behaviour of agent resulting from 
information asymmetries between the two parities.   
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k>0 
h=0 
h>0 
k=0 Contact with no safeguard 
(possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour, information 
disparity and so on) 
            
                 B 
 
Here,  
k is the level of opportunistic behaviour, information asymmetry 
and so on 
h is the level of safeguard for contract 
 
  The relationship between k and h is as follows: 
 
 
k = f(h) | E(h) - h = 0 
 
 
E(h) = expected h 
                                            h = actual h 
  
Figure 3.1: Depiction of Williamson’s Market and Hierarchy 
Model applied to the Change in Bangladeshi Corporate 
Governance 
 
                                                          
                              D                           
Governance by all  
Shareholders 
Governance by market (no 
opportunistic behaviour (e.g 
DRPTs), information to all 
parties, no transaction cost, 
and so on)     
         A 
Bangladesh was 
close to node B 
before reform 
as h ≈ 0    
Contract with safeguard 
(possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour, information disparity 
depends on h)   
                
               C 
 
 
Bangladesh is 
close to C after 
reform as  
h >0 
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Williamson’s market and hierarchy model suggests three basic kinds of governance 
systems: Governance by market, hierarch or governance by owner(s) and hybrid 
governance. Node A of the diagram is an ideal world with no market failure, information to 
all the parties, no opportunistic behaviour by any party, and zero transactions cost for 
governance (k = 0). This is the form of governance in a fully functional market. However, in 
this real world node A is rare for many transactions. Node D of the diagram is a governance 
system by all owners of an organization. This type of governance ensures information to all 
owners, no opportunistic behaviour by any owners, and zero transactions cost (k = 0). 
However, in reality governance by all the owners of a company may not be feasible, 
efficient and effective.7 In between these two types of governance systems there may be two 
basic hybrid forms of governance. Node B is a governance system with a contract with 
some parties (managers and board of directors) to run their business on behalf of all the 
owners. 8  However, because of the bounded rationality of the contracting parties all 
situations may not be included in the contract. This can cause dispute between the 
contracting parties. Moreover, opportunistic behaviour of any of the contracting parties may 
hinder the proper enforcement of the contract. One solution to this problem is to provide 
safeguard for enforcement (h). Node C is a governance system with safeguard for enforcing 
the contract, and therefore at node C is where h >0. Though node C gives protection from 
an unfavoured situation to the contracting parties, it costs money. 
 
                                               
7 According to the model the suitability of governance depends on three attributes of the transaction to be 
governed: frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity. If a transaction is frequent, certain and has least asset 
specificity then market is the most efficient method of governance. One the other hand, if a transaction is 
infrequent, uncertain in it outcomes and asset specific then governance by owners is most efficient and 
effective. This thesis analyses the governance of a corporation which is frequent but its outcome is moderately 
uncertain and moderately asset specific. Therefore, according to the ‘Market and Hierarchy Model’ hybrid 
governance is the most efficient and effective method.   
 
8 In Bangladeshi corporate context managers are the extension of the controlling owner in the board or some 
individuals very loyal to them.  Therefore, this analysis ignores managers from the analysis. 
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Table 3.1: Minority shareholder protection from DRPTs in Bangladeshi law 
Law  Minority shareholders’ protection from DRPT 
The Banking 
Company Act 2001 
Section 27(1) and 28 provide some protection to minority 
shareholders from DRPTs by restricting loans without any 
collateral security to any directors, director’s family members or 
any organization where the directors or directors’ family members 
are involved as director, shareholders or owner. Banks must not 
wave loans of these parties if they fail to repay their loans.    
 
Bangladesh Bank  
(BRPD Circular No 
7, 1999) 
Any loan facility or guarantee or security provided to a director of 
a bank or to his relatives must be approved by the board of the 
bank and has to be disclosed in the balance sheet. However, the 
loan cannot exceed 50% of the paid-up value of the shares of the 
director. 
 
The Company Act 
1994 
According to section 103 of the Company Act 1994 a company 
must not make any loan or give any guarantee or provide any 
security in connection with a loan made by a third party to any 
director of the lending company or any firm in which any director 
of the lending company is a partner or any private company of 
which any director of the lending company is a director.  
 
However, this section will not apply to a loan or giving of any 
guarantee or providing any security by a lending company if such 
company is a banking company or a private company not being a 
subsidiary of a public company and the loan is sanctioned by the 
Board of Directors. However, the total amount of the loan cannot 
exceed 50% of the paid up value of the shares held by the director 
in his own name. 
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Before the 2006 reform  the level of safeguard for the minority shareholders in Bangladesh 
was very low i.e.  h ≈ 0. As shown in Table 3.1, apart from the reform there is minimum 
protection for minority shareholders. The relevant clauses contained in Company Law 1994, 
Bank Company Act 1991 and the BRPD circular by the central bank have been quite 
limited. Therefore, before the reform Bangladesh’s corporate governance was near to node 
B in Figure 3. After the reforms, the safeguards (h) are much higher than they were before 
the reforms  thus Bangladesh’s corporate governance is close to node C. However, h 
gives rise to higher costs to companies:  independent directors’ fees, expenditure for the 
audit committee, additional reporting costs for corporate governance disclosure, and so on. 
Such costs are passed on to minority shareholders by lesser dividend and lesser corporate 
value. If the safeguards (h) do not protect the minority shareholders from opportunistic 
behaviour (k) of controlling shareholders as manifest in DRPT, then the additional costs 
incurred may put minority shareholders in a worse situation than in the pre-reform period. 
Therefore, after the 2006 reforms, which position is preferable for the minority 
shareholders? The following three alternatives situations in terms of the nodes in Figure 3 
can be identified: 
 Node B and node C are equally preferred because the 2006 reforms are 
unenforceable in practice, and hence have no impact. 
 Node B is preferable to node C because the compliance costs to the company (which 
affect minority shareholders) outweigh the expected benefits from a reduction in 
DRPTs. 
 Node C is preferable to node B because the reforms are effective in generating 
benefits of improved minority shareholder protection that outweigh the company’s 
compliance costs. 
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3.2 Development of the Research Questions  
Several research questions are formulated for this study concerning the effects of corporate 
governance features introduced by the 2006 reform and the extent of DRPTs practiced in 
Bangladesh. First, the 2006 reforms stipulate that at least ten percent of the directors on the 
board should be independent. There was neither such legal requirement nor indeed any 
culture (except some few exceptions) of appointing independent directors in the pre-reform 
period. If directors are truly independent and act in the best interests of all shareholders, 
then it is logical to assume that there will be an improvement in the situation of minority 
shareholders in the corporation. This is unlikely to be the case if the appointment of so-
called independent directors is not genuine. Colleagues or friends of controlling members 
are found in prior research to be ineffective in curtailing the private benefits to controlling 
shareholders (Monks and Minow 2003, Dahya et al. 2008). The reform stipulates selection 
of the independent director(s) by the existing board whose dominance and private benefit 
may be curtailed by the inclusion of genuine independent directors. Therefore the following 
research question will be investigated along with the sub questions: 
RQ1: 
Have DRPTs significantly decreased following the requirement of appointing 
independent director(s) in the reform?  
 Sub questions:  
(i) If the answer is no, what factors have influenced the ineffectiveness of 
independent directors in Bangladeshi companies?  
 (ii) Has the effect of independent director on DRPTs in the period been similar for 
all companies? 
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Second, the 2006 reforms stipulate that the board of directors should form an audit 
committee of three members including an independent member, and the chair of the 
committee should have professional qualification or knowledge, understanding and 
experience in accounting or finance. The audit committee’s main responsibility is to ensure 
that the financial statements present a true and fair view of the company. It has a duty to 
report any fraud and irregularities in the company. If the audit committee fulfills an 
important aspect of its monitoring role of reporting fraud and misappropriation of assets, 
then it is expected that this will improve minority shareholders’ protection. While it has 
been argued that having an effective audit committee can significantly reduce DRPTs, this 
will depend on the effective functioning of the audit committee. As already mentioned, 
independence and accounting education and experience of committee members are 
necessary for effective function of the audit committee. The reform requires only one 
independent member and is very lenient on the accounting competence requirement of the 
chair of the audit committee. Audit committee members may be selected from board 
members who are under the influence of the dominant shareholders or may not have proper 
education or experience in this position. Circumstances such as these cast doubt on the 
ability of the audit committee to function properly in fulfilling its monitoring and oversight 
roles. Therefore the following research questions will be investigated with the sub 
questions: 
RQ2: 
Have DRPTs decreased following the requirement to have an audit committee under 
the reform?  
Sub questions: 
(i) If the answer is no, what factors have influenced the ineffectiveness of audit 
committee?  
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      (ii) Has the effect on DRPTs in the period been similar  across companies? 
 
Third, as mentioned earlier, separation of the company’s operations management and 
policy-decisions is pivotal for balance of power and accountability in organizations. It 
prevents abuse of power and brings accountability of powerful people in organizations. The 
2006 reform mandates that the chairperson of the board and CEO of a company should be 
two different persons. This is important when implementing other aspects of the 2006 
reform, involving the requirement that prohibits external auditors from performing several 
non-audit services for their client, and that requires directors certification on  the soundness 
of the internal control system, the appropriateness of accounting policies and accounting 
estimates, the application of the International Accounting Standards in the preparation of 
financial statements, and the fairness in presentation of the financial statements by 
management. If the chairperson of the board and the CEO posts are held by two different 
persons, it can be expected that there would be some improvement in the uncontested power 
of the dominant shareholder group in Bangladeshi companies. The certification by directors 
means that they are responsible for proper disclosure and fairness of transactions in their 
companies. Banning non-audit services decrease the economic dependency of the auditor 
upon the client and therefore increase integrity and quality of audit (Ferguson et al. 2004, 
Frankel et al. 2002b). In Bangladesh in the pre-reform period, however, CEOs in many 
companies were family members of the sponsor director (Farooque et al. 2007), had low 
demand for good quality audit  (Kabir et al.2011), and controlling directors would follow 
law as a matter of formality (Uddin and Coudhury 2008). If that situation still prevails then 
the ban on non-audit services, separate CEO and certification about the financial statements 
by directors may have little effect on DRPTs. Therefore the following research question will 
be investigated along with the sub questions: 
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RQ3: 
Have DRPTs decreased following the requirement of separation of the duality of the 
CEO-Chair, restriction on not audit services, and increased directors’ liability 
under the reform?   
  
Sub questions: 
 
(i) If the answer is no, what factors have influenced the lack of effect on DRPTs of  
CEO-Chair separation, restriction of not audit services and the increase in 
directors’ liability under the reform?  
(ii) Has the effect on DRPTs in the period been similar for all companies? 
 
3.3 Model Specification 
As discussed, the appointment of independent directors, the formation of audit committees, 
and the duality of the CEO and chair of the board are main reform initiatives intended to 
bring about an improvement in the protection of minority shareholder rights. To investigate 
the effect of these reforms on minority rights from DRPTs perspective, the researcher has 
developed the following regression model. Past studies (Cheung et al. 2006, Cheung et al. 
2009a, Peng et al. 2010, Dahya et al. 2008, Gao and Kling 2008) advocate including some 
control variables for more complete model specification. As indicated in the next chapter, 
the model automatically controls unobserved time invariant variables because of the 
statistical method used.9    
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9 This includes all unobserved variables which does not change over time, for example, corporate culture 
(assuming this does not change over the study time frame), corporate reputation and so on. 
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Where,  
DRPTit = the discriminatory related party transactions in company i in year t  
In_Dirit = the number of independent directors in company i in year t  
Audit_Comit= a dummy variable with value 1 if there is an audit committee in 
company i in year t and 0 otherwise 
Separate_CEOit = a dummy variable with value 1 if board chair and CEO are filled  
by  two different persons in company i in year t and 0 otherwise 
Big4_Auditorit= a dummy variable with value 1 if company i in year t is audited by a 
big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise 
Firm_Sizeit = natural log of asset in company i in year t 
CG_ Reformt= a dummy variable with value 1 if year t is before reform and 0 
otherwise10.    
Zt-1 Categoryit = a dummy variable with value 1 if company i in year t-1 is in Z 
category and 0 otherwise 
Board_Sizeit = Total members in the board of directors in company i in year t 
Groupi = a dummy variable with value 1 if company i belongs to any industrial 
group and 0 otherwise  
All βs are different parameters to be estimated and εit   is the error term in the 
regression model 
 
 
The reform requires all companies to have an audit committee to assist the board of 
directors. However, the banking companies in Bangladesh have to comply with the central 
banks regulation apart from SEC regulations. As already mentioned in the earlier chapter, 
the central bank of Bangladesh issued an order in 2003 to form an audit committee in every 
commercial bank on its schedule. Therefore, equation 1 does not evaluate the effect of the 
audit committee stipulated by the 2006 reform as many banking companies in Bangladesh 
may already have an audit committee before the reform. One major difference between the 
                                               
10 Reform 2006 mandates a company to certify the soundness of internal control system and fair presentation 
of financial statements by the board and restricts providing some non audit services by the auditors.  To 
evaluate these reform a single variable ‘CG_ Reform’ is included in the model.    
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central bank’s regulation and the 2006 reform is the independence of the committee 
members. The 2006 reform requires at least one of the members to be independent. 
However, the central bank order 2003 does not contain any such requirement. To evaluate 
the effect of the independent member on the audit committee, the researcher has developed 
the following regression model.  
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Where,  
DRPTit = the discriminatory related party transactions in company i in year t  
In_Dirit = the number of independent directors in company i in year t  
Independent_Audit_Comit= a dummy variable with value 1 if the audit committee is 
consist of at least one independent member in company i in year t and 0 otherwise 
Separate_CEOit = a dummy variable with value 1 if board chair and CEO are filled  
by two different persons in company i in year t and 0 otherwise 
Big4_Auditorit= a dummy variable with value 1 if company i in year t is audited by a 
big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise 
Firm_Sizeit = natural log of asset in company i in year t 
CG_ Reformt= a dummy variable with value 1 if the year t is before reform and 0  
otherwise.    
Zt-1 Categoryit = a dummy variable with value 1 if company i in year t-1 is in Z 
category and 0 otherwise 
Board_Sizeit = total members in the board of directors in company i in year t 
Groupi = a dummy variable with value 1 if company i belongs to any industrial 
group and 0 otherwise  
            All βs are different parameters to be estimated and εit   is the error term 
 
The 2006 reform in Bangladesh mandates that the CEO and Chair of the board should be 
two separate individuals. However, many companies may have already been run by a 
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separate CEO before the reform. Moreover, according to section 2 (e) of BRPD circular no. 
15 of 2002 of the central bank, the CEO of a bank can not be a director or shareholder of a 
bank (Bangladesh Bank 2002b). Therefore, all banking companies may have had a separate 
CEO before the reform. To investigate the effect of having a separate CEO following the 
reform the researcher includes the interaction term Separate CEO*CG_ Reform in the 
following equation:    
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                                                                                                                           … … … (3.3) 
Where,  
DRPTit = the discriminatory related party transactions in company i in year t  
In_Dirit = the number of independent directors in company i in year t  
Audit_Comit= a dummy variable with value 1 if there is an audit committee in 
company i in year t and 0 otherwise 
Separate_CEOit = a dummy variable with value 1 if board chair and CEO are filled  
by  two different persons in company i in year t and 0 otherwise 
Big4_Auditorit= a dummy variable with value 1 if company i in year t is audited by a 
big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise 
Firm_Sizeit = natural log of asset in company i in year t 
CG_ Reformt = a dummy variable with value 1 if the year t is before reform and 0 
otherwise    
Zt-1 Categoryit = a dummy variable with value 1 if company i in year t-1 is in Z 
category  
Board_Sizeit = Total members in the board of directors in company i in year t 
Groupi = a dummy variable with value 1 if company i belongs to any industrial 
group and 0 otherwise 
Separate CEO*CG_ Reformit = an interaction term between Separate CEO and 
CG_Reform  
            All βs are different parameters to be estimated and εit   is the error term 
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All estimated βs represent a measure of the mean effect of each safeguard on DRPTs for all 
companies. Therefore, the above three equations evaluate the effectiveness of the corporate 
governance safeguards on DRPTs for the sample of companies and predict their effect for 
all listed companies. However, the regression result will not provide any information about 
how effective the safeguard is at individual company level. To investigate the effectiveness 
of the safeguards in individual companies the researcher resorts to the following three GCM 
models. The results from these GCM models also provide information on the gradual 
improvement (deterioration) of effect of the safeguard on DRPTs over time. 
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Where,  
DRPTit = the discriminatory related party transactions in company i in year t  
In_Dirit = the number of independent directors in company i in year t  
Audit_Comit= a dummy variable with value 1 if there is an audit committee in 
company i in year t and 0 otherwise 
Separate_CEOit = a dummy variable with value 1 if board chair and CEO are filled   
by two different persons in company i in year t and 0 otherwise 
Big4_Auditorit= a dummy variable with value 1 if company i in year t is audited by a 
big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise 
Firm_Sizeit = natural log of asset in company i in year t 
CG_ Reform= a dummy variable with value 1 if the year is before reform and 0 
otherwise    
Zt-1 Categoryit = a dummy variable with value 1 if company i in year t-1 is in Z 
category and 0 otherwise 
Board_Sizeit = Total members in the board of directors in company i in year t 
            Timet = is a variable with value 0 for the first year, 1 for second year and so on 
Timet *In_Dirit = an interaction term between Timet and In_Dirit  
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            Timet *Audit_Comit = an interaction term between Timet and Audit_Comit 
Timet *In_Audit_Comit = an interaction term between Timet and In_Audit_Comit 
   
All βs are the different fixed parameters to be estimated – this measures the overall effect of 
each independent variable on DRPTs; si are the random coefficient of each independent 
variable which measures the variation in the effect of each of the independent variables on 
DRPTs. This indicates effectiveness of the safeguards  in  individual companies; the 
interaction terms of the independent variables with Time measures how the independent 
variables affect DRPTs over time, and εit   is the error term. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The research approach in this study will involve the use of mixed methods. Quantitative 
analysis based on panel data regression models using secondary data is adopted to address 
all three main research questions proposed in chapter 3. Each main research questions is 
worded in terms of quantifiable relationships that can be observed for the sample when 
analysed as a whole. Additionally, the quantitative empirical approach is applied to address 
the sub-question associated with each main research question. These sub-questions relate to 
the effect of safeguards on DRPTs at an individual company. For their quantitative analysis 
at this level, the growth curve modelling (GCM) technique is used because it can make an 
analysis about relationships in the model at the firm-by-firm level.  For a deeper 
understanding of practices and other phenomena at the firm level, however, qualitative 
methods of analysis are required. Hence, to address the research sub-questions regarding 
probable ineffectiveness of the safeguards of the reform, insights can be gained from 
individual actors in the corporate governance processes at the firm level. This will entail 
semi-structured interviews with a selection of directors (including Audit Committee 
members) of listed companies.  
The first part of this chapter describes and justifies the sample selection and nature of data 
to be collected for quantitative analysis. It also sets out the quantitative methods of analysis 
based on regression and GCM techniques. The second part of this chapter details approach 
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to qualitative data collection and analysis. It explains the sampling method,  interview 
process and analysis of interview transcripts. The last section of the chapter provides the 
definitions and measures for the variables used in the quantitative models that will test the 
three main research questions.    
4.1 Quantitative Methods 
4.1.1 Sample Selection and Sources of Quantitative Data 
There are 240 listed companies on Dhaka Stock Exchange (SEC 2010). Among all the listed 
companies 89 are financial organizations. A random sample of fifty companies is chosen 
from these listed companies and data from years 2002 to 2009 (inclusive) of these sampled 
companies are collected from published annual reports and other corporate documents for 
the modelling. This period is chosen because this period gives symmetry around the 
corporate governance reform year of 2006 i.e. 4 years either side. Also 2002~09 had steady 
economic growth of approximately 6% per annum GDP growth on average. Data were hand 
collected from published annual reports which were obtained from DSE library and some 
downloaded from company websites. Considering the time and resources required for hand 
collection of eight years’ data from library and web search, the researcher considers that 
fifty companies, randomly selected, are sufficient to be representative of the whole 
population of 240 listed companies in Bangladesh. Moreover, using multiple years of data  
controls for unobserved time invariant variables (e.g corporate culture, reputation and so on) 
emboddied in the dataset. This is not possible using a larger sample for single year dataset 
(Wooldridge 2003). Many companies in the sample do not disclose RPT transactions in the 
sample years; others reports RPTs in all or some of the years. Since the study is a panel data 
study, the researcher includes companies which report related party transactions at least for 
five years of the sample period. Based on this criterion, the final sample consists of 182 
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firm-year data of twenty five companies. It is uncommon to have takeovers and winding up 
in listed companies in Bangladesh. So companies were not affected by restructuring or 
discontinuation over the eight year period.  
 
4.1.2 Methods of Quantitative Data Analysis 
4.1.2.1 Fixed versus Random Effects Estimation Method 
The time-series and cross-sectional nature of the data for the study requires that it be 
analysed using the panel data method. There are two alternative panel data methods utilised 
in this study: Fixed Effect estimation method (FE); and the Random Effect estimation 
method (RE).  
 
The FE method can be used when unobserved effects are correlated with explanatory 
variables of the model, while the RE method is suitable when these are not correlated.  
Thus, the nature of the data dictates which method can be applied. Arbitrary assumptions 
about the correlation among unobserved heterogeneous effects and explanatory variables 
may lead to inconsistent estimation of parameters (Green, 2000). Hausman (1978) suggests 
a test for detecting this correlation. The test is based on the idea that if there is no correlation 
between the error term and explanatory variables then the parameter estimation method of 
FE and RE are both consistent, but FE is inefficient. However, if there is correlation then the 
FE is consistent but the RE estimation is not (Greene 2000). Therefore, the test is based on 
the difference between the estimates of the two methods. The test of the correlation between 
unobserved and explanatory variables, which can determine whether to use the FE or RE 
panel data method, is specified as follows:  
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122 )]ˆvar()ˆ[var()ˆˆ(]1[~  REFEREFEkW                            (4.1) 
 
 
Where, W is the Housman test statistic distributed as chi-squared ( 2 ) with (k-1) degree of 
freedom; k is number of parameters to be estimated.  
 
In respect of the FE estimation method, it is described by Wooldridge (2003) through a set 
of equations. He starts with the following model which contains K explanatory variables and 
has ai as the individual heterogeneous factor: 
Ttuaxxx itiitkkitit ,.......,2,1,...................y 2211it           (4.2) 
If equation 4.2 is summed over T and and then divided by T, then it gives: 
 
iiikkii uaxxx   ................... y 2211i                                      (4.3) 
 
 Where iy = 

T
t
it Ty
1
/  and so on.  
Next equation (4.2) is deducted from equation (4.3) to give: 
 
Ttuuxxxxxx iitikitkkiitiit ,.......,2,1,)(..........)()( y-y 2221iit      
Ttuxxxy itktkttit ........2,1,.........2211                             (4.4)                                                                                      
 
Where, the double dotted values in equation (4.4) are time-demeaned data.  
If pooled OLS is used to estimate the parameters of equation (4.4), then the idiosyncratic 
error uit should be uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables across all time periods.  
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The other way to do FE Estimation is to use one dummy variable for each i (in this study i = 
1, 2 ….50) then to run OLS. This way of using the fixed effect method is known as the 
Least Square Dummy Variable method (LSDV). Using LSDV produces the same parameter 
estimation as with the above time-demeaned fixed effect system.  However, the LSDV can 
be problematic as it uses too many dummy variables. For n number of companies (n-1) 
dummy variables have to be used. Therefore, LSDV estimates [(n-1)+k+1] or (n+k) 
numbers of parameters (in this study 25+k). 
Turning to the RE estimation method, Wooldridge (2003) also describes this method 
through a set of equations. He again starts by assuming a model with K explanatory 
variables and ai as the individual heterogeneous factor. If ai is not correlated with the xitj, 
then the RE method is more efficient than FE method.    
 
Ttuaxxx itiitkkitit ,.......,2,1,...................y 2211it                      (4.5) 
 
As ai is not visible, it is within the error term uit. And it makes the error term itiit ua  . 
Therefore,  
 
Ttxxx ititkkitit ,.......,2,1,...................y 2211it                                  (4.6) 
 
Consequently, the error term will be serially correlated as it has time invariant ai in it: 
 
stCorr uaaisit  ),/()(
222
,   
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Using pooled OLS to estimate the RE model will cause bias in the estimated parameter. 
Generalized Least Square (GLS) is robust to serially correlated error terms (Wooldridge 
2003). The GLS is done in the following way: 
 
Suppose, 2/1222 )]/([1 uaa   , where the value of  is between zero and 1. 
 
Now, equation 4.6 is summed over T and divide by T to give: 
iikkii xxx   ................... y 2211i                                                                (4.7) 
 
Next equation (4.7) is multiplied by   and subtracted from equation (4.6) to give: 
)()(..............)()1(yy 11110iit iitikitkkiitit xxxxx     (4.8) 
                                                                                                             
This quasi-demeaned equation is free from serial correlation. If the parameter of the 
equation (4.8) is estimated by OLS this will be a Generalized Least Square Estimation. 
Hence, 
 Can be estimated by )}]ˆ/ˆ(1{1[1ˆ 22 uaT    
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square of the standard error from estimating from equation (4.8) by pooled OLS. Therefore, 
222 ˆˆˆ au    . 
 
4.1.2.2 Growth Curve Modelling 
In GCM, time is included as an independent variable to trace change in the dependent 
variable over time. GCM has the capacity to model the fixed and random part of the 
intercept and the independent variables. Equation 4.9 shows an example of a growth curve 
model: 
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ititkkiitiiii uxxtime  )(...................)()()(y 121it             (4.9) 
 
In the above model  is the fixed intercept and i is the random part of the intercept;  s 
with suffix roman numbers are fixed parameters to be estimated and all i s are the random 
part of each parameter.  
 
GCM provides more information than traditional regression analysis where only the fixed 
part of the parameter is estimated. For example,   indicates the mean of the model and 
i indicates the variation among each company.  
 
Parameters estimated by the FE or the RE model estimate one intercept for the whole model 
and one slope of each explanatory variable. However, the intercept and slope parameters do 
not show how the intercept and slope might vary among individual observations of the data 
set. In the current study, the FE or RE can be used to investigate the research questions 
related to the effect of the 2006 reforms on DRPTs. However, the FE or RE models cannot 
be used to analyse the following research questions: Is the improvement (deterioration) in 
DRPTs following the 2006 reform the same for all companies? 
 
In the FE and RE methods, improvements/deteriorations in DRPTs for all companies are 
averaged. Therefore, improvement/deterioration about individual companies cannot be 
known. The Growth Curve Model (GCM) overcomes this drawback and therefore can be 
used to investigate the above research question.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    Page No. 82 
GCM has been used in medicine for analysis of stroke patient recovery trajectory (Pan et al. 
2008). It has also been used in sociology and psychology for studying growth in the 
delinquent behaviour of adults (Muthén and Muthén 2000) and adolescents (Schaeffer et al. 
2006); and in organizational studies of increasing job satisfaction of employees over a 
period of time (Bliese and Ployhart 2002). However, in the area of accounting and corporate 
governance literature, the researcher is not aware of the use of GCM to date. The parameters 
of the GCM are estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation method. 
4.2 Qualitative Methods 
Qualitative methods are used to investigate the research question related to inefficiencies (if 
any) of the safeguards in the reform 2006 in preventing DRPTs. In-depth face-to-face 
interviews are appropriate to use, considering the nature of the research questions. 
Consideration was also given to the use of focus groups, but the busyness of company 
directors coupled with the sensitivity of the topic made this a non-viable option. 
 
The individual interviewees consisted of board members, audit committee members, and 
independent directors. The interviews were semi-structured in nature. Separate sets of 
questions were prepared for each category of participant. If a board member served on both 
the audit committee and the board, s/he was asked questions from both sets. Questions, 
including tentative follow-up questions, were prepared in advance, and adjustments were 
done as the situation arose during the interview.  
 
Interviews were digitally recorded with the permission of the interviewee. The recordings 
were then transcribed and analysed to get insights about the discrepancies of actual practice 
with the reform requirement. A limitation of the interview method of data collection is that 
participants might not disclose all relevant information. 
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A detailed interview protocol was prepared to ensure that appropriate processes were 
followed regarding digital recording, written consent, and assurance of confidentiality. This 
ensured consistency among interviews. Ethical approval from the university ethics 
committee of the researcher was obtained before any interviews were conducted. 
 
4.2.1 Interview Procedure 
The interviews were conducted over a ten-week period from August 2011 to October 2011. 
To assist the participants in deciding whether or not to participate in the research, they were 
cordially invited to read the interview questions. If the participant agreed to participate in 
this research project, s/he was invited to attend an interview session with the researcher. The 
interview took between 45 minutes and 1.5 hours, and participants were asked questions 
about their experiences and knowledge of corporate governance practices in companies in 
which they hold directorships or serve in an audit committee.  
 
Before the interview, participants were briefed. The researcher explained that he had sought 
to guard against any risk or perceived risk associated with participation in the interview. 
Also the interview data and subsequent publications would ensure participants would 
remain anonymous. Furthermore, participants had the right to withdraw partially or 
completely at any time or to refuse to answer any individual or further questions. The 
interviews were conducted at a time and location convenient to the participant. One 
prospective participant gave the researcher appointments for several times but missed all the 
appointments. Therefore, the researcher had to abandon this one planned participant. 
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4.2.2 Sampling Method  
Non-random sampling is deemed appropriate when the sample selected by a random process 
is not feasible due to access difficulties (Davidson 2006). The non-random sampling method 
is common in qualitative research (Merriam 2009). Personal contact was used to select two 
initial participants and they were requested to refer further participants to the researcher. 
Thus a snowballing of participants occurred. The researcher personally knows several senior 
members of the business community who serve on boards and audit committees of listed 
companies. These directors were approached to take part in an interview. If they express 
their initial interest, they were sent the interview questions and a detailed statement about 
the project to assist them in making their decision about taking part in the interview. In this 
way the researcher interviewed the first two participants. The researcher then requested 
these two participants to suggest names of other potential participants and they contracted 
into the project in the same way as the first two. In this way, another fourteen participants 
were obtained for the interview. Demographic background on participants is given in 
chapter 6. 
4.2.3 Sample Size 
In qualitative research, the concept of saturation is a general guideline used for sample size 
determination. Although helpful, the concept of saturation point is vague. Some literature 
suggests that 5 to 8 participants suffice when the sample is homogeneous and up to12 to 20 
participants for a non-homogenous sample (Crabtree and Miller 1999: 42). Assuming 
homogeneity of the sample of the study, 8 directors, 8 independent directors and 8 audit 
committee members were interviewed. Participants are board members and audit committee 
members of 12 listed companies of Bangladesh. These companies belong to the banking, 
insurance, power, pharmaceuticals and textile industries.  
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4.3 Measurement of Variables 
Independent Director: Under requirements of the 2006 corporate governance reform statute 
an independent director is defined as “a director who does not hold any share in the 
company or who holds less than one percent (1%) shares of the total paid-up shares of the 
company, who is not connected with the company's promoters or directors or those 
shareholders who hold one percent (1%) or more of the total paid-up shares of the company 
on the basis of family relationship; who does not have any other relationship, whether 
pecuniary or otherwise, with the company or its subsidiary/associated companies; who is not 
a member, director or officer of any stock exchange, and who is not a shareholder, director 
or officer of any member of a stock exchange or an intermediary of the capital market” 
(SEC 2006: 2). The number of directors who match these criteria, based on self-reported 
independent directors as disclosed in the company annual report, is used to measure the 
variable. 
 
Audit Committee and Independent Audit Committee:  The study uses two variables related 
to audit committee. In the first model, ‘Audit Committee’ is used as an independent 
variable. The variable is coded 1 if a company has an audit committee in a particular year 
and 0 otherwise. ‘Independent Audit Committee’ is used as an independent variable in the 
second model. Audit committee literature suggests  competence, independence  diligence 
and authority are four key attributes of audit committees (Lary and Taylor 2012). The 
objective of this study is to analyze the effectiveness of reform 2006 in minimizing DRPTs. 
If data were available, the researcher could have included audit committee chair’s financial 
expertise in the study. Unfortunately, companies are not required to, and most companies do 
not, provide any information on the qualification and experience of audit committee 
members in annual reports. All companies, however, have to disclose compliance of the 
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independence of the audit committee members. Therefore, using the annual reports and the 
corporate governance compliance statement it is possible to identify the number of 
independent members on the audit committee. Independence is measured using the number 
of independent members in the audit committee of company in a particular year.   
 
Big4 Audit Firm: In Bangladesh, Hoda Vasi Chowdhury, A Qasem and Co. and SF Ahmed 
are representative firms of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Price Waterhouse Coopers and Ernst 
and Young, respectively; Rhaman Rahman Huq is a member of KPMG International. 
Following  Kabir et al. (2011) the researcher considers firms audited by any of these 
representative or member  firms as Big 4 Audit Firms. 
 
Separate CEO: The researcher categorizes an observation as ‘Separate CEO’ when two 
separate individuals perform the responsibility of the CEO and Chair of the board. The 
variable is coded 1 if board chair and CEO are filled by two different persons and 0 
otherwise. This information is gleaned from the names of the CEO and Chair given in 
annual reports. 
 
Board Size: The total number of board members, including the independent directors, is 
used to measure this variable.  This information is given in annual reports.  
 
DRPTs: This study develops new a measure for DRPTs. The next chapter details the 
measurement. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
A NEW MEASUREMENT FOR DRPTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is related to the achievement of the first objective of this thesis – to develop a 
measure for DRPTs.  As mentioned in the earlier chapter, there is no accurate measure of 
DRPT in literature as yet. The available measures in the literature are: total RPTs, selected 
items of RPTs at company level and the Anti-self Dealing Index at country level. The 
available current measures at company level are prone to high measurement error as these 
measures may contain genuine business purpose transactions. Though the country level 
measure, Anti-self Dealing Index is a sophisticated and comprehensive measure for DRPT, 
thus far there is no systematic effort to develop a measure for DRPTs at a company level.  
This chapter develops a new measure for DRPTs at the company level. Computer 
simulation techniques and real data are used to test the statistical power of the new measure. 
The new measurement is also tested using sensitivity on share prices and compared with the 
existing total RPTs measure. The simulation tests and the market sensitivity test show 
evidence on the superiority of the new measurement over the existing total RPT-based 
proxy measure for DRPTs.  
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The next part of this chapter describes the proposed new measure. After that the research 
method for testing the measure is stated. Then the simulation and real data test results for 
the measure are reported. The final section concludes the chapter.  
5.2 The new DRPT measurement model 
Bebchuk et al. (2000), Dahya et al. (2008) and Jiang et al. (2010) argue that low cash flow 
rights in a company creates incentives for controlling shareholders to tunnel out corporate 
resources to entities where they have more cash flow rights and the power to do that 
tunnelling. To illustrate how conditions of low cash flow rights and high voting power can 
produce tunnelling, consider the following scenario: 
Controlling shareholder, S, has CF1% cash flow right and VC1% voting control 
in firm F1. Simultaneously, S has CF2 cash flow right and VC2 control in firm 
F2.  
S will benefit from any favourable transaction between F1 and F2 if CF1<CF2. Therefore, S 
will be motivated to be involved in a transaction that favours firm F2 and the lower the 
percentage of CF1 the higher the possibility that RPTs of F1 are motivated by asset 
appropriation. Another, important factor that is required for giving F2 a favourable deal is 
the control by S of F1. S can control F1 if it exceeds a certain threshold. Theoretically the 
threshold is more than 50%, however practically much less than that as mentioned in the 
earlier section. However, in general S makes a transaction more favourable to F2 as VC1 
increases. Therefore, VC1 has a direct and CF1 has an inverse relationship with minority 
asset appropriation. 
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Figure 5.1:  Conditions for asset appropriation by related party transactions 
 
  
 
It is assumed in the model in Figure 5.1 that companies will become involved in related 
party transactions for two main reasons: a genuine business purpose and a private benefit for 
controlling shareholders. Based on earlier literature, the researcher further conjectures that 
cash flow right and power of the controlling shareholders are the two motivating factors for 
tunnelling out resources from a company. If the controlling shareholder has less cash flow 
rights in the firm then his motivation to tunnel out is higher than if he has high cash flow 
rights. However, low cash flow right alone is not enough for tunnelling out resources from 
the company. The controlling shareholders must also have enough power to give a 
favourable deal to a related party where they have private benefit. Therefore, control and 
low cash flow right simultaneously influence DRPTs. The researcher uses the following 
regression to separate these DRPTs from genuine related party transactions: 
  
ititititititit SizeConCFCFConRPT   4321 *               (5.1) 
 
Where  
RPTit  is the total related party transactions of company i in year t  
Sizeit is the size of company i in year t  
      F1       F2 
VC1, CF1   VC2, CF2 
CF1<CF2 and VC1 is high enough to control 
F                                                                                                                               
S 
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Conit is the level of voting control of majority shareholders in company i in year t  
CFit  is the percentage cash flow right of the controlling shareholders in company i in 
year t  
CFit*Conit is the interaction term between control and cash flow right of controlling 
shareholders  
εit is the error term   
From empirical results from data run with equation 5.1, 

  would represent average RPTs 
after controlling for size of the company; itititit ConCFCFCon *321

   would 
represent the new measure for DRPTs; and 

it  is the measurement error.  
 
The researcher models related party transactions as: RPT   (Cash Flow Right, Control, 
Size, , s ). The level of cash flow right and control of the controlling shareholders are the 
primarily factors that are expected to influence them to tunnel out resources from the 
company for their private benefit. The coefficients, s , of these variables and the interaction 
of these variable combined provide a measure of the estimated amount of DRPTs in a 
company. In reality, the coefficients s can only be estimated (i.e the

s ) using a sample of 
companies. Therefore,  itititit ConCFCFCon *321

  , the new measurement, 
separates out  those related party transactions influenced by the levels of cash flow right and 
power of the controlling shareholders, from the total related party transactions.    
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5.3 Method of Empirically Testing the DRPT Measurement 
Model  
5.3.1 Data Selection 
Bangladeshi companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange are used for testing the new 
measure for DRPTs. Bangladeshi companies are suitable for the tests at least for two 
reasons. Past studies have shown that minority shareholders are oppressed more in countries 
where there is concentrated power in a group of shareholders (LaPorta et al. 1999) and in 
countries that lack good quality legislation to protect minority shareholders and lax 
enforcement of law (La Porta et al. 1997, LaPorta et al. 1998, LaPorta et al. 2000). Most 
companies in Bangladesh are family firms (Siddiqui 2010) and dominant shareholders of 
founder families resist minority shareholders involvement in companies (Uddin and 
Choudhury 2008, Reaz and Arun 2006). Moreover, the top management of companies of 
Bangladesh are mostly from controlling families or persons loyal to them (Farooque et al. 
2007). Apart from the reform package of 2006, there is minimum protection for minority 
shareholders, with some clauses contained in company law and the banking company act of 
the country. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Bangladesh is the 
government body to monitor listed companies. However, the SEC lacks expert personnel 
(World Bank 2003) and its work is mainly concentrated on formulating stock trading rules 
(Kabir et al. 2011). All these factors make minority shareholders prone to expropriation of 
their share of resources by controlling shareholders.  
Second, the research design used in this study requires a priori indication of DRPTs in 
companies. Each year the SEC categorizes listed companies into four categories: companies 
paying at least 10% dividend and holding annual general meeting (AGM) are labelled A, 
companies paying less than 10% dividend and holding AGM are labelled B, companies 
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neither paying any dividend nor holding an AGM in a particular year are labelled Z, and 
new companies are labelled G (SEC 2005). In Bangladesh many companies do not hold an 
AGM to avoid the anger of minority shareholders on mismanagement and other corporate 
governance weaknesses. This avoidance of facing minority shareholders indicates a high 
possibility of asset expropriation in the Z category companies. This a priori indication of 
DRPTs as reflected in the Z category companies is used in the research design.        
 
5.3.2 Design of Performance Tests for the New and Existing DRPT 
Measurements 
Using equation (5.1), the researcher first partitions the total amount of related party 
transactions into genuine business transactions and DRPTs. The nature of the data in the 
study suggests that it needs to be analysed using the panel data method. The Hauseman test 
suggests that the Fixed Effect method is suitable for the data. 
itititit ConCFCFCon *321

    from equation 5.1 is the total amount of 
transactions for private benefit of controlling shareholders in a particular year and therefore 
is the new measure of DRPTs. To examine how the new measure performs, the researcher 
tested the Type 1 and Type 2 error rates of the measure. After that the error rates are 
compared with an existing measure of DRPTs.11  
A Type 1 error occurs when a researcher fails to reject the null hypothesis when that is 
actually false. One the other hand, a Type 2 error occurs when the researcher rejects the null 
hypothesis when it is actually not false. Type 1 error is analogous to a false fire alarm when 
                                               
 
11  The new measure is compared with total related party transaction measurement. The selected related party 
transaction measure requires detail disclosure of related party transactions in financial statement which our 
sample companies lack.   
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there is no fire or wrongly detecting a disease when someone does not have that disease; 
type two error is analogous to failure to ring the fire alarm when there is a actual fire or not 
detecting someone’s disease by a pathological test when s/he is actually suffering form that 
disease. These two errors are the essence of statistical hypothesis testing. These error rates 
are measured in percentage form; (100% - Type 2 Error rate) is called power of a test. In 
this study, Type 1 occurs if the new measure falsely detects DRPTs when there is no such 
transaction; and a Type 2 error occurs when the measure cannot detect DRPTs when there is 
a related party transaction for private benefit of the controlling shareholders.      
The following regression model is used to detect the Type 1 and Type 2 errors of the 
models.  
                                          PARTDRPTs                         (5.2) 
Where PART is a dummy variable that partitions the sample into two parts and the value of 
the partition point is specified a priori. The sign and significance level of   indicate 
whether the researcher rejects or does not reject the null hypothesis. A similar research 
design has been used in the accounting literature for developing and testing earning 
management proxy measurements (McNichols and Wilson 1988, Dechow et al. 1995, 
Kothari et al. 2005).  
The researcher first calculates the Type 1 and Type 2 error rates of the new measurement 
and then compares these with the error rate of the existing total RPT measurement. 
Algorithms for the tests are as follows:  
Type 1 Error Test 
(i) Five percent of the sample companies are selected at random without 
replacement.    
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(ii) A dummy variable named PART is created. 
(iii) Companies selected at step (1) are coded as 1 and the rest of the sample 
companies are coded 0 for the PART dummy variable. 
(iv) Dummy variable PART is regressed on the new measure of DRPTs i.e 
itititit ConCFCFCon *321

  .  
(v) The above steps are done 1000 times and records are maintained on how 
many times the null hypothesis of no DRPTs is rejected at ten, five and one 
percent significance levels using a one tailed test.12  
Type 2 Error Test (Power of the Measure) 
(i) Eighty percent of the sample firms are selected at random without 
replacement. 
(ii) A dummy variable named PART is created. 
(iii)  PART is coded 1 if a company is in Z category in the next accounting 
year. 
(iv) PART is regressed on the new measure of DRPTs i.e 
itititit ConCFCFCon *321

       
(v) The above steps are done 1000 times and records are maintained on how 
many times the null hypothesis of no DRPTs can not be rejected at ten, 
five and one percent significance levels using a one tailed test. 
                                               
12  For doing all the steps automatically, the researcher coded the algorithms in STATA statistical software. 
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In the above Type 1 error test algorithm, five percent randomly selected companies are 
coded as companies involving DRPTs for the partitioning variable. Therefore, the researcher 
expectation is that the measure fails to reject the null hypothesis of no DRPT. One the other 
hand, in the Type 2 error test algorithm, Zt-1 category companies are taken as the 
partitioning variable. A company may not pay a dividend for various reasons, e.g. the 
company incurred a loss in a particular year or the company wanted to retain profit for 
investing a project instead of paying out dividend to the shareholders. However, when a 
company does not hold an AGM it indicates that the board (who are mostly the controlling 
shareholders or representative of them) wants to avoid the anger of minority shareholders 
for malpractice in the organization including DRPTs. Therefore, the researcher conjectures 
that Zt-1 category companies are prone to asset expropriation through RPTs by the 
controlling shareholders in Bangladeshi companies and expects Zt-1 category companies to 
be positively related to DRPTs.   
 
5.3.3 Measurement of Variables in the New DPRT Model 
Variables contained in the new DRPT measurement model specified above, are described 
and justified as follows:  
RPTs (Total Related Party Transactions)  
Following several earlier studies, this thesis uses the total related party transactions (RPT) 
figure reported in companies’ annual reports. International Accounting Standard 24 defines 
related party transaction as a transfer of resources, services or obligations between related 
parties, regardless of whether a price is charged. The related parties include shareholders, 
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member of board of directors, management, parent or subsidiary company and associated 
person or organizations of these parties.  
CF (Controlling Shareholders’ Cash Flow Right)  
Cash flow right refers to the percentage a shareholder gets of dividend and residuals of a 
company after paying liabilities in the case of liquidation. Bertrand et al. (2002) suggests 
two alternative ways of measuring controlling shareholders’ cash flow right: directors 
ownership in the company and minority shareholders ownership in a company. The first one 
is a directly measure cash flow right, whereas the second one measures cash flow right of 
controlling shareholders in an inverse scale. Following the first approach of Bertrand et al. 
(2002), the researcher uses founder shareholders’ ownership in a company as their cash flow 
right.      
Con (Level of Control by Controlling Shareholders)  
50%+ shares are required for full control of a company. However, as mentioned earlier, a 
20% (or even 10%) owner of a company can control it using dual class, pyramidal or cross 
holding of shares in the corporate group. In empirical research, 20% ownership is used as a 
cut-off point for control of a company (LaPorta et al. 1999, Alves 2010). Preference shares 
in the capital of a company create dual class shares. Cross holding and pyramidal shares are 
seen in corporate groups. The researcher codes Con (Level of Control by Controlling 
Shareholders) as 1 if the founder shareholders’ of a company own more than fifty percent of 
shares (more than twenty percent of shares in the case of a company belongs to a group or 
companies with preference shares in its capital) and 0 otherwise.   
Size  
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This variable is measured as total assets of a company in millions taka (Bangladeshi 
currency). 
Zt-1 Firm  
This is the partitioning variable of equation 5.2. The SEC labels companies neither paying 
any dividend nor holding AGM in the immediate past year as Z companies. When a firm is 
labelled as Z in a particular year by SEC, the preceding year is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. 
5.4 Results of the Model’s Performance Tests 
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 presents an industry classification of the sample companies: financial, food, 
information technology, textile, pharmaceutical and chemical, fuel and power, cement and 
engineering. Table 5.2 presents the summary statistics of the variables in the new DRPT 
measurement model. The mean of the related party transactions is shown in natural 
logarithmic form. Table 5.2 suggests that only part of the total RPTs are tunnelled out from 
the company for private benefit of the controlling shareholders and other related party 
transactions are for genuine business purposes. Total RPTs and DRPTs are visualized in 
Figure 5.2 which shows total RPTs and DRPTs over the sample period of 2002 to 2009.  
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Table 5.1: Sample companies by industry classifications 
Industry Number of firms Number of firm years 
Financial company 13 94 
Food 3 23 
Information Technology 2 14 
Textile 2 16 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals 1 8 
Fuel and Power 2 8 
Cement 1 12 
Engineering 1 7 
Total 25 182 
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics of the variables 
 
Variables 
 
Mean 
 
S.D 
 
Minimum  
 
Maximum 
 
Total Related Party Transactions 637.62 
 
 
1187.26 
 
.03 
 
8627.71 
 
Discriminatory Related Party Transactions  66.75 
 
 
76.66 
 
1.00 332.38 
Cash Flow Right of Controlling Shareholders  42.0 
 
20.02 .10 90 
Total Asset 22.62 
 
2.38 15.40 26.68 
 
Zt-1  Category  
 
.07 
 
- - - 
Note: n = 182, Total Related Party Transactions, Discriminatory Related Party Transactions and Total Asset figures are in log of million Taka (Bangladeshi currency). Cash flow 
right of controlling shareholders are in percentage form. Zt+1 Category is a dummy variable. Out of 182 firm years there are 75 firm years in Zt-1 Category in our sample.    
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Figure 5.2: Total RPT and DRPT over the sample period 2002 to 2009 
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5.4.2 Type 1 and Type 2 (Power) Error Rates of the Measures 
Table 5.3 presents Type 1 and Type 2 test results of the new measurement model. It shows the 
percentage of times the new measurement model fails to reject the null hypothesis at ten, five 
percent and one percent significance level. It also shows the comparison of the test results 
with the existing related party based measurement. Type 1 error rate of both the models are 
pretty low at all the significance levels. However, Type 1 error rate of the new model is lesser 
at all significance levels.  
Table 5.3 also presents the Type 2 error (power) of the two measurements. The new 
measurement performs well at 10% level of significance. The test fails to reject DRPTs by 
controlling shareholders about 95% times in the 1000 runs of the equation 5.2. However, the 
existing total RPT based measurement rejects DRPTs by controlling shareholder only about 
40% times in the 1000 runs of the equation. Therefore, the power of the new model outweighs 
the existing total RPT based measurement i.e 95% vs. 60%. The Type 2 error rate of the new 
measurement is not very satisfactory at 5% and 1% significance levels. However, the error 
rates at these levels are still lower than the total RPT based measurement.        
About half (52%) of the sample firms are from financial companies. Therefore, the researcher 
tests the new measure of DRPT for both the financial companies and non financial companies. 
Table 5.4 presents the Type 1 error rate, Type 2 error rate and power of the new measurement; 
it also compares the result with that of the total RPT based measure. It shows that Type 1 
error rates of the models are low for both measures but DRPTs is still lower than that of the 
total RPTs in all significance levels. However, the Type 2 error rate in this case of the sample 
are high. Error rates are sensitive to sample size. When the sample is split into financial and 
non-financial companies then the sample size becomes almost half of the original sample. The 
lower power of the measurements will be due to the smaller sample size. However, the new 
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measurement still performs better at all significance levels than those the existing total RPT 
based measurement.     
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Table 5.3: Type 1 and Type 2 error (power) of the new and total RPT based measurement 
 Significance Level 
 10% 5% 1% 
Type 1 Error Rate    
         New Measurement 7% 4% 0% 
         Total RPT measurement  9% 8% 4% 
Type 2 Error Rate (Power)    
         New Measurement 5% (95%) 60% (40%) 79% (21%) 
         Total RPT measurement  40% (60%) 80% (20%) 98% (2%) 
Note: The result is based on 1000 regressions runs of each measurement at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance (one tail test). Figures in the parenthesis show the power of each 
measurement at respective significance level.  
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Table 5.4: Type 1 and Type 2 error result of the new and total RPT based measurement 
for financial companies and non-financial companies 
 Significance Level 
 10% 5% 1% 
Financial Companies    
        Type 1 Error Rate    
                          New Measurement 8% 5% 0% 
                          Total RPT measurement  11% 7% 3% 
        Type 2 Error Rate (Power)    
                          New Measurement 3% (97%) 40% (60%) 65% (35%) 
                         Total RPT measurement  65% (35%) 90% (10%) 97% (3%) 
Non-Financial Companies    
        Type 1 Error Rate    
                         New Measurement 8% 4% 1% 
                          Total RPT measurement  10% 9% 3% 
        Type 2 Error Rate (Power)    
                          New Measurement 40% (60%) 65% (35%) 92% (8%) 
                         Total RPT measurement  82% (18%) 94% (6%) 100% (0%) 
Note: The result is based on 1000 regressions of each measurement at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance 
(one tail test). Figures in the parenthesis show the power of each measurement at respective significance level. 
                                                   Page No.105 
5.4.3 Further Evidence: DRPTs sensitivity on firms’ market value  
Past studies suggest that curbing DRPTs in a company effects firm value positively (Atanasov 
et al. 2010, Black and Khanna 2007) as investors positively react to curbing DRPTs in their 
investment decisions. For example, the study by Atanasov et al. (2010) finds that the 2002 
reform in Bulgaria made a significant contribution to reducing DRPTs which were reflected 
positively in the increase of firm value after the reform. The finding of the study by Black and 
Khanna (2007) that evaluates reform 2000 in India is consistent with Atanasov et al (2010); 
the share price of the Indian listed companies increase by 4% after one day of the 
announcement of the reform. Likewise, Black and Khanna (2007) contend that investors 
perceived the potential of the reform to reduce DRPTs and other malpractice in Indian 
corporations as this was manifested in the share prices at the time.  
 
This section provides further evidence on the acceptability of the new measure of DRPTs by 
showing the sensitivity of firm’s market value to the measure. To test the sensitivity of market 
value to the measure, the researcher plotted the share price of each firm against the DRPTs 
using the new measurement model, itititit ConCFCFCon *321

   and total RPTs  
over the sample period. Figure 5.3 plots share price and the new DRPTs measure. It shows 
that the share price line and DRPTs line diverge in many sample companies which indicates 
an inverse relationship between the two. However, this sensitivity is not quite clear in Figure 
5.4 which plots share price and total RPTs of the sample companies. This suggests higher 
sensitivity of market value of a company on the new measure over total RPTs as a measure of 
DRPTs.      
 
To get a clearer picture of market sensitivity of the new DRPT measures, the researcher  uses 
six Olson models (Ohlson 1995); the first three models contains the new measurement and the 
last three models include total RPTs. There is a significant negative effect of DRPTs on share 
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price of firms in all of the first three models. This result is consistent with the fact that the 
new measure reflects discriminatory behaviour of controlling shareholders to minority 
shareholders which reduces firm value. The later three models show no effect of total RPTs 
on share price. This insignificant result may be due to high measurement errors in the existing 
total RPT based measure; therefore, the effect is attenuated by the high genuine RPTs in the 
total RPTs.     
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Figure 5.3:  The new measure of DRPTs and share price: company-by-company plots 
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Figure 5.4:  Total RPTs and share price: company-by-company plots 
 
 
 Page No.108 
 
 
 
Table 5.5:  Sensitivity of DRPT on share price: panel data regression results  
 Sensitivity of DRPT on  
share price 
Sensitivity of Total RPT on 
share price 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 
 
296.73 
(90.47) 
 
-512.51 
(449.47) 
-396.03 
(594.38) 
 
 
-55.73 
(323) 
-865.65 
(531) 
-396.08 
NAV .74*** 
(.12) 
 
.75*** 
(.12) 
.75*** 
(.12) 
 
 
.74*** 
(.12) 
.74*** 
(.12) 
.74*** 
(.12) 
EPS .31 
(.52) 
 
.09 
(.60) 
.04 
(.62) 
 
 
.12 
(.61) 
-.05 
(.60) 
.09 
(.61) 
DRPT -50.25** 
(23.05) 
 
-44.01* 
(23.38 
-42.46* 
(22.64) 
 
 
- - - 
Total RPT - 
 
 
- - 10.61 
(17.46) 
 
 
-.48 
(18.86) 
-.38 
(19.12) 
Volatility 1.01*** 
(.06) 
 
.98*** 
(.06) 
.99*** 
(.06) 
1.01*** 
(.05) 
 
 
.98*** 
(.06) 
.98*** 
(.06) 
Total Asset - 
 
 
35.55 
(19.49) 
29.19 
(27.97) 
- 45.48** 
(23.72) 
 
 
41.67 
(32.98) 
Bank  
 
- - 47.38 
(131.46) 
 
- - 29.65 
(151.74) 
 
 
R2  .84 
 
 
.84 .84 .82 .83 .83 
 
 
 
n 182 182 182 182 182 
 
 
182 
Note:* p< .1, ** p< .05, *** p< .01  
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5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter the researcher has developed and tested a new measurement for DRPTs. The 
new measure has also been compared with an existing proxy measure of DRPTs. The current 
research literature’s use of the total RPTmeasure and selected RPTmeasures as proxies for 
DRPTs is theoretically weak, and prone to be high in measurement error. The new DRPT 
measurement developed in this chapter is founded on improved theoretical underpinning. The 
high measurement error in the previous proxy measures arises because these proxies contain 
both legitimate RPTs and discriminatory (i.e., asset expropriations) RPTs. Current literature 
suggests low cash flow right and high voting control of controlling shareholders are the prime 
motivators for DRPTs. The proposed new measure uses these two variables in separating out 
asset expropriation transactions from genuine related party transactions.  
Several test results show satisfactory results in favour of the new measure. Test results show 
that error rates and power of the new measure are satisfactory and comparatively better than 
that of the existing total RPT based measure. Though Type 1 error rates of total RPTs are low, 
Type 2 error rates of the measure are very high. However, the new measure has low error 
rates in both cases. Furthermore, the new measure is sensitive to share price of a firm, which 
confirms acceptability of the new measure as a measure of discriminatory transactions of 
controlling shareholders. However, the total RPT based measure does not impact on firms’ 
share price.  
The empirical evidence in this chapter highlights the drawback of prior DRPT measures and 
the superiority of the new measure. This new measure separates out asset expropriating 
transactions from genuine RPTs and thus provides a better measure for empirical researchers 
in accounting. It is also a measure that can better estimate the actual extent of DRPTs at the 
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company level and hence, can provide policy-makers and minority shareholder with improved 
information to assist in protection from DRPTs.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
 
FINDINGS: EVALUATION OF THE 2006 REFORM  
FROM THE DRPTS PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results related to the second research objective of this thesis – to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the corporate governance reforms of 2006 in Bangladesh 
(referred to as reform 2006) for protecting minority shareholders from DRPTs. In chapter 3 
the researcher developed several research questions to address this objective. Also chapter 3 
developed several models to answer those research questions. These models are tested using 
quantitative research methods. However, as explained in Chapter 4, qualitative methods are 
also used. The researcher conducted several semi-structured interviews to get insights about 
the research questions. The researcher has then tested the quantitative models using secondary 
data collected from corporations in Bangladesh and has analysed transcription of the 
interviews. This chapter presents both the quantitative analysis of secondary data to test the 
models and qualitative analysis from the text of the interviews. Hence, there are two main 
sections in this chapter – the quantitative section details the analysis and results of the models  
and the qualitative section presents the finding of the interviews.     
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6.2 Quantitative Analysis and Results   
 
In this sub-section, the descriptive statistics are presented followed by the multivariate 
analysis of the quantitative models from chapter 3.  
6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics on the 182 firm-year observations of this study. The 
table separates firms into financial and non-financial sectors. There are 94 (51%) firm-year 
observations from financial companies and the rest 88 (49%) are from non-financial 
companies. The mean RPT of sampled companies for all the observations is 637.62 million 
taka (A$ 8.98 million). The non-financial firms’ average total RPTs are higher than that of the 
financial firms, 805.70 million (A$ 11.35 million) vs. 480.28 million (A$ 6.76 million). This 
is probably because of the legal restriction of board approval for related party loans from 
financial companies. As previously mentioned, total DRPT is only a part of total RPTs as the 
later contains both genuine business transactions and DRPTs. Like the total RPT, DRPTs in 
financial companies are also lower than that of financial companies – mean DRPT of financial 
companies is 54.40 million taka (A$ 0.77 million) and 84.07 million taka (A$ 1.18 million) in 
non-financial companies. This is probably because of higher regulation in financial 
companies. 
 
On average sampled companies have 10 members on their board. Financial companies have a 
comparatively larger board size (12 members on average) compared to the non-financial 
companies (7 members on average). Most sample companies changed board size over the 
sample period 2002 to 2009 (see Figure 6.1). 
 
The board of the sampled companies had 0 to 3 independent directors during the sample 
period. Financial companies in the sample have a higher number of independent directors 
ranging from 0 to 3 compared to non-financial companies (0 to 2). This is because the reform 
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recommends at least 10 percent of the board to be independent members. As the sample’s 
financial companies have a higher number of board members, they have higher independent 
directors. The number of independent directors changed over the sample period because of the 
reform 2006 (see Figure 6.2). Bangladesh did not have a culture of appointing independent 
director on company boards before the reform. There was no independent director in any of 
the sample companies except two before the reform (sample number 7 and 8). Further 
inspection of the data reveals that these two non-financial companies are local subsidiaries of 
two foreign companies, who voluntarily appointed independent directors to their board just a 
few years before the reform.   
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of the sampled firms 
Variable  n Mean S. D Min. Max. 
All Companies      
Total RPT 
 
182 637.62 
 
1187.26 
 
.03 
 
8627.71 
 
DRPT 
 
182 66.75 76.66 
 
1 332.38 
Total Asset 182 28531.89 43960.28 4.88 278302.80 
Independent Directors 
 
182 .41 .58 
 
0 3 
Independent Audit Committee 182 .35 
 
.48 0 1 
Board Size 182 
 
10.02 3.92 3 23 
Financial Companies       
Total RPT 
 
94 480.28 746.84 10.68 3371.39 
DRPT 
 
94 54.40 51.42 1 247.72 
Total Asset 
 
94 51781.92 51059.07 3737.5
2 
278302.80 
Number of  Independent Directors 
 
94 .29 .52 0 3 
Independent Audit Committee 
 
94 .27 .44 0 1 
Board Size  94 
 
12.34 3.67 6 23 
Non-financial Companies       
Total RPT 
 
88 805.70 1510.31 .03 8627.72 
DRPT 
 
88 84.07 94.56 1 332.39 
Total Asset 
 
88 3696.63 5073.46 4.88 19891.93 
Independent Directors 
 
88 .53 .62 0 2 
Independent Audit Committee  
 
88 .42 .49 0 1 
Board Size  88 7.54 
 
2.36 3  11 
Note: Total RPT, DRPTs and Total Asset figures are in million Taka (Bangladeshi currency).  Independent 
directors, independent audit committee members and board size are in number of individuals.   
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Figure 6.1 Board sizes of the sample companies 
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           Figure 6.2: Number of independent director in the sample companies 
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Both financial and non-financial companies in the sample have a maximum one independent 
member on their audit committee during the whole sample period. Many companies in the 
sample had audit committees before the reform. This is because the sample contains financial 
companies which were required to have an audit committee before the reform according to the 
central bank regulation. All companies however formed an audit committee after the reform 
except one non-financial company which is yet to form any audit committee even after three 
year of the reform.  
 
Many of the sampled companies included an independent member on their audit committee 
after the reform 2006, though some are yet to follow this reform provision. Seven companies 
(28%) of all the sampled firms do not have an independent member on their audit 
committee. 13  Among the non-compliance firms, four are financial companies and the 
remaining three are non-financial companies. Therefore, the non-compliance among financial 
companies (30%) is slightly higher than that of non-financial companies (25%). There are 
independent members on the audit committee of two companies before the reform. As 
mentioned above, these two non-financial companies are local subsidiaries of two foreign 
companies, who voluntarily appointed independent members to their audit committee before 
the reform.  
 
Reform 2006 stipulates that the office of CEO and Chair of the board should not be held by a 
single individual. That is, duality of role of the CEO and Chair was strongly discouraged 
under reform 2006. Many of the sampled companies had a separate CEO in the company 
before the reform. All the financial companies have a separate CEO on their board for the 
                                               
13 This finding is consistent with the recent SEC report on compliance corporate governance which shows that 
74.34% listed companies fully and 20.39% partly complied the reform directive and the rest 5.27% did not 
submit report to SEC SEC 2011. 'Securities and Exchange Comission of Bangladesh Annual Report  2010-11.' 
This suggests the random sample is representative of the population i.e all listed companies in Bangladesh. 
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whole sample period. The reason for this is that the financial companies are required to have a 
separate CEO according to central bank’s regulation (Bangladesh Bank 2002b). However, 
non-financial companies which did not have a separate CEO before the reform (41%) are 
reluctant to comply with this reform. Only one company in the sample appointed a CEO after 
the reform.   
 
6.2.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 6.2 gives the bi-variate correlations  between the dependent variable (DRPT) and the set 
of independent and control variables specified in the primary model in this study, model 3.1 
in Table 3.  It reveals that only three of the independent variables are significantly correlated 
with DRPT. First, independent directors is weakly significantly correlated with DRPT (r = -
.12, p<.1).  This is a preliminary indication that when the number of independent directors on 
the board is higher, then the incidence of DRPTs will be lower. Second, there is a strong 
correlation between the engagement of a Big4 Auditor and the extent of DRPTs (r = -.47, 
p<.001).  This indicates a lower incidence of DRPTs in a company when that is audited by 
any of a Big4 audit firm. Third, there is a strong correlation between companies within an 
industrial group and extent of DRPTs. This is also a primary indication that companies in 
groups engage in DRPTs more than non-group companies.   
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Table 6.2: Correlation Matrix of Variables of the Study 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. DRPTs 
 
1.00 
 
         
2. Independent Directors 
 
-.12* 
 
1.00         
3.Audit Committee 
 
-.20 
 
.34*** 1.00        
4.Independent Audit Committee   -.05 
 
.89*** .44*** 1.00       
5. Big4 Auditor -.47*** .09 
 
.19*** .03 1.00      
6. Board Size -.04 
 
-.01 .35*** -.01 .10 1.00     
7.Z t-1 Category   .10 
 
-.12* -.03 -.10 -.16** .18*** 1.00    
8.Company Size 
 
-.80 .07 .51*** .10 .25*** .65*** -.12* 1.00   
9.Group  .31*** 
 
.11 -.20*** .14** -.21*** -.36*** -.01 -.36*** 1.00  
10. Financial companies  -.08 
 
-.20*** .39*** -.15** .21*** .61*** -.01 .75*** -.61*** 1.00 
Note:* p< .1, ** p< .05, *** p< .01 
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6.2.3 Panel Data Regression Analysis 
 
To answer the research questions in chapter 3, the researcher has run four regression 
models developed and discussed in chapters 3 and 4. These regression models have been 
developed to analyse the effects of different safeguards introduced in the reform (e.g. 
independent directors, audit committee, separate CEO and so on) on DRPTs. The results 
are presented in Table 6.3.  
 
For the four models, the results in Table 6.3 first show that there is no effect of 
independent directors on DRPTs. That is, having an independent director in the board 
does not affect DRPTs in Bangladeshi companies. This result is similar to the finding of  
Chung et al. (2006) but different from studies by Gallery et al. (2008) Gao and Kling 
(2008), Dahya et al. (2008), and  Cheung (2009a) who find a significant inverse 
relationship of independent directors with DRPTs.  
 
Second, the audit committee also shows no significant effect on DRPT in Table 6.3. 
Therefore, having an audit committee does not affect the amount of DRPT in 
Bangladeshi companies during the sample period.  This result is different from the result 
of Cheung et al.(2006) who finds significant inverse relationship of audit committee and 
DRPT; however the result is similar to the finding of Gallery et al. (2008)  who fails to 
find any relationship of the two variables.  
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Table 6.3: Regression Results for effects of Reform 2006 factors on the level of 
DRPTs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 
 
2.58 
(2.42) 
2.38 
(2.43) 
2.26 
(2.41) 
 
4.66* 
(2.88) 
Independent director 
 
 
.01 
(.21) 
- -.01 
(.21) 
.06 
(.21) 
 
Audit Committee 
 
.19 
(.26) 
 
- .17 
(.27) 
.17 
(.26) 
Separate CEO 
  
.16 
(.52) 
 
.18 
(.50) 
.33 
(.53) 
.27 
(.51) 
Firm Size 
 
.03 
(.11) 
 
.03 
(.11) 
.04 
(.11) 
-.10 
(.14) 
Big4 Audit Firm 
 
-.48* 
(.26) 
 
-.45* 
(.25) 
-.50** 
(.26) 
-.47* 
(.26) 
Z-1 Category 
 
.60* 
(.34) 
.59* 
(.34) 
.62* 
(.35) 
 
.57* 
(.34) 
Board Size 
 
-.03 
(.04) 
 
-.02 
(.04) 
-.03 
(.04) 
-.04 
(.04) 
Reform  
 
-.16 
(.23) 
 
.04 
(.22) 
.14 
(.44) 
-.10 
(.23) 
Group  
 
.93* 
(.49) 
 
.97** 
(.49) 
.91** 
(.49) 
 
1.35** 
(.59) 
Independent Audit Committee  
 
- -.20 
(.26) 
 
- - 
Separate CEO * Reform 
 
 - -.34 
(.42) 
 
- 
Financial Companies - - - 1.09 
(.80) 
 
R2 .28 .29 .28 
 
.30 
N 182 182 
 
182 182 
Note:* p< .1, ** p< .05, *** p< .01  
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Third, the regression result in Table 6.3 shows that big four audit firms are significantly 
inversely related to DRPT. This is consistent with the finding of Gao et al. (2008) but 
differs with Cheung et al (2009) that fails to find any relationship between the two. 
Therefore, the result suggests that companies audited by big four audit firms have less 
DRPTs in Bangladeshi listed companies.  
 
Fourth, firms with a Z categorization in the previous year have significantly higher 
DRPTs than that of non Z categorized firms. Moreover, like the study by  Bertrand et al. 
(2002), this study also finds significantly higher DRPTs in companies in the industrial 
group than companies not in that group.  
 
Regression Model 1 includes the existence of an audit committee to test its effect on 
DRPTs. However, the goal of the research is to evaluate the 2006 reform. As mentioned 
earlier, many companies had an audit committee before the 2006 reform. However, the 
reform initiated the recommendation to have only independent members in the audit 
committee. Model 2 tests the effect on DRPTs of having independent members on the 
audit committee. The result, however, finds no effect of independent audit committee 
members on DRPTs.  
 
Many companies had a separate CEO and Chair before the reforms. None of the 
regression models find any effect of having a separate CEO on DRPTs which is 
consistent with the earlier DRPT research (Cheung et al. 2006, Gallery et al. 2008). Only 
one sample firm in the study appointed a separate CEO after the reform. Model 3 
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includes an interaction term between ‘Separate CEO’ and ‘Reform’ in order to study such 
change. The result shows that the company which made such a change does not have any 
effect on its DRPTs. This non-significant effect may be due to the small number of 
sample companies that appointed a separate CEO or may be due to real ineffectiveness of 
having a separate CEO.   
 
About half of the sample companies of this study are financial companies. To test 
whether financial companies are different from non-financial firms, model 4 controls 
financial companies as a dummy variable. However, the result shows that there is no 
effect of being a financial company on DRPTs.  The effect of other variables does not 
change much in the model. 
 
As mentioned in the descriptive statistic sections, two of the sample companies are a local 
subsidiary of a foreign company. They had independent directors and independent audit 
committee members before the reform. The researcher excluded these two companies 
from the sample firms and re-ran all the models. However, the results of the models 
remain almost the same.  
  
To check for any multicollinearity among the independent variables of the study, the 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) of each independent variable is calculated. Though there 
is no precise cut-off point for indication of multicollinearity, a VIF greater than 10 is 
often used as a rule of thumb for the presence of multicollinearity among independent 
variables of a regression model. The highest VIF of the models’ independent variables is 
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4.16 indicating that the independent variables in the study are free from any 
multicollinearity problem.  
 
 
6.2.4 Growth Curve Modelling (GCM) Result 
 
To investigate the research questions related to companies’ individual performance, the 
study uses the GCM technique. As mentioned earlier, GCM provides analysis which can 
supplement the regression results.  
 
All three GCM models in the study find the following coefficients to be significant: 
)( _ DirectortIndependen , )( __ CommitteeAuditetIndepenedn , and )( _ CEOSeparate . This suggests the 
existence of high dispersion in the corporate governance safeguards on DRPTs in the 
sample companies. This significant dispersion in the above effects suggests that the non- 
significant effect of these independent variables on DRPTs found in the regression 
models may be due to the cancelling out of larger effects with smaller effects among 
sample companies. The results in Table 6.4 of GCM Model 1 show that the interaction 
effect between time and independent directors is significant. This indicates that 
independent directors are becoming more effective over the 2002-09 period of study at 
preventing DRPTs in Bangladeshi listed companies. This is probably because the 
independent directors are in the process of learning their job as independent directors. 
However, the interactions between time and audit committee in Model 2 and between 
time and independent audit committee members in Model 3 are insignificant. This 
suggests no improvement of these safeguards over the sample period.   
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Table 6.4: GCM Results for effects of Reform 2006 factors on level of DRPTs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Constant 
 
6.66*** 
(2.35) 
6.75*** 
(2.36) 
6.76*** 
Independent director 
 
.20 
(.58) 
.17 
(.57) 
- 
Audit Committee 
 
.15 
(.29) 
.22 
(.33) 
- 
Separate CEO 
  
-.10 
(.56) 
-.27 
(.60) 
-.04 
(.57) 
Firm Size 
 
-.16 
(.11) 
-.16 
(.11) 
-.17 
(.11) 
Big 4 Audit Firm 
 
-.57*** 
(.22) 
-.57*** 
(.22) 
-.43** 
(.23) 
Z-1 Category 
 
.16 
(.26) 
.13 
(.26) 
.17 
(.26) 
Board Size 
 
.05 
(.03) 
.05 
(.03) 
.06* 
(.03) 
Time .09 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.14) 
.10 
(.08) 
Reform 
 
.03 
(.25) 
.04 
(.24) 
-.05 
(.23) 
Time * Independent Director -.14* 
(.08) 
-.12 
(.09) 
- 
Time*Audit committee  - -.07 
(.10) 
- 
Time* Independent Audit Committee - - -.11 
(.10) 
  
Random Coefficient 
 
 
  
 (Constant) 
 
.78** 
(.47) 
.80** 
(.49) 
.84** 
(.47) 
 ( Time ) .25*** 
(.06) 
.25*** 
(.06) 
.27*** 
(.06) 
 ( DirectortIndependen _ ) 1.39*** 
(.33) 
1.39*** 
(.33) 
- 
 ( CommitteeAudit _ ) .42 
(.38) 
.42 
(.38) 
- 
 ( CEOSeparate _ ) 1.03*** 
(.46) 
1.01*** 
(.49) 
1.06*** 
(.48) 
 ( CommitteeAudittIndependen __ ) - - 1.73*** 
(.39) 
Note:* p< .1, ** p< .05, *** p< .01  
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6.3 Qualitative Research Finding 
 
As explained in the methods chapter, several interviews were conducted to get a deeper 
understanding about the research question concerning what attitudinal and behavioural 
influences underlie the ineffectiveness of the safeguards against DRPTs set out in the 
2006 reform. Because of the nature of this research question, semi-structured interviews 
are used. This section presents the findings of the interviews and suggests probable 
reasons for the ineffectiveness of the safeguards in the reform.      
 
6.3.1 Demographic Information on the Interview Participants 
 
Tables 6.5 to 6.8 present the demographic background of the interviewees. The average 
age of the interviewees is 56.38 years. The mean age of the independent and non-
independent directors is 57.12 years and 55.63 years respectively. Note that the non-
independent directors are made up of the founder and executive directors. All the non-
independent directors are businessmen except two – one is the CFO of a power/energy 
company, the other is the CEO of a financial institution. The professional backgrounds of 
the independent directors are from diverse areas: academic, public accounting practice, 
corporate accountants and ex-bureaucrats. Half of the independent directors (50%) 
interviewed are academicians working in different public and private universities; two are 
(25%) retired bureaucrats with active involvement with social and voluntary 
organizations and two are a business executive and a partner of a chartered accountancy 
firm.  
 
The interviewees who are members of audit committees are also from diverse 
professional backgrounds. Among the eight participants, three are academician, one is a 
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public accountant, two are business executives and the other two are retired bureaucrats. 
Like their profession, academic backgrounds of the audit committee members are also 
diversified: one from engineering, four from accounting and finance, and two are from 
liberal arts background. 
 
 
Table 6.5: Professional Background of Participants 
Profession                   Total Number 
Businessman  6 
 
Academician 4 
 
Public Accounting Practice 1 
 
Business Executive  3 
 
Retired Bureaucrat  2 
Total 16 
 
 
 
Table 6.6: Professional Background of Non-Independent Directors 
 
Profession  Total Number 
Businessman   6 
 
Academicians  0 
 
Public Accounting Practice   0 
 
Business Executives  2 
 
Retired Bureaucrats   0 
 
Others  0 
 
Total  8 
 
 
 
 Page No.127
 
 
Table 6.7: Professional Background of Independent Directors 
Profession  Total Number 
Businessman   0 
 
Academicians  4 
 
Public Accounting Practice   1 
 
Business Executive  1 
 
Retired Bureaucrat   2 
 
Total  8 
 
 
Table 6.8: Educational Background of Independent Directors 
 
Profession  Total Number 
Engineering   1 
 
Accounting and Finance  4 
 
Liberal Arts and Social Science   2 
 
Not-disclosed  1 
 
Total   8 
 
 
6.3.2 Independence of Independent Directors in Bangladesh   
 
According to the reform guidelines exiting directors select the independent director to 
their board. Most corporations in Bangladesh are run by powerful founder family 
members who make all major decisions and follow state laws as a matter of formality 
(Uddin and Choudhury 2008). The appointment of genuinely-independent directors could 
curtail the the founder family’s dominance and private benefit; therefore the existing 
controlling shareholders are likely to choose someone who is tame and under their 
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influence. The interviews with non-independent directors reveal that the exiting directors 
select independent director(s) who do(es) not cause any trouble in the board. One 
independent director admits: 
 
The independent director is just a compliance requirement. The selection of independent 
directors depends on the CEO and the Chair of the Board. Either the chair of the board or 
the CEO finds someone who would not cause any problem in the board. Other directors 
normally accept the candidate selected by the CEO or Chair as they are getting assurance 
from them that the independent director(s) would not cause any problem in their affairs.  
 
 
One sponsor director frankly states in the same way: 
 
 
Independent directors are selected by the exiting directors based on the criterion that 
these directors would not disturb them in their affairs and would listen to them. I have 
seen this in many companies where I sit as a director.  
  
The corporate governance reform 2006 restricts any relationship either pecuniary or 
otherwise with a company for an independent director. However, it does not say anything 
about the relationship with influential individuals in the company. The interview reveals 
that many of the independent directors are linked with the influential person in the board. 
One independent director notes: 
 
I had a link with the board. Therefore, they took me in when they required complying 
with the SEC corporate governance guidelines. Normally the board nominates such a 
person who complies with the guidelines, just for the sake of complying with the rule.   
 
Effectiveness of the safeguard through the mechanism of ‘tamed’ independent director is 
highly unlikely.  Independent directors who sit on the ex-colleague’s or friend’s 
company’s board are likely to be biased towards the interests of that person in doing their 
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job. The collegial and inter-personal culture within the board prevents independent 
directors speaking out for minority shareholders (Monks and Minow 2003). The 
interviews reveal that many independent directors fail to take due care of their duties 
when they should report concerns to the board or the SEC. One independent member of 
an audit committee of a financial organization states: 
 
If the CEO spends Tk. 500,000 for any purpose and there is the Chair’s consent for that, 
then even though it may be for an abnormal purpose, we do not do anything as it is 
consented by the chair. The practice is not always what is written in the rule.   
 
The inference from these interviews about the independence of directors appointed  to 
Boards of Bangladeshi corporations under the SEC’s criteria is  consistent with the claim 
by Dahya et al. (2008) that controlling shareholders do not choose true independent 
directors as that would cause a loss of private benefit to the controlling shareholders.  
 
 
 
6.3.3 Audit Committee Competence 
  
As already mentioned in the literature review chapter, accounting knowledge and 
experience are pivotal attributes of a competent audit committee (Bedard et al. 2004, Lary 
and Taylor 2012). Many audit committee members in Bangladesh lack either or both of 
these vital attributes for their job. The corporate governance guidelines stipulate that the 
chairperson of the audit committee should have professional qualifications or knowledge, 
and understanding and experience in accounting or finance. Requiring only the 
chairperson, not other audit committee members, to have accounting or finance expertise 
seems a very lenient requirement for assuring the formation of a competent audit 
committee. The interviews with the audit committee members reveals that lack of 
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knowledgeable and experienced members make some committees like a one man show 
and other members of the committee as spectators. One audit committee member with 
accounting background notes:  
 
The other two audit committee members completely depend on me. They ask my opinion 
in most cases. If all of them had accounting and finance background we could have 
performed much better. 
 
Some of the committee members interviewed held incompatible education background 
e.g sociology, water resource engineering and so on (See Table 6.9). Some of these 
participant mentioned that they have fellow audit committee members even with degree 
in medicine. These interviews revealed that inappropriately qualified members struggle 
in doing their job on the audit committee. An independent audit committee member with 
a sociology education background notes: 
 
At the beginning I was very uncomfortable with my role on the audit committee. I start 
leaning. I collected the government guidelines and books about audit committee. My son 
has an MBA in Finance. He helped me a lot to learn the basic things in finance and 
accounting. I used to take some books in the audit committee meeting and used those 
during meetings. I think a Chartered Accountant would perform better in this position. 
 
Hence, the lenient requirement for expertise on the audit committee in Bangladesh tends 
to make this committee just a formality of compliance rather than fulfilling an effective 
role of vetting the financial statements and monitoring the internal and external audit 
functions of the company. In this sense, the audit committee seems to achieve little more 
for minority shareholders and wider stakeholders than increasing the burden of 
compliance cost. 
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Table 6.9: Audit Committee Competence 
  Total Number 
Profession Background   
               
              Businessman  
  
0 
               
              Academicians 
  
3 
               
              Public Accounting Practice  
  
1 
               
              Business Executives 
  
2 
               
              Retired Bureaucrats  
  
2 
               
              Total 
  
8 
Education Background    
               
              Engineering  
  
1 
               
              Accounting and Finance 
  
4 
               
              Arts and Social Science  
  
2 
               
               Not-disclosed 
  
1 
               Total                     8 
 
 
 
6.3.4 DRPTs Approval in Bangladeshi Companies 
 
Though banking companies in Bangladesh requires board approval for related party 
loans, there is no regulatory requirement in non-financial companies for approval of 
RPTs by the board, or even a requirement for discussion of RPTs by the board. The 
interview process reveals that there is no voluntary discussion of RPTs in board meetings 
nor do the board members feel the necessity for that. One board member comments:   
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We do not discuss related party transactions in board meeting. There is disclosure for that 
in the annual report and these are audited by external auditor. Therefore, I think we 
should not do that. 
 
In relation to financial companies, the interviews reveal that these companies do discuss 
RPTs in the board meetings. As already mentioned financial companies require board 
approval for a loan to a related party. An interview reveals that, although RPTs are 
discussed in the board of financial companies, the terms and conditions of these loans are 
questionable and more favourable than that of arms-length transactions. Non-interested 
board members do not oppose these approvals because they may desire similar treatment 
in their case at some stage in the future. One independent board member of a bank 
frankly states:         
 
We discuss related party transaction in board meetings. However, if any director has any 
interest in any of these transactions, normally other non-interested director do not want to 
discuss that issue much to avoid any conflict with that director. They do that because in 
future they may require similar favourable treatment from the board.  
 
This revelation is consistent with Siddiqui and Podder (2002) and Ahmed (2012b), who 
find a high percentage of bad loans in Bangladeshi commercial banks which are in many 
cases caused by disbursement to directors, directors’ relatives or related organizations 
without considering the creditworthiness of these borrowers. This finding is also 
consistent with  Silanes et al. (2003) who show that the borrowing terms offered to 
related parties of Mexican banks are much more favourable than those available to 
unrelated ones and often  related parties are less credit worthy.   
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6.3.5 The Stance of the Board’s Chair  
 
Delegation of responsibilities to professional managers by the owners is the normal mode 
of operation as corporations become larger. However, the deeply-held attitude of founder 
shareholders in Bangladesh corporations is to resist this need to delegate responsibilities 
to professional managers. Many founder shareholders hold the position of chair of the 
board and take the stance that the listed company is their family business. They view the 
CEO and top executives as their loyal and obedient employees. One founder director of a 
bank states: 
 
Appointment and remuneration of the CEO is mainly decided by the chair of the board. 
Therefore, CEOs generally try to keep the chair happy and do not do anything that may 
cause any conflict with the chair. In black and white they are supposed to work 
independently but the reality is different. The chair of the board is a major shareholder of 
the company and he treats the CEO as an employee of his business. And I think it should 
be like this.   
 
The reform stipulates that CEO and Chair of the board should be held by two different 
persons and the board should clearly define respective roles and responsibilities of the 
chair and the CEO. The central bank requires that the CEO of a financial company must 
look after the operation of a business. The interviews reveal that a CEO can hardly take 
any decision without the consent of the dominant founder shareholders who dominates 
the board as a chair. One founder director of a company comments:   
 
Normally the Chair holds most power in a typical Bangladeshi company. The CEO 
maintains a good relationship with the board and tries to avoid any conflict to secure his 
job.  
 
Another independent director of a financial company states: 
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The Chair is the all in all in the organization. The CEO prepares proposals for loans and 
other things for his approval. The chair discusses these at the board and makes decisions. 
Therefore, it seems to me that the post of CEO is meaningless as every decision is made 
by the Chair and the board.     
 
This finding is similar to Reaz and Arun (2006) who maintain that the founder 
shareholders of private commercial banks in Bangladesh virtually control everything 
from appointment/firing of CEO, to loan approval, to purchase decisions, to salary 
determination. Founder directors of Bangladeshi listed corporations consider their 
business as their sole proprietorship type organization. This mentality prevents accepting 
modern corporate practice of delegating operations of the business to professional 
manager. One director comments: 
 
Most of the businessmen (in Bangladesh) are a first or second generation businessman. 
They lack vision and long term aspect of business and therefore do not want bringing 
contemporary corporate culture into their organizations. They even never realize these 
things.    
 
This comment is consistent with Uddin and Choudhury (2008) who opine that the 
Bangladeshi corporate sector is at its infancy and therefore lacks the corporate culture of 
delegation of duties to professional managers. 
 
6.3.6 Disparity in Governance among Companies 
The SEC in Bangladesh is the monitoring authority for compliance to the reform 2006. 
The SEC requires that compliance status to specific requirements in the guidelines must 
be included in the annual report. According to the SEC, as of 30 June 2011 74.34% of 
listed companies fully complied and 20.39% partly complied to the directive to report 
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their compliance status. However, 5.27% of listed companies did not submit an annual 
report to SEC (SEC 2011). Kabir et al. (2011) argue that these compliance levels reported 
by the SEC are unlikely to be a reflection of actual compliance levels because  the SEC 
lack monitoring capacity and manpower to investigate the self-reported compliance status 
by companies on various items.  
 
Even if compliance with the letter of the SEC’s requirements is achieved, the findings in 
this study concerning the dominance of the founder family, the lack of independence of 
directors, and the lack of expertise amongst audit committee members suggests that the 
SEC’s corporate governance requirements are relatively ineffective in protecting the 
interests of minority shareholders in many Bangladeshi listed companies. These results 
are consistent with  Wetphal and Zajac (1994), Carpenter and Feroz (2001), Fiss and Zajc 
(2004) and Tilcsik (2010) who shows that a powerful individual or group in an 
organization may comply with rules on paper but in reality do not do so.  
 
However, the interviews reveal some exceptions to this. One independent director of a 
bank comments on the appointment of independent directors:  
 
In a typical Bangladeshi company the board selects someone as independent director who 
would not cause any problem in the affairs of the board. However, there are some 
exceptions. Some good governed companies have specific by-laws regarding the 
qualification of the independent directors. For example, I know some companies who 
have by-laws that the chairman of the Department of Finance of the University of Dhaka 
or the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountant of Bangladesh would be their 
independent director. These companies appoint genuine independent directors and are 
generally very well governed. 
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Another director comments about balance of power between the board and the  
management of Bangladeshi companies :  
 
I have bad experience as a director. I felt like …. I was not enjoying my job because the 
board was dominating the management for every operation of the business. So I gave up 
and resigned. However, there are some companies which are running smoothly following 
good governance principles.  
 
These comments are consistent with the GCM results which show significant disparity  
of the safeguard effects on DRPTs among the sample companies. The inference is that 
some companies are well governed and are following the reform guidelines genuinely,  
whereas most companies are following the reform guidelines symbolically.      
 
 
6.3.7 Improvement in the effectiveness of safeguards   
Mukherjee-Reed (2002) and Uddin and Choudhury (2008) contend that western style 
governance is not suitable for developing countries. Their contention is disputed in this 
study. The interviews point to the problem lying with the proper implementation of these 
safeguards – not the safeguard per se. The problem for implementation in Bangladesh is 
found in this study to be due in large part to lack of experience of the independent 
directors in similar positions. All the eight independent directors interviewed did not have 
any experience in a similar position as independent director. Since 2006, independent 
directors have become a new governance mechanism which is a concept that did not exist 
in previous corporate culture in Bangladesh. 
 
Though the results from the quantitative analysis revealed ineffective corporate 
governance mechanisms for reducing DRPTs in many Bangladeshi companies, there was 
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also evidence that the situation would improve gradually. This prospect of gradual 
improvement is supported by the discourse from the interviews. Several of the interview 
participants stated that their main motivation to become an independent director was to 
learn from their new position and build their reputation in fulfilling such a role. One 
independent director notes: 
 
It was a new opportunity for me. It’s a public listed leasing company.  I wanted to know 
how the board works in a listed company and how different decisions are made there. 
Moreover, sitting in the board improves reputation. 
 
Another independent director comments: 
 
Money was not at all the motivating factor as the money we make as an independent 
director is not that high. There are about 52 commercial banks in Bangladesh. I wanted to 
learn how the banks works. Moreover, it is a symbol of a social prestige to sit in the 
board of a listed company.  
 
This finding is consistent with the GCM results in the earlier section which shows that  
independent directors are becoming increasingly effective over the years after the reform. 
The researcher argues that over time independent directors would learn from their 
directorial role and would become effective in protecting minority shareholders to 
maintain their reputation among investors as an independent director. This is consistent 
with the Fama and Jensen (1983) hypothesis – outside directors form a market of 
independent directors that will monitor the quality of work of independent directors. Non 
performing independent directors will be eliminated from the market and will not be 
appointed as directors in any company. It is believed that the market for independent 
directors will develop over time in Bangladesh as the current inexperienced independent 
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directors become experienced over time and learn how to be effective in maintaining their 
reputation in an emerging market for outside directors. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
7.1 Overview and Summary of Findings 
This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of reform 2006 in curbing DRPTs. Unlike some 
past studies which opine that western style governance is not suitable for developing 
countries (Mukherjee-Reed 2002, Uddin and Choudhury 2008, Siddiqui 2010), the 
researcher maintains the current Western-adapted reform is appropriate in Bangladesh but 
highlights some drawbacks in its implementations. The deficiencies in implementation 
are found to be mainly due to a lack of experience of the independent directors in similar 
positions, strong and ubiquitous influence of founder family members in the corporations, 
lack of competency of the audit committee and the infancy of corporate culture in 
Bangladesh. These influences cause a decoupling of regulation and practice in respect of 
corporate governance safeguards against DRPTs. Control over the opportunistic 
behaviour of controlling shareholders in Bangladeshi corporations remains relatively 
weak in practice.  
 
One major reform in 2006 is the inclusion of independent directors on the board. Unlike 
past studies in China (Gao and Kling), Australia (Gallary et al 2008) and Hong Kong 
(Cheung et al 2009) the results of this thesis show no significant effect of independent 
directors on DRPTs. The interviews conducted for this thesis reveal flaws in the selection 
of independent directors and inexperience of independent directors in their role. 
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However, the interviews reveal that independent directors are motivated to learn the job 
and are concerned about their social reputation which indicates potential to improvement 
in their performance over the coming years. Growth curve modelling results shows that 
independent directors are becoming significantly effective in reducing DRPTs over time. 
This indicates the independent directors in Bangladesh are currently in learning phase and 
have potential to become effective in protecting minority shareholders in the future. 
 
The interview process reveals that most of the independent audit committee members are 
either retired bureaucrats or academics. Many of them openly acknowledge their 
deficiencies in accounting knowledge and experience. The results of the quantitative 
analysis show no improvement of audit committee effectiveness over the post-reforms 
period of years investigated. This is probably because audit committee members with 
shallow or no accounting knowledge may not decipher complex transactions with related-
parties by controlling shareholders and their loyal professional managers. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that the effectiveness of the audit committee is not improving over time. 
The responsibility of the audit committee is to monitor the integrity of the financial 
affairs of a company. Former bureaucrats or academics lacking accounting education and 
experience may not be capable of detecting and addressing complex discriminatory 
transactions by controlling shareholders against other shareholders in collaboration with 
their managers.  
 
It has been highlighted in an earlier chapter that a collegial environment prevents 
independent directors speaking out to protect minority shareholders’ interests. The 
interview results reveal that many independent directors do not speak out to protect 
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minority shareholders’ interests mainly because of their friendly relationship with the 
chair or controlling shareholders group who recruited him/her to the board.  
 
The results of the qualitative and quantitative sections show that a lack of accounting 
education and experience hinders the audit committee’s activities. At present the 
guidelines requires one independent member on the committee. However, it does not 
require any accounting education or experience of the members. Accounting expertise is 
a pre-requisite for effective performance of an audit committee member in this era of 
complex business transactions in corporations (Agrawal and Chandra 2005).  
 
7.2 Contribution to the Literature 
There are two principal contributions of this thesis. The first contribution of this thesis is 
the development of a measure for DRPTs. Current literature does not provide a precise 
measure for DRPTs at company level. Total RPTs or some selected items of total RPTs 
are used as measures of DRPTs by researchers. However, all RPTs are not for asset 
appropriation by powerful shareholders; many RPTs are for genuine business purposes. 
Therefore, these current measures contain high measurement errors. High power and low 
cash flow right of controlling shareholders motivate them to appropriate minority assets 
through DRPTs (Bebchuk et al. 2000, Dahya et al. 2008, Jiang et al. 2010). Using cash 
flow rights and voting power of controlling shareholders, this study segregates DRPTs 
from total RPTs. This study provides the first effort to separate out DRPTs from total 
RPTs in the literature. The new measurement is low in measurement error. Computer 
simulation and real data tests find the new measure as more precise than the existing total 
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RPT measure. In quantitative research, accurate measurement of variables is pivotal. 
Error in measurement of a variable may lead to biased and inconsistent estimation of a 
coefficient in regression analysis (Wooldridge 2003). As mentioned in the earlier chapter, 
empirical studies have to date found inconsistent relationships between/among DRPTs 
and other variables which may be largely due to high measurement errors of current 
DRPT measures. The new DRPT measure may resolve some of these inconsistent 
findings in this area of literature.    
 
The second contribution of this thesis is that, using the new measure, this thesis evaluates 
the effectiveness of reform 2006 in restricting DRPTs in Bangladeshi corporations. As 
mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis, past studies have investigated a range of 
effects of corporate governance reforms mainly in developed countries. These include the 
costs and benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 to US companies (Zhang 2007, Doyle et 
al. 2007, Iliev 2010, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008), 
effectiveness of governance reform in preventing RPTs in developed countries mainly the 
USA (Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2007) and Australia (Gallery et al. 2008) and so on. 
Therefore, this area of literature on most developing countries is largely undeveloped. 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by investigating the effectiveness of the 
reforms in a developing country from the specific perspective of DRPTs. 
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7.3 Implications of the Findings 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, reform 2006 in Bangladesh imposes additional costs on 
corporations, which would be passed on to shareholders. If the reforms do not yield 
appropriate benefits to all shareholders, the net cost involved means that the minority 
shareholders, at least, would be in a worse situation than in the pre-reform period, 
knowing that the controlling shareholders have the power to minimize net costs to them. 
The strengthening of reform initiatives by tightening the prescription in the requirements 
and enhancing the enforcement resources of the regulator might make it more effective to 
protect minority shareholders from DRPTs. SOX, for example, was amended several 
times to make it more effective as well as compliance friendly by corporations. Though 
SOX provides protection to minority shareholders, some requirements of the law are 
costly to comply with, which triggered amendment of a few sections of the original law. 
Section 404 of SOX mandates a public corporation’s assessment and report on the 
effectiveness of internal control by managers and certification of the management’s 
assessment by an independent auditor. In the first few years after the enactment of the act, 
compliance with these requirements of the law became notoriously costly for companies 
and subsequently the section was amended in 2007 to reduce the cost burden for 
companies (Iliev 2010). 
 
However, amendment of the reform needs to be well-informed and evidence-based.  The 
result of this thesis suggests appointment of independent directors by the existing non-
independent directors as one of the main reasons for ineffectiveness of the reform. It is 
revealed in the interviews that independent directors who sit on a company board with 
their ex-colleague or friend fail to take due care of their duties when they should report a 
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concern to the board or the SEC of Bangladesh. This suggests a need for strengthening of 
the guidelines regarding independence of the independent directors and their 
appointment. SEC could consider establishing a pool of suitable independent directors 
from which listed companies must draw, or alternatively, the SEC could introduce a 
certification process for independent directors who are appointed by companies.  
 
 The results of the thesis, in general, show that the current ineffectiveness of the corporate 
governance safeguard for protection of minority shareholders from DRPTs is mainly due 
to ineffective implementation of the safeguards. The ineffective implementation is due in 
large part to a lack of qualification, experience and training of the independent directors 
and audit committee members. Therefore the result of the thesis suggests amendment of 
the guidelines regarding mandatory proper education and experience requirements of 
independent directors and audit committee members. It is hoped that this study will 
inform policy-making decisions in relation to future corporate governance reforms in 
Bangladesh and other developing countries as well as alerting policy-makers to the 
amendment of the reforms.  
 
Empirical studies have to date found inconsistent relationships between/among DRPTs 
and other variables which may be due to the use of an imprecise measure for DRPTs in 
prior studies. As mentioned in this thesis, currently many researchers use total dollar 
amount of RPTs as a proxy for DRPTs (Gordon et al. 2004, Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2005, 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew 2010) and other researchers use selected RPTs or some 
derivatives of related party transactions as a measure of DRPT (Cheung et al. 2009a, 
Cheung et al. 2006).  All these measures, however, are based on weak theoretical 
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underpinnings and, because of their poor construct validity, are prone to high 
measurement error. This research will contribute in filling the vacuum for a more precise 
DRPTs measurement. As a result, it is anticipated that the future adoption (and possible 
further refinement) of the measure developed in this thesis will be able to resolve these 
anomalous prior findings related to relationships between/among DRPTs and its related 
variables.  
 
7.4 Limitations 
There are limitations relating to the use of the interview method, sources of secondary 
data and analytical techniques used in this thesis. First, interviews were used as part of 
the research methods. A limitation of interviews is that participants might not reveal 
certain relevant information, especially if they perceive the research questions as 
sensitive. While the interview approached used in this study has only been face-to-face 
with individuals, a focus group approach could have provided a more comprehensive 
understanding of the position taken by members of an organisation or profession. 
However, the busyness of directors and audit committee members coupled with the 
sensitivity of the topic made focus groups a non-feasible option.  
Second, one of the main contributions claimed for this thesis is the development of a new 
measure for DRPTs. Computer simulation tests find the new measure more precise than 
other existing measures of DRPTs. However, this study uses data collected from 
companies in one country. The measure may not give the same precision if it is validated 
using data collected from companies in different countries.  
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Third, the quantitative analysis in this thesis is based on secondary data collected from 
annual reports and other documents published by Dhaka stock exchange. Though the 
annual reports are audited and the documents published by the stock exchange are 
perceived as a credible source, the data published in these reports and documents may 
contain financial statement misstatements and compliance reporting omissions. Also hand 
collection of this secondary data by the researcher, while done with much care, may be 
prone to data extraction and collation error.  
Finally, the data analysis technique of growth curve modelling is part of the analytical 
methods used in this thesis. GCM can be modelled in two ways: Random Coefficient 
Modelling (RCM) and Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). Although random 
coefficient modelling techniques and structure equation modelling produce similar results 
(Bliese and Ployhart 2002), the latter has the advantage of considering measurement 
errors in variables and using multiple indicators for measuring a latent variable. However, 
RCM is used in this thesis as SEM technique requires very large number of samples size 
which made it a non-viable options for this thesis.   
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7.5 Future Research Direction 
In terms of directions for extending this study regarding discrimination actions by 
controlling shareholders, past studies suggest that initial public offerings (IPOs) are a 
major way of appropriating minority shareholders’ assets in a company. A recent 
investigation by the Ministry of Finance of Bangladesh reveals that there had been 
significant transfers of wealth from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders by 
private placement in IPOs during 2010-2011. This is an area for future investigations. 
 
In respect of further research on the effectiveness of corporate governance reforms, the 
2006 Reform in Bangladesh does not require shareholders’ approval or external 
independent review of RPTs. Some countries have such protection against DRPTs. It is 
costly to arrange meetings for RPTs approval. Does the cost outweigh its benefits? A 
future investigation might suggest the need for this type of safeguard in Bangladesh.  
 
Finally, the development and testing of the new DRPT measure in this study would need 
to be replicated in other countries or corporate governance jurisdictions in order to 
substantiate its suitability for more general application.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
QUESTION SCHEDULE FOR THE INTERVIEW 
 
 
 
A.  Questions to be asked of all participants  
 
 
- Please tell me a little about your career and experience in business generally.  
- Are you a director and/or audit committee member in any other company(ies)? 
If yes, in which company(ies) and for how long? 
- What is the nature of the working relationship between the CEO and the 
Chair of the Board?   
- How has the size of the Board changed as a result of the reforms? Do you 
consider the current size of the Board to be appropriate to the task? Why or 
why not? 
- How has the composition of the Board changed as a consequence of the 
reforms? Is the composition appropriate? 
- What factors does the Board consider in appointing a new member? Have 
these factors changed as a result of the reforms? 
 
Corporate governance guidelines notification of the SEC 
-     How familiar are you with these guidelines? 
-     To what extent have the guidelines been adopted by this company? 
-      Do you think these guidelines are beneficial to this company?  
 a.  If yes, in what ways has your company benefitted from the guidelines? 
 b.  If no, do you consider the guidelines unnecessary? 
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-   What problems, if any, has the company encountered in applying 
the guidelines?  
       -     Do you think the guidelines have been beneficial to other companies of 
which you are a director? Why or why not? 
 
 
B.  Questions to be asked only to independent directors and audit committee 
members 
- When and how were you recruited as an independent director by this 
company? Who introduced you to the company?  
- What factors motivated you to serve on the Board? 
- Do you communicate with Board members other than at Board meetings? If 
yes, how and why?   
- What do you see as your role as an independent director? What obstacles, if 
any, do you face in fulfilling that role? 
- At Board meetings, to what extent do inside directors consider the opinions of 
independent directors?  
- Do the Articles of Association of your company require Board approval of 
related party transactions?  
- Does the Board discuss related party transactions at its meetings? 
-   In your opinion, what is the role of the audit committee in this company?   
-     What is your specific task as a committee member? What obstacles, if any, do 
you face in fulfilling that role? 
-     What motivates you to work as an audit committee member? 
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-     How does your background (education and experience) help you in your role 
on the audit committee? 
-     Do you think the backgrounds of members of the audit committee in this   
      company are appropriate to the task?   
-     How effective is the audit committee? How could it do its job better? 
-     If you are a member of an audit committee in another company or companies,   
       to what extent do you believe those committees add value?  
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Profile of Independent Directors 
No. Age  Education Profession 
1 55 B.Com (Hons.) 
M.Com(Accounting) 
FCA 
 
Public Accounting   
Practice  
2 
 
35 B.Com 
 
Accountant   
3 72 BA (Honours) from Dhaka 
University   
MA (UK) 
 
Retired bureaucrat   
4 45 BCom (Hons)  
MCom, University of Dhaka 
MBA ( Canada) 
 
University professor   
5 
 
 
 
 
60 BA (Honours)  
MA Sociology, University 
of Dhaka 
Masters in Sociology, 
(Russia) 
University professor 
6 70 - Retired bureaucrat  
 
 
7 60 
 
Chartered Accountant Accountancy education 
 
 
8 60 BSc, MSc and PhD in Civil 
Engineering 
University professor  
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Profile of Non- independent Directors 
No. Age  Education Profession 
1 65 B.Com 
Charted Accountant 
CFO of a group of 
companies 
 
2 60 MBA 
 
Businessman  
3 55 B.Com  (Honours) 
MCom in Management  
LLB 
 
Businessman 
4 60 B.Com Businessman 
 
5 65 BA and MA Economics 
MBA in Accounting and 
Finance 
 
Businessman 
6 45 - Businessman 
 
7 45 MBA (Finance) CEO of a bank 
 
8 50 MBA (USA) Businessman  
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Profile of Audit Committee Members 
No. Age  Education Profession 
1 55 B.Com (Hons.) 
M.Com(Accounting) 
FCA 
 
Public accounting   
practice  
2 35 B.Com Accountant  
 
3 72 BA (Honours) from Dhaka 
University   
MA (UK) 
 
Retired bureaucrat  
 
4 60 BA (Honours)  
MA Sociology, University 
of Dhaka 
Masters in Sociology, 
(Russia) 
University professor 
5 70 - Retired bureaucrat 
 
6 60 Chartered accountant Accountancy education 
 
7. 60 BSc, MSc and PhD in Civil 
Engineering 
University professor 
 
 
8 65 B.Com 
Charted accountant 
CFO of a group of 
companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page No.154 
RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS LAWS IN 
BANGLADESH 
        
I. RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS IN THE COMPANY LAW 
1994 
 
Company Law 1994 of Bangladesh provides limited protection to minority shareholders 
from some related party transactions. According to section 103 of the Company Act 1994 
(1) no company, shall make any loan or give any guarantee or provide any security in 
connection with a loan made by a third party to-- 
(a) any director of the lending company 
(b) any firm in which any director of the lending company is a partner; 
(c) any private company of which any director of the lending company is a 
director or member; or 
(d) any public company, the managing agent manager or director where of is 
accustomed to act in accordance with the directions or instruction of any director 
of the lending company: 
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to the making of a loan or giving of any 
guarantee or providing any security by a lending company. if-- 
 
(i) such company is a banking company or a private company not being a subsidiary of a 
public company, or if such company as a holding company makes the loan or gives the  
guarantee or provide the security to its subsidiary; and 
 
(ii) the loan is sanctioned by the Board of Directors of any company and approved by the 
general meeting and, in the balance sheet, there is a specific mention of the loan, 
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guarantee or security, as the case may be. Provided further that, in no case the total 
amount of the loan shall exceed 50% of the paid up value of the shares held by such 
director in his own name 
 
(2) In the event of any contravention of sub-section (1) every person who is a party to 
such contravention including in particular any person to whom a loan is made or on 
whose behalf a guarantee is given to or security provided shall be punishable with the 
fine which extend to five thousand taka or simple imprisonment for six months in lieu of 
fine and shall be liable jointly and severally to the lending company for the repayment of 
such loan or for making good any sum which the lending company may be called up to 
pay under the guarantee given or security rovided by the lending company. 
 
(3) This section shall apply to any transaction represented by a book debt which was from 
its inception in the nature of a loan or an advance. 
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II. RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS LAWS IN THE BANK 
COMPANY ACT 1991 (AMENDED IN 2003) 
 
 
Section 27 and 28 of the Bank Company Act 1991 provide some protection to minority 
shareholders from DRPTs by restricting loans without any collateral security to any 
directors, director’s family members or any organization where the directors or directors’ 
family members are involved as director, shareholders or owner. Banks must not wave 
loans of these parties if they fail to repay their loans. Section 27 stipulates that (1) no 
banking company- 
a) shall make any loans or advances on the security of its own shares;  
b) shall, without security, make any loan or advance to any of the following persons or 
institutions, or make any loan or advance in cases where those persons or institutions are 
guarantors- 
i) any of its directors;  
 
ii) any member of the family of any of its directors;  
 
iii) any commercial institution or private company in which the banking company itself, 
or any of its directors or any member of the family of any of its directors is involved as 
director, owner or shareholder;  
 
iv) any public limited company which is in some way or other controled by the company 
itself, or any of its directors or any member of the family of any of its directors, or the 
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shares of which are held by any of the said persons to such an extent as to give it control 
of no less than twenty per cent of the voting rights. 
 
(2) No banking company shall give to any of the following persons or institutions any 
loan or advance without the approval of the majority of the directors, excluding the 
director concerned,- 
 
a) any of its directors; or  
 
b) any person, commercial institution or company in which any of the directors of the 
said banking company is interested as partner, director or guarantor. 
Explanation.- For the purpose of this subsection "director" shall include the director's 
wife, husband, father, mother, son and daughter.  
 
(3) No banking company shall, without the previous permission in writing of the 
Bangladesh Bank, give to any person or institution, directly or indirectly, any benefit the 
aggregate value of which exceeds- 
 
a) 15 per cent of the total capital of the said banking company; or  
 
b) 25 per cent of the total capital of the said banking company where the security of the 
said benefits has been provided by such financial securities as might be easily put on the 
market for sale. 
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Explanation.- (1) "Benefit" shall mean any loan, advance or any other loan benefit, or 
financial guaranties or any such obligation as any banking company has taken on in 
behalf of any person or institution; and  
 
(2) "Total capital" shall mean paid-up capital and reserve fund including those various 
kinds of security which are in accordance with the provisions of the Bangladesh Bank 
under section (13), certificates of indebtedness, deposits, obligations etc. . 
(4) Every banking company shall, before the close of the month to which the report 
relates, submit to the Bangladesh Bank a report in the prescribed form and manner, and in 
the said report the following particulars shall be mentioned- 
a) all loans and advances granted by it to companies, private as well as public, in which 
the banking company or any of its directors is interested as director; and  
 
b) all loans and advances granted by it to public companies in which the banking 
company or any of its directors is interested as managing agent or guarantor. 
 
(5) If on examination of any report submitted under subsection (4) it appears to the 
Bangladesh Bank that any loans or advances referred to in that subsection have been 
granted to the detriment of the interests of the depositors of the banking company, the 
Bangladesh Bank may, by order in writing, prohibit the banking company from granting 
any such further loans or advances or impose restrictions on the granting of such loans or 
advances, and may direct the banking company to secure the repayment of loans or 
advances granted in this way within such time as may be specified in the order. 
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Section 28 restricts the respite of loans. It states that (1) No banking company shall, 
without the previous approval of the Bangladesh Bank, grant respite of loans taken from 
it by any of the following persons or institutions,- 
a) any of its directors, and his family members;  
 
b) a commercial institution or company in which any director of the banking company is 
interested as landowner, co-director, managing agent; and  
 
c) any such person in which any director of the banking company is interested as partner 
or landowner. 
 
(2) Any respite of loans in disregard of the provisions of subsection (1) shall be illegal, 
and whoever is responsible for such a respite shall be punishable with imprisonment for 
no more than three years or a fine of no more than thirty thousand Takas or both. 
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III. BRPD CIRCULAR NO. 7 DATED AUGUST 5, 1999 
RESTRICTION ON LENDING TO DIRECTORS OF PRIVATE 
BANKS 
  
 
 
The following instructions on the above issued with the authority vested under Section 45 
of Bank Companies Act, 1991:  
1. Any loan facility or guarantee or security provided to a Director of a bank or to his 
relatives must be sanctioned by the Board of Directors of the bank and has to be 
specifically mentioned in the Balance sheet of the bank. However the total amount of the 
loan facilities extendable to a Director or to his relatives should not exceed 50% of the 
paid-up value of the shares of that bank held in Director's own name. 
 
2. If the total amount of loan facilities already extended to a Director or to his relatives 
exceeds 50% of the paid-up value of the shares of the bank held in Director's own name, 
the amount in excess should be repaid within the time approved by Bangladesh Bank. 
Under no circumstances, renewal or extension of time of the loan facilities in excess of 
that 50% can be made.  
 
3. No such loan wherein the borrower is exempted fully or partially from bearing the loss 
including Mudaraba or Musharaka systems of loan can be extended to any Director or 
any relatives of him. 
 
4. Subject to compliance of the conditions mentioned in paragraph No.1 above, loan 
facilities in excess of Tk.10 lacs for funded loan and Tk.50 lacs (funded and non-funded) 
in favor of any Director or his relatives or proprietorship or partnership firms and private 
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or public limited companies wherein those persons have interests, can be extended 
subject to obtaining no-objection from Bangladesh Bank. 
 
5. If any Director of a bank without being apparently involved in any industrial 
/commercial organization, conducts or directs accounts thereof or otherwise has control 
thereupon or extends collateral security or guarantee against any loans thereof, he will be 
treated to have interest in that organization/loan account. 
 
6. Bank loan of any public limited company will be treated as liability of a Director of the 
bank in proportion of the amount (percentage) of shares of that company held by him. 
 
7. If any Director extends guarantee against any loan for any specific amount, his liability 
will remain limited up to that specific amount. 
 
8. In case of extending loan facilities in favor of the organization wherein the Director 
has interest, all kinds of legal formalities have to be properly executed as per norms. 
 
9. Respective rules and regulations of Bank Companies Act, 1991 regarding loan 
facilities in general and other instructions of Bangladesh Bank should be followed as 
usual. 
 
10. For the purpose of extending loan facilities, the explanation as given under Sub-
section 27(2) of Bank Companies Act, 1991 will be applicable to define the term 
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`Director', i.e., it will include his/her spouse, father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister 
and all his dependants. 
 
11. If any loans availed in the names of the Directors or organizations wherein they have 
interests, turn to defaulted ones, legal action has to be initiated instantly and inter alia the 
Directors have to be served with the notice under Section 17 of Bank Companies Act, 
1991. 
 
12. The quarterly statement of liabilities of the Directors and Ex-Directors of the bank as 
defined in the latest amendment of Bank Companies Act, 1991, will have to be submitted 
to Bangladesh Bank in the format as enclosed with the BRPD Circular Letter No. 8 dated 
19 June, 1997. 
 
13. Any change/cancellation/return of security, collateral security, guarantee etc, 
provided against the loan of any Director or Ex-Director of a bank will require prior 
permission from Bangladesh Bank. 
 
14. Any change of the conditions of any loans of any Director or Ex-Director of a bank 
will require prior permission from Bangladesh Bank. Copies of sanction-letters of all 
loans of the Director or Ex-Director have to be submitted to Bangladesh Bank. Copies of 
the sanction-letters of existing loans have to be submitted within September 30, 1999 to 
Banking Regulation and policy Department. In future, copies of the sanction-letters will 
have to be submitted to the said Department within 1(one) week from the date of sanction 
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of the loan with the no-objection from Bangladesh Bank but before the disbursement of 
the loan. 
 
15. The above rule will also be applicable in case of those loans extended in favor of any 
organizations wherein any Director/ex-Director of the bank has interest or he/she was 
once proprietor, partner, director or guarantor thereof; i.e., any change of the security, 
collateral security, guarantee provided against the loans of those organizations or of the 
conditions of sanction will require prior permission from Bangladesh Bank. Copies of 
sanction-letters of such loan-accounts will have to be submitted to Banking Regulation 
and policy Department within October 15, 1999. 
 
16. No remission facilities (including A/C blocking) to any loan accounts wherein bank's 
Director or Ex-Director has interest can be allowed without prior permission from 
Bangladesh Bank. However, in case of the Ex-Directors who are at present not holding 
any share of the bank including the Govt.-nominated Directors, the issue of waiver of 
interest on loans availed before they were Directors of the bank or after they ceased to be 
the Directors, with the permission of the Board of Directors of the bank will not require 
prior permission from Bangladesh Bank. 
 
17. If re-scheduling is required in case of loans extended before the issuance of BRPD 
Circular No. 07 dated 5.8.99 in favor of Director or any organization wherein he has 
interest, time of repayment in case of term loan can be extended for maximum 03(three) 
years and in case of working capital latest up to 31st December, 2001. The proposal of 
rescheduling has to be approved by the Board of Directors of the bank and will come into 
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effect after obtaining no-objection from Bangladesh Bank. If the history of past 
repayment of loan accounts of the Director or wherein they have interests, is good and at 
the same time repayment is not being possible for reasons beyond control and temporary 
inconvenience, only those accounts will be considered for rescheduling as per above 
procedure. 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES 2006  
(SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/ADMIN/02-08) 
 
 
1.00 Board of Directors: 
1.1. Board’s Size 
The number of the board members of the company should not be less than 5 (five) and 
more than 20 (twenty): Provided, however, that in the case of banks and non-bank 
financial institutions, insurance companies and statutory bodies for which separate 
primary regulators like Bangladesh Bank, Department of Insurance etc. exist, the Board 
of those companies should be constituted as may be prescribed by such primary 
regulators in so far as those prescriptions are not inconsistent with the aforesaid 
condition. 
1.2. Independent Directors 
All companies should encourage effective representation of independent directors on 
their Board of Directors so that the Board, as a group, includes core competencies 
considered relevant in the context of each company. For this purpose, the companies 
should comply with the following:- (i) At least one tenth (1/10) of the total number of the 
company’s board of directors, subject to a minimum of one, should be independent 
directors.  
 
For the purpose of this clause “independent director” means a director who does not hold 
any share in the company or who holds less than one percent (1%) shares of the total 
paid-up shares of the company, who is not connected with the company’s promoters or 
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directors  or shareholder who holds one percent (1%) or more than one percent (1%) 
shares of the total paid-up shares of the company on the basis of family relationship; who 
does not have any other relationship, whether pecuniary or otherwise, with the company 
or its subsidiary/associated  companies, who is not a member, director or officer of any 
stock exchange, and who is not a shareholder, director or officer of any member of stock 
exchange or an intermediary of the capital market. 
 
(ii) The independent director(s) should be appointed by the elected directors. 
 
1.3. Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive 
The positions of the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of the 
companies should preferably be filled by different individuals. The Chairman of the 
company should be elected from among the directors of the company. The Board of 
Directors should clearly define respective roles and responsibilities of the Chairman and 
the Chief Executive Officer. 
 
1.4 The Directors’ Report to Shareholders 
The directors of the companies should include following additional statements in the 
Directors’ Report prepared under section 184 of the Companies Act, 1994:- 
 
(a) The financial statements prepared by the management of the issuer company present 
fairly its state of affairs, the result of its operations, cash flows and changes in equity. 
 
(b) Proper books of account of the issuer company have been maintained. 
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(c) Appropriate accounting policies have been consistently applied in preparation of the 
financial statements and that the accounting estimates are based on reasonable and 
prudent judgment. 
 
(d) International Accounting Standards, as applicable in Bangladesh, have been followed 
in preparation of the financial statements and any departure therefrom has been 
adequately disclosed. 
 
(e) The system of internal control is sound in design and has been effectively 
implemented and monitored. 
 
(f) There are no significant doubts upon the issuer company’s ability to continue as a 
going concern. If the issuer company is not considered to be a going concern, the fact 
along with reasons thereof should be disclosed. 
 
(g) Significant deviations from last year in operating results of the issuer company should 
be highlighted and reasons thereof should be explained. 
 
(h) Key operating and financial data of at least preceding three years should be 
summarised  
 
(i) If the issuer company has not declared dividend (cash or stock) for the year, the 
reasons thereof should be given. 
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(j) The number of Board meetings held during the year and attendance by each director 
should be disclosed. 
 
(k) The pattern of shareholding should be reported to disclose the aggregate number of 
shares (along with name wise details where stated below) held by:- 
 
(i) Parent/Subsidiary/Associated companies and other related parties (name wise details); 
 
(ii) Directors, Chief Executive Officer, Company Secretary, Chief Financial Officer, 
Head of Internal Audit and their spouses and minor children (name wise details); 
 
(iii) Executives; and 
 
(iv) Shareholders holding ten percent (10%) or more voting interest in the company 
(name wise details). 
 
Explanation: For the purpose of this clause, the expression “executive” means top five 
salaried employees of the company, other than the Directors, Chief Executive Officer, 
Company Secretary, Chief Financial Officer and Head of Internal Audit. 
 
2.00 Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Head of Internal Audit And Company 
Secretary: 
2.1. Appointment 
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The company should appoint a Chief Financial Officer (CFO), a Head of Internal Audit 
and a Company Secretary. The Board of Directors should clearly define respective roles, 
responsibilities and duties of the CFO, the Head of Internal Audit and the Company 
Secretary. 
 
2.2. Requirement to Attend Board Meetings 
 
The CFO and the Company Secretary of the companies should attend meetings of the 
Board of Directors, provided that the CFO and/or the Company Secretary should not 
attend such part of a meeting of the Board of Directors which involves consideration of 
an agenda item relating to the CFO and/or the Company Secretary. 
 
3.00 Audit Committee: 
The company should have an Audit Committee as a sub-committee of the Board of 
Directors. The Audit Committee should assist the Board of Directors in ensuring that the 
financial statements reflect true and fair view of the state of affairs of the company and in 
ensuring a good monitoring system within the business.  The Audit Committee shall be 
responsible to the Board of Directors. The duties of the Audit Committee should be 
clearly set forth in writing 
3.1. Constitution of Audit Committee 
(i) The Audit Committee should be composed of at least 3 (three) members. 
 
(ii) The Board of Directors should appoint members of the Audit Committee who  
should be directors of the company and should include at least one independent    
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director. 
 
(iii) When the term of service of the Committee members expires or there is any  
circumstance causing any Committee member to be unable to hold office until  
expiration of the term of service, thus making the number of the Committee  
members to be lower than the prescribed number of 3 (three) persons, the Board  
of Directors should appoint the new Committee member(s) to fill up 
thevacancy(ies) immediately or not later than 1 (one) month from the date of 
vacancy(ies) in the Committee to ensure continuity of the performance of work of  
the Audit Committee. 
3.2. Chairman of the Audit Committee 
(i) The Board of Directors should select 1 (one) member of the Audit Committee to  
be Chairman of the Audit Committee. 
 
(ii) The Chairman of the audit committee should have a professional qualification or 
knowledge, understanding and experience in accounting or finance.  
 
3.3. Reporting of the Audit Committee 
3.3.1. Reporting to the Board of Directors 
(i) The Audit Committee should report on its activities to the Board of Directors. 
 
(ii) The Audit Committee should immediately report to the Board of Directors on   
the following findings, if any:- 
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(a) Report on conflicts of interests; 
 
(b) Suspected or presumed fraud or irregularity or material defect in the internal 
control system; 
 
(c) Suspected infringement of laws, including securities related laws, rules and 
regulations; and 
 
(d) Any other matter which should be disclosed to the Board of Directors   
immediately. 
 
3.3.2. Reporting to the Authorities 
If  the Audit Committee has reported to the Board of Directors about anything which has 
material impact on the financial condition and results of operation and has discussed with 
the Board of Directors and the management that any rectification is necessary and if the 
Audit Committee finds that such rectification has been unreasonably ignored, the Audit 
Committee should report such finding to the Commission, upon reporting of such matters 
to the Board of Directors for three times or completion of a period of 9 (nine) months 
from the date of first reporting to the Board of Directors, whichever is earlier. 
 
3.4. Reporting to the Shareholders and General Investors 
Report on activities carried out by the Audit Committee, including any report made to the  
Board of Directors under condition 3.3.1 (ii) above during the year, should be signed by 
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the Chairman of the Audit Committee and disclosed in the annual report of the issuer 
company. 
 
4.00. External/Statutory Auditors 
The issuer company should not engage its external/statutory auditors to perform the 
following services of the company; namely:- 
(i) Appraisal or valuation services or fairness opinions; 
(ii) Financial information systems design and implementation; 
(iii) Book-keeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial     
statements; 
(iv) Broker-dealer services; 
(v) Actuarial services; 
(vi) Internal audit services; and 
(vii) Any other service that the Audit Committee determines. 
 
5.00 Reporting the Compliance in the Director’s Report 
The directors of the company shall state, in accordance with the annexure attached, in the 
directors’ report whether the company has complied with these conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page No.173
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES FOR BANKS 
 
 
Bangladesh bank, the central bank of Bangladesh, issue guidelines and rules for 
monitoring banks and financial institutions. It has issued several circulars relating to 
corporate governance guidelines in banks in Bangladesh.   
 
 
Corporate Governance in Bank Management 
(BRPD Circular No. 16 dated 24 July 2003) 
 
BRPD Circular No. 16 dated 24 July 2003 of Bangladesh Bank stipulates the 
responsibilities and authorities among the board of directors, the chairman, Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of and adviser to the private bank in respect of its overall 
financial, operational and administrative policymaking and executive affairs including 
overall business activities, internal control, human resources management and 
development thereof, income and expenditure etc., along with lending and risk 
management issues, is outlined as follows:- 
 
01. Responsibilities and authorities of the board of directors: 
(a) Work-planning and strategic management: 
(i) The board shall determine the objectives and goals and to this end shall chalk out 
strategies and work-plans on annual basis. It shall specially engage itself in the affairs of 
making strategies consistent with the determined objectives and goals and in the issues 
relating to structural change and reorganization for enhancement of institutional 
efficiency and other relevant policy matters. It shall analyse /monitor at quarterly rests the 
development of implementation of the work-plans. 
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(ii) The board shall have its analytical review incorporated in the Annual Report as regard 
the success/failure in achieving the business and other targets as set out in its annual 
work-plan and shall apprise the shareholders of its opinions/recommendations on future 
plans and strategies. It shall set the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the CEO and 
other senior executives and have it evaluated at times. 
 
(b) Lending and risk management: 
(i) The policies, strategies, procedures etc. in respect of appraisal of loan/investment 
proposal, sanction, disbursement, recovery, reschedulement and write-off thereof shall be 
made with the board's approval under the purview of the existing laws, rules and 
regulations. The board shall specifically distribute the power of sanction of 
loan/investment and such distribution should desirably be made among the CEO and his 
subordinate executives as much as possible. No director, however, shall interfere, directly 
or indirectly, into the process of loan approval. 
(ii) The board shall frame policies for risk management and get them complied with and 
shall monitor at quarterly rests the compliance thereof. 
 
(c) Internal control management: 
The board shall be vigilant on the internal control system of the bank in order to attain 
and maintain satisfactory qualitative standard of its loan/investment portfolio. It shall 
review at quarterly rests the reports submitted by its audit committee regarding 
compliance of recommendations made in internal and external audit reports and the 
Bangladesh Bank inspection reports. 
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(d) Human resources management and development: 
1. Policies relating to recruitment, promotion, transfer, disciplinary and punitive 
measures, human resources development etc. and service rules shall be framed and 
approved by the board. The chairman or the directors shall in no way involve themselves 
or interfere into or influence over any administrative affairs including recruitment, 
promotion, transfer and disciplinary measures as executed under the set service rules. No 
member of the board of directors shall be included in the selection committees for 
recruitment and promotion to different levels. Recruitment and promotion to the 
immediate two tiers below the CEO shall, however, rest upon the board. Such recruitment 
and promotion shall have to be carried out complying with the service rules i.e., policies 
for recruitment and promotion. 
 
2. The board shall focus its special attention to the development of skills of bank's staff in 
different fields of its business activities including prudent appraisal of loan/investment 
proposals, and to the adoption of modern electronic and information technologies and the 
introduction of effective Management Information System (MIS). The board shall get 
these programs incorporated in its annual work plan. 
 
(e) Financial management: 
(i) The annual budget and the statutory financial statements shall finally be prepared with 
the approval of the board. It shall at quarterly rests review/monitor the positions in 
respect of bank's income, expenditure, liquidity, non-performing asset, capital base and 
adequacy, maintenance of loan loss provision and steps taken for recovery of defaulted 
loans including legal measures. 
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(ii) The board shall frame the policies and procedures for bank's purchase and 
procurement activities and shall accordingly approve the distribution of power for making 
such expenditures. The maximum possible delegation of such power shall rest on the 
CEO and his subordinates. The decision on matters relating to infrastructure development 
and purchase of land, building, vehicles etc. for the purpose of bank's business shall, 
however, be adopted with the approval of the board. 
 
(f) Formation of supporting committees: 
For decision on urgent matters an executive committee, whatever name called, may be 
formed with the directors. There shall be no committee or sub-committee of the board 
other than the executive committee and the audit committee. No alternate director shall 
be included in these committees. 
 
(g) Appointment of CEO: 
The board shall appoint a competent CEO for the bank with the approval of the 
Bangladesh Bank. 
 
02. Responsibilities of the chairman of the board of directors: 
(a) As the chairman of the board of directors (or chairman of any committee formed by 
the board or any director) does not personally possess the jurisdiction to apply 
policymaking or executive authority, he shall not participate in or interfere into the 
administrative or operational and routine affairs of the bank. 
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(b) The chairman may conduct on-site inspection of any bank-branch or financing 
activities under the purview of the oversight responsibilities of the board. He may call for 
any information relating to bank's operation or ask for investigation into any such affairs; 
he may submit such information or investigation report to the meeting of the board or the 
executive committee and if deemed necessary, with the approval of the board, he shall 
effect necessary action thereon in accordance with the set rules through the CEO. 
However, any complaint against the CEO shall have to be apprised to Bangladesh Bank 
through the board along with the statement of the CEO. 
 
(c) The chairman may be offered an office-room, a personal secretary/assistant, a 
telephone at the office and a vehicle in the business-interest of the bank subject to the 
approval of the board. 
 
03. Responsibilities of the adviser: 
The adviser, whatever name called, shall advise the board of directors or the CEO on 
such issues only for which he is engaged in terms of the conditions of his appointment. 
He shall neither have access to the process of decision-making nor shall have the scope of 
effecting executive authority in any matters of the bank including financial, 
administrative or operational affairs. 
 
04. Responsibilities and authorities of the CEO: 
The CEO of the bank, whatever name called, shall discharge the responsibilities and 
effect the authorities as follows: 
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(a) In terms of the financial, business and administrative authorities vested upon him by 
the board, the CEO shall discharge his own responsibilities. He shall remain accountable 
for achievement of financial and other business targets by means of business plan, 
efficient implementation thereof and prudent administrative and financial management. 
 
(b) The CEO shall ensure compliance of the Bank Companies Act, 1991 and/or other 
relevant laws and regulations in discharge of routine functions of the bank. 
 
(c) The CEO shall report to Bangladesh Bank of issues violative of the Bank Companies 
Act, 1991 or of other laws/regulations and, if required, may apprise the board post facto. 
 
(d) The recruitment and promotion of all staff of the bank except those in the two tiers 
below him shall rest on the CEO. He shall act in such cases in accordance with the 
approved service rules on the basis of the human resources policy and sanctioned strength 
of employees as approved by the board. The board or the chairman of any committee of 
the board or any director shall not get involved or interfere into such affairs. The 
authority relating to transfer of and disciplinary measures against the staff, except those at 
one tier below the CEO, shall rest on him, which he shall apply in accordance with the 
approved service rules. Besides, under the purview of the human resources policy as 
approved by the board, he shall nominate officers for training etc. 
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Constitution of the Audit Committee of Board of Directors 
(BRPD Circular No. 12 Dated December 23, 2002) 
 
 
Audit Committee of the Board of a bank can play an effective role in providing a bridge 
between the board and management, shareholders, depositors and stake-holders and help 
in ensuring efficient, safe and sound banking practices. Role of the audit committee is 
also important in evolving an effective procedure for financial reporting disclosure, 
developing a suitable internal control system and maintaining liaison with internal and 
external auditors to minimize various business risks. Moreover, new business 
opportunities and increased competition due to globalization of markets, increased use of 
electronics and information technology, increased complexity of transactions, accounting 
standards and regulatory requirements are contributing to essentiality and expansion of 
the role of audit committee. Under the above circumstances, as part of the best practices, 
banks are advised to constitute Board's Audit Committee and the following regulations 
are being issued by Bangladesh Bank for compliance by the banks:- 
 
Overall Purpose/Objectives 
 
The audit committee will assist the board in fulfilling its oversight responsibilities 
including implementation of the objectives, strategies and overall business plans set by 
the board for effective functioning of the bank. The committee will review the financial 
reporting process, the system of internal control and management of financial risks, the 
audit process, and the bank's process for monitoring compliance with laws and 
regulations and its own code of business conduct. 
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Roles and Responsibilities of the Audit Committee 
The audit committee will: 
Internal Control 
(1) Evaluate whether management is setting the appropriate compliance culture by 
communicating the importance of internal control and the management of risk and 
ensuring that all employees have understanding of their roles and responsibilities; 
 
(2) Review the arrangements made by the management for building a suitable 
Management Information System (MIS) including computerization system and its 
applications; 
 
(3) Consider whether internal control strategies recommended by internal and external 
auditors have been implemented by the management; 
 
(4) Review the existing risk management procedures for ensuring an effective internal 
check and control system; 
 
(5) Review the corrective measures taken by the management as regards the reports 
relating to fraud-forgery, deficiencies in internal control or other similar issues detected 
by internal and external auditors and inspectors of the regulatory authority and inform the 
board on a regular basis. 
Financial Reporting 
(1) Review the annual financial statements and determine whether they are complete and 
consistent with the accounting standards set by the regulatory authority; 
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(2) Meet with management and the external auditors to review the financial statements 
before their finalization. 
Internal Audit 
(1) Review the activities and organizational structure of the internal audit function and 
ensure that no unjustified restrictions or limitations are made; 
 
(2) Review the efficiency and effectiveness of internal audit function; 
 
(3) Review that findings and recommendations made by the internal auditors for 
removing the irregularities detected and also running the affairs of the bank are duly 
considered by the management. 
 
External Audit 
(1) Review the auditing performance of the external auditors and their audit reports ; 
 
(2) Review that findings and recommendations made by the external auditors for 
removing the irregularities detected and also running the affairs of the bank are duly 
considered by the management.; 
 
(3) Make recommendations to the board regarding the appointment of the external 
auditors. Compliance with existing laws and Regulations;  
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Review whether the laws and regulations framed by the regulatory authorities (central 
bank and other bodies) and internal regulations approved by the board have been 
complied with. 
 
Other Responsibilities 
(1) Place compliance report before the board on quarterly basis regarding regularization 
of the errors & omissions, fraud and forgeries and other irregularities as detected by the 
internal and external auditors and inspectors of regulatory authorities ; 
 
(2) Perform other oversight functions as requested by the board and evaluate the 
committee's own performance on a regular basis. 
 
Organization 
(1) The audit committee will comprise of 03 (three) members ; 
(2) Members of the committee will be nominated by the board of directors from the 
directors ; 
(3) Members may be appointed for a 03 (three)-year term of office ; 
(4) Company secretary of the bank will be the secretary of the audit committee . 
 
Qualifications of the Member 
(1) Integrity, dedication, and opportunity to spare time for the committee will have to be 
considered while giving nomination a director to the committee; 
(2) Each member should be capable of making valuable and effective contributions in the 
functioning of the committee; 
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(3) To perform his or her role effectively each committee member should have adequate 
understanding of the detailed responsibilities of the committee membership as well as the 
bank's business, operations and its risks . 
 
Meetings 
(1) The audit committee should hold at least 3/4 meetings in a year and it can seat any 
time as it may deem fit; 
(2) The committee may invite such other persons (e.g. the CEO, head of internal audit) to 
its meetings, as it deems necessary; 
(3) The internal and external auditors of the bank should be invited to make presentations 
to the audit committee as appropriate; 
(4) To maximize effectiveness, detailed memorandum to be discussed in the meeting 
should be distributed to committee members well in advance of the meeting to allow 
proper consideration of enclosed papers; 
(5) The proceedings of all meetings will be minuted. 
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Constitution of the Board of Directors in Banks 
(BRPD Circular No. 12 dated 26 April 2003) 
 
 
 
Responsibilities of running the affairs of a bank-company, like other companies, are 
entrusted to its board of directors. The responsibilities of the board of directors of a bank 
company are more important than those of other companies; because in case of a bank-
company it is essential to earn and maintain confidence of the depositors as its business is 
mainly run with the depositors' money. The board of directors shall also have to strive to 
protect interests of its depositors as well as of the shareholders. It is imperative to 
constitute the board of directors with competent and professionally skilled persons and 
limit the number of directors with a view to formulating policy-guidelines and 
supervising business activities of the bank efficiently as well as ensuring good and 
corporate governance in the bank management. Bangladesh Bank deems it necessary to 
issue directives for compliance of the bank company regarding constitution of the board 
of directors and fit and proper test for appointment of directors in the interest of 
depositors and for securing proper management of the bank-companies. Therefore, in 
exercise of the powers conferred by section 45(1) of the Bank Companies Act, 1991, the 
following restrictions have been imposed regarding constitution of the board of directors 
and fit and proper test criteria for consideration and compliance of the appointing 
authority (viz.- general meeting, board of directors etc.) of the private banks regarding 
appointment or reappointment and filling up of casual vacancy of the offices of bank 
directors: 
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1. Constitution of the Board of Directors:- 
a) The board of directors of the bank-companies shall be constituted of maximum 13 
(thirteen) directors. However, the directors of the banks, where the number of directors is 
more than this number, shall be allowed to complete their present tenure of office. 
b) This restriction shall apply to appointment/reappointment of the directors against 
retirement or filling casual vacancy subject to section 15 Ka Ka of the Bank Companies 
Act, 1991. Not more than one member of a family will become director of a bank. For 
this purpose family members shall include spouse, parents, children, brothers and sisters 
of the director and other persons dependent on him/her. 
 
2. Fit and Proper Test:- 
a) The concerned person must have management/business or professional experience for 
at least 10 (ten) years; 
b) (S)he has not been convicted in any criminal offence or involved in any fraud/forgery, 
financial crime or other illegal activities; 
c) (S)he has not been subject to any adverse findings in any legal proceedings, 
d) (S)he has not been convicted in regard to contravention of rules, regulations or 
disciplines of the regulatory authorities relating to financial sector; 
e) (S)he has not been involved with a company/firm whose registration/license has been 
revoked or cancelled or which has gone into liquidation; 
f) Loans taken by him/her or allied concern from any bank or financial institution have 
not become defaulted; 
g) (S)he has not been adjudicated a bankrupt by a court; 
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h) (S)he must be loyal to the decisions of the board of directors. However, in case of note 
of dissent, (s)he may record it in the minutes of the board meeting and/or bring it to the 
notice of Bangladesh Bank considering its merit. 
 
3. A person, proposed as a candidate for the office of director, shall furnish along with the 
consent letter for the purpose of section 93 of the Companies Act, 1994 a declaration as 
per the attached format that (s)he is not disqualified to become a bank director in 
accordance with the above mentioned fit and proper test. 
 
4. The declaration shall have to be signed by the concerned person (candidate) and if 
elected it shall have to be forwarded to Bangladesh Bank by the Chairman of the board of 
directors. 
 
5. The above-mentioned restrictions for qualifications of bank directors shall be in 
addition to any related laws/regulations for the time being in force. 
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RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT OF CEO AND ADVISER 
BRPD CIRCULAR NO. 15 DATED SEPTEMBER 03, 2002 
 
 
Sub-section (4) of Section 15 of Bank Companies Act, 1991 empowers Bangladesh Bank to issue 
regulations requiring bank companies to obtain prior approval of Bangladesh Bank in respect of 
appointment as well as dismissal, release or removal of Chief Executive and Adviser in bank 
companies. In bank management, the issue of good governance is very important. In order to 
strengthen the financial base of the bank and obtain confidence of the depositors, appointing 
honest, efficient, experienced and suitable Chief Executive is one of the responsibilities of the 
Board of Directors. In order to ensure good governance the following rules are issued for 
compliance of the banks replacing the previous instructions in this respect: 
 
1. Moral Integrity: 
 
In case of appointment to the post of Chief Executive /Adviser, satisfaction in respect of the 
concerned person should be ensured to the effects that: - 
a) (s)he has not been convicted by any Criminal Court of Law; 
b) (s)he has not violated any rules, regulations or procedures /norms set by any Controlling 
Authority; 
c) (s)he was not associated with any such company /organization, registration or licence of which 
has been cancelled or which has gone into liquidation; 
d) (s)he has not been disqualified to be the Chairman or Director or Chief Executive of any 
Company 
2. Experience and Suitability : 
a) For appointment as Chief Executive, the concerned person will have experience for at least 15 
(fifteen) years as an active officer in bank or financial institution and at least for 02 (two) years in 
the post immediate to the post of the Chief Executive of a bank. The tenure of the Chief 
Executive shall be for at least 03 (three) years, which is renewable. For appointment as Adviser, 
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15 (fifteen) years' job experience in bank or financial institution or administrative experience will 
be regarded as eligibility. But, the tenure of the Adviser shall not exceed 01 (one) year. 
b) Higher academic education in the field of Economics, Banking and Finance or Business 
Administration will be regarded as additional qualification for the concerned person. 
c) In respect of service, the concerned person should have high record of performance. 
d) Satisfaction should be ensured that the concerned person was not dismissed from his service 
when he was Chairman/Director/Official of any company; 
e) No Director of the Bank or financial institution or person who has business interest in that bank 
will be considered eligible for appointment to the post of Chief Executive/ Adviser. 
 
3. Transparency and Financial Integrity: 
Before appointment as chief Executive/Adviser, satisfaction should be ensured to the effects that: 
a) The concerned person was not involved in any illegal activity while performing duties in his 
own or banking profession; 
b) (s)he has not suspended payment or has not compounded with his creditors; 
c) (s)he has never been adjudicated an insolvent . 
 
4. Before appointment as Chief Executive or Adviser, prior permission in writing from 
Bangladesh Bank as per provision of Sub-section (4) of Section 15 of Bank Companies Act, 1991 
should be obtained. In order to have such permission, full bio-data and terms and conditions of 
appointment (mentioning direct and indirect payable salary and allowances and facilities) should 
be submitted to Bangladesh Bank. The banks are required to follow the guidelines stated below 
while determining the salary and allowances of the Chief Executive and submitting such proposal 
to Bangladesh Bank: - 
 
(1) In fixing the salary and allowances of the Chief Executive of a bank, financial condition, area 
of operation, business-volume and earning capacity of the bank, qualifications, age and 
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experience of the person concerned and the remuneration paid to the persons occupying same 
position in the peer banks shall have to be taken into consideration. 
 
(2) Total salary shall be comprised of direct salary covering 'Basic Pay' and 'House Rent' and 
allowances as 'Others'. The allowances (e.g., provident fund, utility bill, leave-fare assistance etc.) 
in 'Others' head should be specified in amount/ceiling. Besides, other facilities (e.g., car, fuel, 
driver etc.), as far as possible, shall have to be monetized and thus determining monthly total 
salary, it shall have to be mentioned in the proposal to be submitted to Bangladesh Bank. In the 
proposal, Basic Pay, House Rent, Festival Allowance, other allowances and other facilities shall 
have to be specified in amount in Taka. 
(3) Terms of salary-allowances and other facilities as specified in the terms and conditions of 
appointment cannot be changed during the tenure. In case of renewal, proposal may be made for 
re-fixation of the salary considering the job performance of the incumbent Chief Executive.  
(4) The Chief Executive so appointed shall not get any other direct or indirect facilities (e.g., 
dividend, commission, bonus, club expense etc.) other than the salary-allowances and other 
facilities as enumerated in item no. (2). 
(5) The bank shall not pay any income tax for the Chief Executive, i.e., the Chief Executive so 
appointed shall have to pay it. 
 
5. No person crossing the age of 65 years shall hold the post of Chief Executive of a bank. 
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